Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

373. Telegram From the Embassy in Yemen to the Department of State¹

Taiz, August 10, 1965.

34. Ref: Embtel 31.² My two-hour interview with PriMin Hassan al Amri on August 9 was as trying as I had expected and doubtless was embarrassing to the half dozen educated aides who listened to him ranting and me rejecting his distorted statements. He has limited intelligence and is clearly incapable of balanced judgements. He indulged in such extremes as vilifying the United States one minute and shortly thereafter exclaiming “we Yemenis love the U.S. far more than the Saudis do”. After repeating charges such as were included in the Beichman Herald Tribune article (Deptel 28),³ he ended by quoting an Arab proverb that to complain to a friend is to show his love for him, and requesting a U.S. loan for development purposes. He urged me appeal to President Johnson to put a stop to Saudi machinations in Yemen.

The details are best left to a memcon, but I feel I succeeded in setting the record straight and injecting a much needed note of caution into current Y.A.R. and at least local U.A.R. deliberations. (The press and radio characterized our talk as a review of existing “friendly” YAR-US relations.) I was told that the captured American arms are being flown to Cairo as fast as they come in and that a plan is afoot to display them at the UN in connection with a YAR attempt to have Saudi Arabia condemned as an aggressor. I pointed out the damage such a move might do to the Republican cause, and urged peace talks as the only realistic course to pursue.

My talks with a number of other key persons including UAR Amb. Shukri and the top UAR military command showed that they were thinking in similar terms, but have not yet made up their minds as to what they should do next; Shukri said he would have some freshly captured arms for us to inspect in a day or two but acting UAR Commander General Kabir said the details would be given to Embassy Cairo. I urged them to let an Embassy officer here inspect some.

Shukri assured me that no military action would be taken against Saudi Arabia until all possibilities for peace had been exhausted in talks now proceeding. All UAR officials were calm, frank and cordial but made clear they would not indefinitely let Saudi Arabia keep on training and supplying the Royalists with a steadily rising number of US arms without taking action to protect their forces. Kabir asserted there are hundreds of thousands of Yemenis living in Saudi Arabia from which a steady flow of fresh recruits is being sent to fight the republic, with their wives and children being held hostage for their good behavior. (Emb Jidda please comment.) This, he asserted, was clearly aggression, and it was mainly US arms that were being employed. They seemed eager to have our help in stopping the war and reproachful we had not done more. Kabir said Royalists and Saudi spokesmen are broadcasting that the USG is fully behind them and this is having its effect on ignorant tribesmen. All Egyptians asserted their aim was to withdraw as soon as peace was achieved, leaving only a troop training contingent.

If al Amri were the only YAR critic of US policy re Saudi Arabia I would not be so concerned and would be tempted to blame the two suspected Communists (Shahari and Yahya Bahran) in the presidency for most of this anti-US campaign. From my talks in Sanaa over past three days with a variety of people including Arab diplomats, pro-Western Yemenis, UNTAB AmbTinay and Yugoslav Charge Grebovic, I gather that feeling is widespread in YAR circles that we are closing an eye to Saudi actions if not actually encouraging them. Unfortunately the press statement contained in Deptel 22⁴ has strengthened this belief, since it does not single out Saudi Arabia as being involved in supplying Royalists and in YAR eyes seems to imply we will “protect” Saudi Arabia come what may. Much of my time was taken up setting statement in perspective, and Shukri told me YAR has seized upon the reference to Yemenis being left free to determine their own destiny as implying we think that republic should give way to something else since Saudi position is also that Yemenis should have right to “self-determination”, meaning return of Imamate. This was a helpful tip and I made good use of it. I made a bold point of inviting Shukri, UAR Generals and all others to help me set record straight and in almost every case they gave lip service to idea. Grebovic said he would try but it would help him do so if USG made clear it would only protect Saudi Arabia so long as it did not permit its territory to be used to attack a friendly govt which nearly all countries of world recognize.

Grebovic contrasted Soviet and ChiCom policy in Yemen in a manner which is disturbing but should probably be treated with reserve. He said the Soviets were pledged to help republic and would continue to supply needed arms, but only wanted a peaceful, united Yemen which would cooperate in “co-existence”. The ChiComs wanted to escalate the war as much as possible, on the other hand, and he had heard from Yemeni officials that ChiComs had offered as many well armed troops as needed, and would have 10,000 here in a month if requested. YAR had not requested them but its young military men were bitter, ill-informed and desperate, and anything could happen if the US “permitted” SA to continue its present policy. He urged us to pursue our “historic destiny” of ensuring a peaceful, progressive local order.

Comment follows.

Clark

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Aden, London, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Kuwait, Tehran, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. No time of transmission appears on the telegram; it was received at 4:13 p.m.
2. In telegram 31 from Taiz, August 8, Chargé d’Affaires Harlan B. Clark reported that Yemeni Foreign Minister Yaqub had told him on August 7 that after nearly 3 years of futile attempts to persuade the Saudi dynasty to stop committing aggression against the Yemen Arab Republic from bases in Najran and Jizan, Yemeni patience was now exhausted and that it appeared that the only way for Yemen to stop the aggression was to attack those bases. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 28 to Taiz, August 6, instructed the Embassy to make clear to Yemeni Prime Minister Hassan al-Amri U.S. displeasure with the attitude reflected in an August 6 Herald Tribune article quoting his statement that the “US encourages Saudi Arabia to war against us.” (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)
4. Telegram 22 to Taiz, August 4, quoted the Department’s press statement that the United States hoped that UAR-Saudi talks would lead to a situation where the Yemenis themselves would be able to decide their own national destiny free from any outside interference. The Department spokesman also reiterated U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s integrity and said that the United States would deplore any extension of hostilities in the area. (Ibid.)