Office of the Historian

353. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts1

Washington, September 24, 1964, 6:40 p.m.

532. In call September 23 on Assistant Secretary Talbot, YARG Ambassador Al-Aini made following points:

1.
In light Nasser-Faisal September 14 communique, hope US will use its influence with both parties to promote a settlement in Yemen.2
2.
Settlement envisaged by Al-Aini personally would involve following:
a.
Elimination of al-Badr; as necessary quid pro quo YARG would no doubt have to expel Sallal.
b.
Conference of up to 300 representatives of various Yemeni elements to be held, preferably outside Yemen (Sudan or Kuwait for example) to preserve strictly neutral atmosphere; group to determine membership new Yemeni Government. SAG and UAR could divert some of their aircraft now used support military activities Yemen to transport the group.
c.
UAR troops to withdraw from Yemen and Saudis to cease interference.
d.
Joint Arab force from countries not involved in dispute might be required in Yemen for limited period of time.
e.
UAR and SAG to devote fraction of their present expenditures on military operations to economic and developmental assistance for Yemen.
3.
Emphasis must be on solution by Yemenis themselves, not imposed by outsiders. Any government not representing real will of Yemenis would not receive required long-term popular support.
4.
Nasser-Faisal communique represents necessary start; but by its recognition that each side has followers in Yemen it shows possible intent of UAR and SAG to play with country, perhaps ultimately dividing it into spheres of influence in opposition to desires Yemeni people.
5.
Concerning southern frontier, al-Aini repeated willingness as stated to UNSYG to establish DMZ, UN observers and even demarcation, provided these part of overall settlement in which British recognize YAR and concede rights of people in south freely to choose own government. (In response subsequent specific query from Department officer, Al-Aini said recognition and provision for self-expression in southern Arabia were the only elements which YAR stood to gain from British since demarcation would mean giving up longstanding Yemeni claims to south; these items would have to be part of ultimate package settlement with British, although not necessarily first step.)
6.

Foreign Minister Sirri has given Al-Aini continued assurance that YARG doing all possible not exacerbate situation on border, although to some extent it is pushed unwillingly in this direction by Egyptians. Example of latter was UAR creation puppet National Front for Liberation Occupied South in violation of al-Aini-Mahmoud Riad agreement that UAR/YAR would deal with all nationalist groups in area. Al-Aini suggested UK-YAR solution to own problems would ease Egyptian anti-British interference in south.

In response, Talbot noted that Yemen problem had reached encouraging new stage with September 14 communique and now, for first time in two years, UAR and SAG talking directly with each other about situation. We hopeful for future and would keep in mind possibilities where we might be able to assist as situation develops.

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on September 23; cleared by Davies, Campbell, and Judd; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Cairo, Jidda, London, Taiz, USUN, and Aden.↩
  2. The joint communique of September 14 declared that the two countries intended to cooperate fully in solving existing differences between the various parties in Yemen and that steps would be taken to establish the necessary contacts with the interested parties in order to reach a peaceful solution to existing differences. Telegram 905 from Cairo, September 15, transmitted the text of the joint communique to the Department. (Ibid.)↩