331. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
Mac—
Rusk’s talk with Butler on Yemen, Aden, and YAR policy is set for next Monday the 27th. So lunch today may be the best time for LBJ to weigh in.
There are signs the British themselves now see the Harib retaliation as involving excessive political cost. It got all the Arabs (not just Nasser) sore at them, and pointed the finger directly at Aden.
Let’s also remember that trouble on Yemen/SAF border is largely result of UK clandestine ops in support of Yemeni royalists.
As for a tougher line toward Nasser, the overriding argument is that it will cost us more than we gain. The Aswan Dam episode and refusal of US military aid in 1955-56 is a case in point. They led directly to Soviet entry into the Arab world, and Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal. We’ve spent some years digging out of that hole; why get into it again.
Sure Nasser is trying to oust us from US/UK bases in Libya and Aden, and opposes us on Israel. But the key point is that our support to him (which goes mostly into the bellies of the fellahin) constrains him from pushing too hard. He knows he has something to lose if he makes too many speeches about Libyan bases (one was bad enough).
We can’t lick Nasser so long as he symbolizes Arab nationalism. So the best way to prolong our hold on our assets is to string him along, not give him a bloody nose. A flexible policy—using carrots as well as stick—best serves UK as well as US interests, and the Fonoff knows this.
Nor does succumbing to Sandysism buy us kudos in London. I’d argue that the British will be more amenable if we growl at them, than if we are apologetic about the Middle East. After all, our record is better than theirs.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Meetings with Butler, 4/64. Secret.↩