Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

369. Telegram From the Embassy in Yemen to the Department of State¹

Taiz, April 30, 1965, 1200Z.

463. Following are main points made by Mohsin al Aini in my first call on him in his capacity as FonMin:

1. He expressed cordial friendship for US and urged that USG stand by Yemen’s side and help it in this, its greatest hour of trial as well as of opportunity for peace and sound progress.

2. Numan govt represents what Yemen people hoped for when revolution of 1962 broke out, but were prevented from realizing by outsiders. It has backing of entire nation but lacks an army and is beset by many obstacles. He said UAR wants to discredit the group of leaders under Numan and is working hard to see that Khamir conference fails. Al Aini believes conference will succeed and lead to some changes in govt and particularly in powers of presidential council, where Sallal trying thwart Numan’s policies.

3. YARG truly wants peace with SAG and UK and if they will adopt understanding attitude peace will come and UAR troops will withdraw. Yemen wants good relations with UAR but does not want to bow to Nasser’s policy lines. Numan took brave step in dropping post of Minister of Occupied South and is under pressure from UAR to restore it. Numan trying take over radio and press against Sallal’s objections, in effort stop attacks on SAG and temper output on Arab South. He being accused of kowtowing to imperialism and must move cautiously. Faisal and British must be understanding and patient until he wins this battle. He cannot do so if they continue to help Hamid al-Dins, who do not have slightest chance of returning to power. We can help best by convincing British and especially Faisal of this fact. If as UAR hopes SAG brushes off Numan govt it will fall and all Yemen will decide UAR is right in saying Faisal does not want a Yemen at peace. Result would be a bigger war. (In response my question he said all Yemenis want to settle the Yemen question themselves and resent idea it can be worked out by Nasser and Faisal. It is rather for SAG and UAR to acknowledge fact of an all-Yemeni settlement once it occurs. Virtually all Yemeni tribes though not Hamid al-Dins will be represented at Khamir conference.)

4. Al Aini made no specific request for U.S. material aid, but implied one would be forthcoming after Khamir conference. He deplored growing Yemeni dependence on bloc and said there are many hundreds Yemeni students behind iron curtain who will constitute danger to stability when they return. Other hundreds should be accepted by universities in France, UK, West Germany and US. He hoped France would recognize YARG. He reaffirmed YARG would not recognize GDR (Embtel 461) and said I must know it was not Yemeni who organized anti-FRG affairs. Numan govt would submit written apology and make other amends but “not now”.

5. In response my inquiry Al Aini said in view of Numan’s known pro-Western policies and charges circulated by his enemies that he is Western stooge, it would be better for me not to call on PriMin until after Khamir conference. I asked him convey Numan USG’s best wishes for success and other points in Deptel 232,² which he acknowledged gratefully.

6. AID/Y Director John Benz accompanied me to Sanaa and had cordial and useful talks with Ministers of Public Works, Economy, Health and Finance.

Comment: While we are not yet sure UAR policy at least at highest levels, towards Numan govt is as anti-Numan as Al Aini described it, there undoubtedly is campaign to pad Khamir conference with obstructionists and that Numan is facing many obstacles. I agree with FonMin’s assessment of importance Faisal’s attitude, and although it would be miracle if he could be brought to support Numan govt., it is to us equally great miracle that latter has come to power. (One indication that it truly has power is persistent report that UAR high command asked but was refused Numan govt’s permission to bomb Royalists attempting to cut access routes to Khamir conference. Numan said he would rely on guarantees given by tribes.) We earnestly hope SAG and UKG will realize that the present opportunity is a golden one and that if lost is not likely ever to recur. I recommend US do its best in Riyadh and London to enlist the “understanding attitude” Al Aini seeks.

Clark

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, London, Bonn, Aden, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD.
2. Telegram 232 to Taiz, April 20, authorized the Embassy to inform Numan that the United States was pleased at current Yemeni moves to attain greater stability by establishing a broader-based government. (Ibid., POL 15 YEMEN)