Office of the Historian

343. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic1

Washington, August 17, 1964, 5:07 p.m.

918. Cairo tel 562,2 Jidda tel 127.3 Continued UN Presence Yemen. It now appears that UNYOM may be at an end, having been all but written off by all parties, including SYG. Concur with Cairo view that Nasser-Faisal understanding is sine qua non of overall settlement. However, continued UN presence Yemen could be especially important catalyst for promoting internal settlement and easing southern border tensions, and could play limited impartial observer role on ad hoc basis. With such broad frame of reference, UN presence could also [Page 650] serve as symbol of commitments undertaken by UAR and SAG in Bunker Agreement, which we consider remains broadly in effect even after departure formal UNYOM observation mission.

While USG willing acquiesce in demise UNYOM, we strongly believe that continuation UN representatives in country with political mandate would thus appear to be in interests all parties concerned.

For Cairo: You authorized approach UARG at appropriate level to urge UAR/YAR support for UN presence, using argumentation above and in ref Cairo tel.

For Taiz: In coordination with Spinelli you should urge YARG to request that SYG establish UN presence. (Understand from Al-Aini that while he reported to Taiz gist his August 13 talk with Assistant Secretary Cleveland—Deptel 52 to Taiz4—he did not request authority ask SYG take action.)5

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-14 YEMEN/UN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Buffum and Symmes, and approved by James P. Grant. Also sent to Taiz and repeated to London, Dhahran, USUN, and Jidda.↩
  2. Telegram 562 from Cairo, August 16, commented that the United States had expended a considerable amount of influence in Saudi Arabia to maintain in Yemen a UN organization that had now demonstrated it was incapable of preparing the way for a solution of the Yemen situation, and emphasized that the key issue in Yemen was the crisis of confidence between Faisal and Nasser. (Ibid.)↩
  3. In telegram 127 from Jidda, August 16, Hart reported that Faisal had told Spinelli that he had no objection to the continuation of UNYOM, but saw no reason to continue paying a share of the costs, since the United Arab Republic was determined to flout the agreement by retaining its troops in Yemen. (Ibid.)↩
  4. Document 342; telegram 384 to USUN was also sent to Taiz as telegram 52.↩
  5. Printed from an unsigned copy.↩