Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

406. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait¹

Washington, August 5, 1966, 5:37 p.m.

22681. Kuwait’s 79,² Cairo’s 569,³ Jidda’s 67.⁴

1. Begin FYI. We gratified at energy and skill used by Kuwaiti negotiators in isolating issues and bringing SAG and UAR so close to agreement. While not surprised Hamid ad-Din issue remains unsettled, we concerned lest it has assumed proportions prevent settlement Yemen dispute for months if not years. We also concerned lest, with apparent interruption of Arab summitry, Kuwaiti mediation might be last chance to reach settlement for a long period to come.

2. We believe both Nasser and Faisal look upon Hamid ad-Din question as key to future of Yemen and basic to survival their own regimes. Nasser believes, not without reason, that Hamid ad-Din’s remaining on Yemeni soil under any guise would make any UAR claims to “famous victory” in Yemen sound hollow. He is concerned lest anything other than reasonably plausible claim of victory raise discontent in UAR armed forces to intolerable level.

3. Faisal on other hand remains so deeply suspicious of UAR motives and distrustful of Nasser that he reluctant to compromise. King has however on several occasions indicated he not wedded to maintenance of monarchical principle in Yemen. His main interest in Hamid ad-Din appears to be tactical one of leverage he can exercise on Yemen situation through them. This attitude most recently reflected in King’s July 6 talk with Ambassador Eilts (Jidda 67) when he expressed fear exiling Hamid ad-Din before completion UAR withdrawal would reduce royalist forces to tribal rabble and give Nasser sole mastery of situation.

4. Given above considerations, both Faisal and Nasser may prefer rock along with present Yemen situation, unpleasant though it may be, rather than make final sacrifice required for settlement. With accord apparently so close and consequences continuation conflict so dangerous to both sides, we strongly hope Saudis and UAR can be persuaded make necessary concessions while agreement still possible. End FYI.

5. For Jidda: You should approach Pharaon and reiterate keen USG interest in successful outcome August 15 meeting with Khouly. Suggest presentation along following lines: a) Forthcoming talks appear to be last remaining possibility within foreseeable future to bring about withdrawal of UAR forces from Peninsula. With agreement between two parties apparently so close, USG cannot believe Saudis would let pass opportunity to get UAR troops out of Yemen, particularly in view of serious threat they pose to future of Saudi Arabia. b) We recognize importance Hamid ad-Din issue for Saudis but wonder whether there not room for compromise even on this point. Would it not be possible for example that banning of Yemeni royal family might be arranged in stages, with exiling of Hamid ad-Din princes being echeloned to parallel withdrawal of UAR forces? (Similar suggestion was made to Ambassador Eilts by Kamal Adham during conversation March 12 (Jidda’s 790).⁵ Yemeni Ambassador Al-Aini broached same possibility in talk with Department Officer August 3.) We have no idea what UAR reaction would be to such proposal and mention it only as illustration that legitimate possibilities for compromise exist. c) Even Yemeni republicans visibly tiring of UAR presence and are actively seeking means of asserting their independence. Once UAR has withdrawn we are confident SAG’s ability establish influence and good relations with Yemeni Government. d) You may also wish reiterate points your excellent presentation to Faisal July 6.⁶

6. For Cairo: Chargé should approach Hassan Sabri al-Khouli or suitable other available GUAR official and state that all parties to Kuwaiti mediation effort have been kind enough to keep us informed of its progress. Seems to us that in current state of affairs in Arab world, Kuwaiti mediation may well be last opportunity to reach honorable settlement Yemen issue for a long time to come. We believe GUAR fully aware of wholesome effect freely negotiated and fully implemented Yemen settlement would have. We urge GUAR overlook no opportunity contribute to such a settlement at upcoming meeting in Kuwait.⁷

7. For Kuwait: You should inform Foreign Minister we making approaches Cairo and Jidda to urge both sides make every effort achieve settlement at forthcoming meeting. You should express our warmest appreciation to Kuwaitis for energy, tact, and skill with which they have pursued this difficult task. We hope for successful outcome August meetings, but would urge Kuwaitis to continue their efforts beyond this if required. A great deal is at stake, in terms of our mutual desire for a stable and prosperous Arabian peninsula.⁸

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Bergus and Korn, cleared by Davies, and approved by Hare. Also sent to Jidda and Cairo and repeated to Taiz, Aden, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.
2. Dated August 2. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 569 from Cairo, August 3, reported that Al-Khouli had confirmed that he would meet the Saudi representative, Dr. Rashad Pharaon, in Kuwait on August 15 to attempt to resolve their last disagreements on Yemen. Al-Khouli had indicated that the only significant remaining issue was disposition of the Hamid-ad-Din family. Both parties had agreed on the name of the provisional government (state of Yemen) and its composition (three-fifths republican and two-fifths royalist). (Ibid.)
4. Document 403.
5. Dated March 12. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN)
6. In telegram 451 from Jidda, August 7, Eilts reported that he met with Faisal, Pharaon, and Saqqaf on August 6 and carried out the Department’s instructions. The King responded that the Saudis had in the past shown great flexibility and been the only party that had genuinely sought to compromise. He stated that he would never agree to specifying removal of the Hamid ad-Din family by name; any exclusion would have to be in general terms of “undesirables.” Second, he would not agree that the Hamid ad-Dins be excluded by any Yemen organ until the last UAR soldier was out of Yemen. Despite Eilts’ urging that he reconsider the last point, Faisal continued to insist that these two points were non-negotiable. (Ibid.)
7. In telegram 683 from Cairo, August 8, Nes reported that he and Parker had met with Al-Khouli that morning and spoken along the lines of paragraph 6 of the Department’s telegram, noting that the United States was making a parallel approach to the Saudis in hopes that he and Pharaon would have maximum flexibility. (Ibid.)
8. In telegram 99 from Kuwait, August 7, Cottam reported that he had met with Sayyid Bishara, Director of the Kuwaiti Foreign Office, who affirmed that Kuwait did not consider this the last and final round, although for tactical reasons it had said so. (Ibid.)