Office of the Historian

371. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, August 2, 1965.

SUBJECT

  • UAR Sensitivities over Yemen

PARTICIPANTS

  • H.E. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of the U.A.R.
  • NE—H. Earle Russell, Jr.

Mr. Russell expressed our concern about provocative U.A.R. overflights over Jizan and the opinion expressed by the U.A.R. Consul in [Page 699] Taiz that the U.A.R. might broaden the Yemen war if the mission of Hassan Sabri al Kholi were unsuccessful or no progress toward a Faisal-Nasser meeting were made at the September Summit Conference at Rabat. We had the impression that al Kholi might have been disappointed with Faisal’s reaction to his proposal for a Nasser-Faisal meeting. We thought, however, that Faisal did not wish to close the door to such a meeting but might find it difficult to comply with U.A.R. desires for fear of appearing to capitulate publicly to Nasser’s threat of a confrontation. There might be some advantage to re-instituting the U.A.R.-S.A.G. border observation teams disbanded some months ago.

Speaking informally and personally, Ambassador Kamel said that Faisal’s present policy in Yemen was an invitation to trouble in Saudi Arabia that inevitably would affect American oil companies and the U.S. Government. It would be unfortunate if by pulling down Faisal’s house the U.A.R. caused the collapse of its own, but this was a necessary risk. There was hope and speculation in Egypt that the U.S. would use its good offices to convince Faisal of the desirability of working with the U.A.R. for a peaceful settlement in Yemen. A Nasser-Faisal meeting after such U.S. action would be useful. Kamel envisaged a U.S. effort similar to the one mounted in 1963. He stressed the desirability of a U.S. initiative to allay widespread suspicions among the U.A.R. military that the U.S. is seeking to undermine the regime in Egypt. Both the Odell case and the U.S. sales of arms to Saudi Arabia contributed to the conviction that the U.S. was backing Saudi Arabia against the U.A.R. in Yemen.

Ambassador Kamel suggested the desirability of a Battle-Nasser talk to 1) dispel suspicions arising from the Odell case and the Yemen situation; 2) convey to President Nasser the Secretary’s hopes for a PL-480 agreement. A high level approach on these subjects both in Cairo and in Washington about a week before Nasser’s visit to Moscow could have a restraining effect. A similar approach to Nasser through Tito might provide a useful means to reassure high level U.A.R. officials. In this connection, the Ambassador suggested the U.S. make a gesture by granting export licenses for hydraulic pumps ordered by the U.A.R. for use in the construction of the HA-300 fighter. This might provide Ambassador Battle with a useful pretext to call on Marshal Amer and explain the U.S. position in Yemen. While Ambassador Kamel appreciated the delicacy with which we had handled the deferral of a response to the U.A.R. request for these pumps, he felt that, while preferable to outright disapproval, even this might cause an adverse reaction given the sensitivity of the Egyptian army.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Russell.↩