Office of the Historian

358. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts1

Washington, January 13, 1965, 6:05 p.m.

1254. In call January 11 on Assistant Secretary Talbot YARG Ambassador Al-Aini commented as follows:

1.
Written resignation last month Nu’man, Iryani and others had been circulated as clear statement their opposition to UAR; it noted they had tried cooperate all possible ways but had been completely frustrated by Egyptians and that UAR forces were present Yemen only to support corrupt regime.
2.
Al-Aini had just heard reports, which he unable evaluate, that Jaifi, Uthman and al-Ahmar had refused cooperate with new Government; that provinces Taiz and Hajja in revolt; and that some ex-Ministers now jailed.
3.
He had written Sallal indicating general loss confidence in Yemen Government which now prevailed internationally and implying he ready resign if situation continues as at present. (Later commented to Department Officer he purposely vague on resignation, not wishing prejudice position his deputy, Jaghman, whom he had sent via Cairo on December 13 en route Yemen to ascertain facts of situation. Department Officer responded positively to Al-Aini’s hope that we would be willing transmit any messages from Jaghman.)
4.
Al-Aini had approached Ambassadors Algeria, Tunisia, Kuwait, UAR (sic) in US to request their assistance for Yemenis in face UAR [Page 673] takeover, noting that their countries willing interfere such areas as Congo and therefore should be ready help in this Arab problem. He said UAR Ambassador Kamel is “with us”, understands problem and promised report to Nasser.
5.
If appears useful, Al-Aini will visit various Arab capitals to present Yemeni case for freedom from Egyptian control.
6.

Suggested Nasser had full support USSR in preventing establishment any Yemeni Government which capable of running country and not being manipulated by UAR.

Talbot responded that we scarcely able act as arbiter in this Arab problem, but continued make clear to Cairo our concern with Yemen situation. Continuation of our aid program was one way we felt we could be generally helpful. Al-Aini agreed that little more we could do.

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on January 12; cleared by Davies and Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs James J. Blake; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Algiers, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Taiz, Tunis, and USUN.↩