350. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Mac

We’ve had very strong reply by Faisal (Jidda 177)2 to our counsels of restraint, backed by LBJ letter. In effect, Faisal says that disengagement is dead, UAR presence in Arabian Peninsula puts SA in “mortal danger,” and SA will take all means necessary to prevent royalists from going under.

Hart thinks Faisal (who’s still going to Arab Summit) hopes for some sort of solution but is braced for a showdown. Hart thinks we [Page 662] should play it cool, not show panic or argue with Faisal any more. He and State both think Faisal as well as Nasser is engaging in pre-Summit brinkmanship.

For your amusement, Rusk took seriously Saudi request that US “oversee” Faisal’s flight to UAR, commenting that Nasser is one leader who would stoop to assassination of competing leaders. NEA took great umbrage and did research job proving Nasser had never done so to our knowledge.

We can probably avoid too much Yemen trouble through Arab Summit (say till 8 September), but I’m starting to worry we’ll have a minor flap after that. We’ll do our best.

RWK
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret.
  2. Telegram 177 from Jidda, August 29, reported Hart’s conversation with Faisal when he delivered President Johnson’s letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN)