Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, June 28, 1967, 5:32 p.m.

219929. Jidda 5498,² 5520,³ 5538.⁴

1. Recent UAR military defeat in Sinai and accompanying area developments, including further Egyptian troop withdrawals from YAR, obviously have implications for Yemen problem. Jidda 5538 suggests these not lost on Royalists and their backers, who may well believe now is the time resume major fighting with maximum chance success in ejecting remainder Egyptian troops and causing downfall Sallal regime.

2. Royalist capabilities remain something of an enigma. They appear recently have scored some success in local fighting around Hajja, but whether they can interdict UAR communications and capture Sanaa would appear highly uncertain. Though reduced in numbers UAR Air Force in Yemen is still unchallenged. Ruthless gas bombings seem to have cowed populace in some areas, and such tribal leaders as al-Ahmar and Ruwayshan seem for moment to have swung toward YARG.

3. Particularly view radical successes South Arabia, UAR may well consider it should remain in Yemen at all costs in order (a) avoid additional loss of face which withdrawal now would mean; and (b) facilitate FLOSY’s takeover in Aden. If UAR is so disposed, and we not in position to tell, new Royalist military effort could well backfire, prompting return more troops and increasing Egyptian military and subversive pressure on SAG.

4. Whether indigenous effort can force Egyptians out remains uncertain, but circumstances have now altered due Israeli triumph. Moreover, we have less to lose vis-a-vis UAR than formerly, should Yemen war intensify in coming months with active Saudi support.

5. Our reiterated counsels restraint on SAG in past were prompted by concern that UAR countermeasures, including occupation Saudi territory, would directly involve USG in view our commitments to Saudi regime. Now, however, even though UAR may still be able maintain itself in Yemen, Egyptian capability for offensive military action against Saudi Arabia would seem to be reduced. It would of course be error for us counsel SAG to “unleash” Royalists, since such palpable encouragement would increase our vulnerability to Saudi appeals were renewed fighting to backfire on Saudis. However, circumstances do suggest we might now be somewhat less emphatic and repetitive in recording our well-known reservations re increased Saudi support for Royalists. This would not substantively change our position but would be tactical modification.

6. Unless you perceive objection, you should be guided by foregoing in your future discussions Yemen problem with senior SAG officials. Suggest you point out, per State 214082,⁵ that we continue believe any action which might prompt brutal UAR military response against Saudi Arabia might be ill advised. However, in absence normal means accurately assessing situation in either Yemen or Egypt, we no longer in position give Saudis as much meaningful counsel on this subject as formerly. In any case, decision re Royalist action obviously one entirely for SAG to take in light all circumstances.⁶

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Drafted by Brewer on June 27; cleared by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow, Davies, Bergus, Battle, and Deputy Director of the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Herbert J. Liebesny; and approved by Katzenbach.
2. In telegram 5498 from Jidda, June 22, Eilts reported that Rashad Pharaon informed him that during the recent crisis several Arab states had urged Faisal to settle the Yemen problem. The Saudi response had been consistent; the King had indicated that if UAR troops were withdrawn from Yemen, Saudi aid to the royalists would also cease. The Saudis would expect a period of civil war, following which the Yemenis would decide their own government. In the absence of UAR troops in Yemen, Saudi Arabia would accept any government the Yemenis themselves chose. (Ibid.)
3. Dated June 24. (Ibid.)
4. Dated June 25. (Ibid.)
5. Dated June 21. (Ibid., POL 15-1 SAUD)
6. In telegram 5616 from Jidda, June 30, Eilts reported that he had mentioned to Prince Sultan that Yemen seemed to be quiet for the moment, to which Sultan had replied that things were not as peaceful there as it might seem and that he expected the center of attention would soon shift back to Yemen. Sultan also said that the Saudis were maintaining very strong restraints on the Yemeni royalists in spite of their eagerness to resume action. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)