Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, August 12, 1965, 8:02 p.m.

68. Jidda tel 102.² Agree with Jidda’s analysis that our efforts must be concentrated on means deterring UAR attack and bringing Faisal and Nasser to bargaining table. We are not considering dispatch air unit unless serious threat to Saudi Arabia’s integrity develops. Believe there are strong parallels between situation now and that prevailing one year ago when UAR and Saudis were jockeying for military advantage prior to September meeting Alexandria.

For Jidda: In view known unreliability Sultan as channel for information and his past propensity for exaggerating dangers, it important you hear directly from King his analysis situation. In discussion with King you should take following line:

1. You have been given preliminary report by Sultan expressing King’s concern. In view of situation you wished have benefit first-hand discussions with King on what occurring on border.

2. UAR tells us it desires talks with Faisal to reach peaceful solution Yemen problem. We encouraged by Cairo press report that SAG Ambassador Alireza met with Faisal August 11. We continue believe Faisal-Nasser meeting most desirous. What are King’s views on prospects?

3. In response Sultan’s request we can arrange early visit US destroyer to Jidda and speed up future proposed visits. (FYI: Navy has sent separate message to COMIDEASTFOR requesting program for stepped-up schedule visits, with Embassy to be consulted on suitability this schedule. You may inform King of exact date of visit if firm by time your conversation. Navy here estimates a destroyer, not the Fox, could be in Jidda in 55 hours. Destroyer cannot approach closer than two miles to Jizan because of the reefs and shoals. In any event call at Jizan probably unsuitable so long as Saudi aid to royalists continues. End FYI.)

4. FYI only: We seeking high level authorization proceed with planned visit early October reinforced rifle company involving 500 men with own air transport. You should not apprise Faisal of this possibility until instructed. End FYI.

5. Urge King make subject UAR overflights and penetration matter of record with UN. Should again be noted that Saudi case in UN as well as US ability aid Saudis seriously complicated by continued SAG assistance to royalists.

For Cairo: You should seek immediate appointment with appropriate UAR officials (perhaps Al-Khouli and/or FonMin Riad) for discussion on following lines:

1. Pass on Saudi report on occurrences Yemen border (points 1 through 5 of reftel).

2. Emphasize we doing utmost get Faisal agree to meet with Nasser but above forms UAR military pressure make this task virtually impossible.

3. As stated to Nasser by Assistant Secretary Talbot in April, UAR attack on Saudi Arabia could cause very great trouble in US-UAR relations. We strongly urge UAR halt any infringements Saudi territory or air space in order pave way for Nasser-Faisal meeting.³

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Davies, Bunte, General Sibley (J-5), Stoddart (DOD/ISA), Hart, Komer, and Warren; and approved by Handley. Also sent to Cairo and repeated to London, Taiz, Aden, CINCSTRIKE/ CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, Dhahran, CHUSMTM, COMIDEASTFOR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and USUN.
2. Document 374.
3. Telegram 1001 to Cairo, August 13, informed the Embassy that the points in the Department’s telegram had been made to Ambassador Kamel on August 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) Telegram 499 from Cairo, August 16, reported that Embassy senior political officer Richard B. Parker met with UAR presidential adviser Hassan Sabri al-Khouli on August 14 and passed on the Saudi report of border incidents contained in telegram 102 from Jidda. Parker also gave Al-Khouli a paper containing points 2 and 3 of the Cairo section of the Department’s telegram. Al-Khouli contended that the whole business of a UAR military threat was a concoction being spread with the help of the Beirut press and that if the threat were real and Faisal were really interested in negotiating, he would agree to a meeting with Nasser. Al-Khouli noted that so far, he had not done so. (Ibid.)