Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

363. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, March 9, 1965, 1:32 p.m.

5335. Jidda tels 634 and 638 and Cairo 3059² to Department. Threatened UAR Attacks on Saudi Arabia.

Saudi avowed aid to royalists places US in extremely difficult position. If UAR attacks Saudi territory in strictly military context of Yemen campaign, any US move provide aircraft patrols similar “Hard Surface” opens us to charge giving air umbrella for SAG activities against regime which we recognize in Yemen. (Fact of Iranian assistance to royalists, presumably through Saudis, poses additional complication.) In absence extensive network ground observers, it would be difficult for us give credence any Saudi bona fides that aid not being supplied, if such should be offered as quid pro quo for US air cover. In any event, only really effective form in which we could come to Faisal’s aid would be with US military strength, risking direct US-UAR clash. Saudi direct involvement in Yemen precludes present consideration such action. In these circumstances, must be made clear to Faisal that while we continue concerned with integrity Saudi Arabia, our commitment does not extend to providing defense against UAR attacks within framework Yemeni military campaign directed at armament dumps for royalists on Saudi territory. Despite fact Faisal claims he acting only in interest self-defense, we not ready give him this degree support in defending such an extended concept of defense. Obviously if UAR attacks expanded to other parts of country we would be required review our position.

At same time, agree with Jidda we should make clear in Cairo our continuing grave concern at any extension conflict in Yemen which would endanger Saudi integrity. Realize we have little leverage with Nasser, but in wake Haikal’s threatening remarks on resumption attacks on Saudi Arabia it imperative we make certain UARG under no illusion about our continued concern for Saudis.

For Cairo: You should make following points at as high level in UARG as possible, perhaps Ali Sabri or Fawzi for passing to Nasser:

1. US was heartened by events following Nasser-Faisal conversations last September which seemed indicate Yemen on road to peaceful solution and to government acceptable to all Yemenis. Subsequent breakdown of ceasefire and apparent narrowing of YARG popular base have been discouraging.

2. Continued massive UAR troop presence Yemen is cause of concern by Faisal and has been steady source friction in US-UAR dealings since withdrawal undertakings made in connection Bunker Agreement.

3. US continues be greatly interested in support integrity and independence Saudi Arabia and views with concern continuation bloodshed Yemen, threatened increase armed action there and possible expansion of conflict to Saudi Arabia.

4. US would view with great seriousness any extension UAR military activities to Saudi airspace or territory as indicated by Haikal (Cairo tel 3002).³ Such action would be further aggravation present US-UAR relations.

5. US urges UAR, and is similarly urging SAG, to resume discussions with Saudis for resumption of ceasefire in Yemen, perhaps strengthening joint patrols, and ultimate settlement by Yemenis themselves, as reportedly planned following Erkowit conference.⁴

For Jidda: Request you have full and frank discussion with Faisal in response his query for definition US attitude, making following points:

1. The oft-repeated US concern with Saudi integrity continues unabated; our friendship is of long standing and highly cherished by US.

2. As stated in past, US continues willing come to Saudi assistance against unprovoked attack. However, we frankly believe that continued Saudi material aid to Yemeni royalists can be considered provocative. With continuance such aid, US hard put to justify within world-wide framework any military reaction to assist SAG in face UAR attacks against purely military targets in Saudi territory near Yemen border. US can scarcely provide military umbrella for continuation Saudi support of a movement against the government in Yemen which we recognize. If UAR attacks should spread elsewhere in Saudi Arabia we naturally would review our position.

3. As evidence US interest in Saudi defense, US made technical survey air defense requirements SAG and presented results to Saudis over one year ago, including recommendations for improving F-86’s currently in Kingdom to enable SAG, pending procurement and delivery new air defense aircraft, develop some defense capability. US offers made at that time, and subsequently elaborated on, to supply interceptor aircraft and related ground environment systems, including training and follow-on spares, are still open for Saudi acceptance.

4. US was encouraged by Faisal-Nasser conversations last September and subsequent Erkowit conference but was disheartened by later breakdown ceasefire and current preparations on both sides for increased military operations Yemen. We are strongly re-emphasizing to Nasser our concern for integrity and independence of Saudi Arabia and our hope for resumption Nasser-Faisal negotiations for peaceful solution Yemen problem. Similarly, we wish emphasize to Faisal our hope he will resume contacts with Nasser—either directly or indirectly—for this purpose. Additionally, we should again warn Faisal about the inadvisability of reinvolving Saudi Arabia directly in support Yemen royalists, pointing out as one example the difficulty with which this faces us in aiding Saudi Arabia in case of attack.

5. If there were imminent or actual UAR attacks on Saudi Arabia, Faisal would probably wish to take matter to UN, giving him forum present his case to world opinion, and marshal such opinion against UAR aggression and in favor of talks between Faisal and Nasser. Hopefully, UN consideration would tend to inhibit further military action and renew pressure for negotiated settlement in Yemen, both of which we assume to be in Saudi interest.⁵

For London: You should inform HMG of above thinking and démarches and request British join us in urging restraint on Faisal. Clearer picture would be helpful of what, if any, commitments British have made to Saudis and of current British attitude and dealings with Yemeni royalists.⁶

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Moore on March 8; cleared by Davies in draft, and by Campbell, George L. Warren (G/PM), Quinn, Judd, Bunte, and Talbot; and approved by Ball. Also sent to Jidda and London and repeated to Taiz, Paris, USUN, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for Ramsey, and COMIDEASTFOR.
2. Telegram 634 from Jidda, March 1; telegram 638 from Jidda, March 2; and telegram 3059 from Cairo, March 4. (All ibid.)
3. Dated February 27. (Ibid., POL ARAB-ISR)
4. In telegram 3439 from Cairo, April 1, Battle reported that on March 31 he had made the points in the Department’s telegram to Deputy Prime Minister Fawzi, who said that the United Arab Republic had also been hopeful after the Nasser-Faisal meeting, but that Saudi Arabia had subsequently stepped up its supplies to the rebels. Fawzi assured the Ambassador that the United Arab Republic desired to settle the matter if it could be done honorably. (Ibid.)
5. In telegram 680 from Jidda, March 16, Hart reported that he had delivered the instructions contained in the Department’s telegram to the King orally on March 14. Faisal had thanked him for the statement of the U.S. Government position, but commented that it contained “nothing new.” He insisted that following the Alexandria conference Saudi Arabia had done everything possible to facilitate UAR withdrawal of troops “without loss of dignity” and that the United Arab Republic and Yemen had broken the truce. Faisal stated that his country was obliged to support the royalists as long as UAR troops remained in Yemen. (Ibid.)
6. Printed from an unsigned copy.