Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, May 7, 1964, 9:08 p.m.

706. We are somewhat concerned at possibility that as aftermath Nasser’s speeches Yemen Faisal may be tempted jeopardize his detente with UAR by resuming aid to royalists or at very least by allowing Saudi Arabia be used as channel for possible future British aid to royalists. Accordingly, suggest at your discretion you make following points with Faisal at appropriate opportunity.

1. Since concern for security of Saudi Arabia was fundamental reason US became involved in advancing disengagement agreement Yemen, we particularly pleased that SAG renewed support for UNYOM² and continues to eschew sending aid to royalists. Full availability SAG resources for sustaining progress of development and reform program is doubtless best investment for security of country against subversive attacks.

2. In view increasing friction on Yemen’s southern border and treatment of that conflict in much of Arabic press and radio as part of Arab liberation movement, security concerns Saudi Arabia would seem particularly served by continuing scrupulously avoid any implication involvement (i.e., assistance to royalists) which would doubtless be interpreted in Arab world in fashion detrimental to Saudi regime.

3. We understand that recent governmental changes in Yemen may bring into office persons who command wider Yemeni support, including perhaps northern tribes. We hope Faisal will encourage royalists to keep open mind to possibilities of compromise with republicans.

4. Renewal SAG-UAR relations has opened way for more stable and fruitful development in area; would be shame if momentum this direction gained at time Amer, Sadat visit Riyadh were allowed lapse. We realize that events connected Nasser’s trip Yemen may have discouraged Faisal from making contemplated journey Cairo. However, our own dealings with Nasser may have relevant parallel: while we frequently have not agreed with UAR policies and actions, we have found it of continued benefit to maintain dialogue with Nasser, leaving avenue open to explore areas of mutual interest.³

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POLSAUD-UAR. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Judd and in substance by Campbell; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo, London, Taiz, and Dhahran.
2. In telegram 1020 from Jidda, May 2, Hart reported that Faisal had agreed to renewal of UNYOM for another 2 months. (Ibid., POL 27-14 YEMEN/UN)
3. In telegram 1052 from Jidda, May 12, Hart wrote that he had concluded that it would be premature for him to make the suggested points to Faisal. When meeting with Acting Deputy Foreign Minister Mas’ud on May 9, however, the Ambassador had dwelt on the opportunities offered by the recent governmental changes in Yemen as suggested in paragraph 3. (Ibid., POLSAUD-UAR)