State-Defense message. Attached is the preliminary talking paper on
Indian Ocean islands which the British requested from us before
beginning discussions in London on this subject. The Embassy is
requested to review this paper and make any modifications deemed
advisable. Substantive changes should, of course, be referred to
Washington for State-Defense approval before submission to the British.
Otherwise, you should present this paper to the Foreign Office, stating
that we are ready to begin discussions in London on February 25 or
26.
There have been several developments concerning the Indian Ocean since
these talks were first proposed, including the proposed visits to the
area by a carrier task force, and the transfer of theater
responsibilities to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. Any discussions with the British on the Indian
Ocean will logically relate these various elements in an integrated
approach to overall US-UK future
intentions in the area. Therefore, while we have kept the attached
talking paper focused on the original subject of possible small island
bases, we have also inserted some language at the end of it which would
permit us to expand the scope of the talks to the extent that we and the
British are prepared to do at the time.
Attachment
DEFENSE PROBLEMS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA
The United States interest in exploring certain aspects of the
US/UK military posture in the
Indian Ocean area arises from an essentially simple proposition. On
the one hand, we note a variety of threats to the political
stability and security of the area. Among these factors we would
include the existence of massive communist military power north of
the Indian Ocean periphery with the added prospect of Communist
China attaining a nuclear capability in the foreseeable future.
We are also concerned that dissidence among and within the nations of
the periphery could produce local disorders, offering the communists
attractive opportunities for various forms of influence and
intervention. In the Arabian Peninsula, the United States has
important interests in Saudi Arabia and has pledged its support to
the reformist-minded Faisal regime. Arab nationalism in the Persian
Gulf Shaykhdoms, which are under varying degrees of British
protection, is becoming a threat to Western interests, particularly
the British. This, coupled with the fact that the Persian Gulf area
is the largest source of petroleum available to the West on
financially acceptable terms, makes the Peninsula a key area which
warrants our joint attention. There is also the problem of
Malaysia.
We assess these threats against the acknowledged interest of the West
in maintaining the general stability of the area and the
independence of its governments from Communist Chinese and/or Soviet
domination. Since the end of World War II the UK has provided the predominant Western military forces
in the area, and it is expected that this will continue. The US,
however, believes it is desirable to examine ways and means of
improving, even on an austere basis, the overall Western military
posture in the Indian Ocean.
On the other hand, we are conscious of serious potential difficulties
in the application of US military influence in the area, should this
ever become necessary. The circumstances in which such a decision
might be taken, and the level of force required under any set of
conditions, are, of course, not fully predictable. Such factors as
the nature of the particular threat, the practicability of seeking
concerted action under UN auspices, and the requirement for reserve
capability to meet simultaneous contingencies elsewhere would all
demand consideration at the time. It is clear, however, that once a
decision was made to bring military force to bear, its application
should be swift and decisive.
The area itself does not possess, for example, indigenous forces or
support systems capable of protracted defense against a determined
external challenge. This would increase the urgency of any response
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we decided to make, and
in this respect difficult problems can be foreseen. The difficulties
lie largely in the great distances over which operational units and
their follow-on support would have to travel. Even more important
would be the possibility that even these long routings could not be
politically assured, but might be beset by possible complications
such as refusal of overflight rights, terminal air facilities, or
the denial of passage through Suez.
We are currently studying various ways in which these potential
difficulties might be alleviated. For a variety of reasons, we are
not now considering the continuous deployment of forces or the
establishment of extensive facilities within the area. We feel that
such an approach is outside the scope of our present defense
resources, considering the demands of other theatres. We are,
therefore, focusing on less conspicuous ways of supplementing and
facilitating the employment of the highly mobile air, land, and
naval forces on which we would expect to rely. In this regard,
studies are in progress on the possible use of vessels as floating
depots in forward areas, and on the possible prestockage of
equipment at key locations for subsequent marrying with mobile
combat units which might be deployed into the area under various
contingencies.
In this context, we are particularly interested in the potential
usefulness of a number of strategically situated Indian Ocean
islands under British control. It is not possible to predict, apart
from the specific circumstances of a case, how various governments
on the Indian Ocean periphery would react to US or UK military operations in the area.
However, it is evident that strategic locations on the continental
mainlands might be controlled preponderantly by regimes which were
not, or could not appear to be, sympathetic to any active Western
military presence. Thus, we cannot assume that in any military
operation we might undertake in the area we would have adequate
access to staging or support sites on the periphery. This makes it
important, in our view, to keep available wherever possible those
island locations which could be put to the military service of the
West in an emergency without delay, negotiation, or political
restraint. Such locations might then be used on an “as is” basis
during a spontaneous contingency, or for the development of austere
staging or other facilities in a pre-emergency period. It is
believed that certain of the Indian Ocean islands under British
control might lend themselves to such planned or pre-arranged use.
They do not appear to us to be capable of supporting serious
independence movements and probably are too remote and culturally
isolated to figure plausibly in the plans of any mainland
government.
Examples of the island locations we have in mind are those in the
Chagos Archipelago and those administered as part of the Seychelles
Colony, but lying outside the main Seychelles group (Coetivy, Ile
des
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Roches, Aldabra). Our
concern with the future availability of such islands for possible
contingency use is, of course, distinct from our more immediate and
concrete interests in the satellite tracking station now operational
in the Seychelles and an Indian Ocean communications station (in
which regard we have requested authorization to conduct a survey of
the Chagos Archipelago).
We believe that the exploration of this total problem could usefully
proceed in both military and political discussions. We envisage the
military talks as encompassing a joint assessment of (a) the
potential military threats confronting us in the area, (b) general
plans for the use of forces and facilities existing in the area, and
for bringing additional force to bear as necessary, and (c) the
potential military value in a contingency situation of the various
Indian Ocean islands. In connection with (c), a joint UK-US military survey of promising
island locations may be desirable.
At the political level we would anticipate discussing (a) the
prospects for long-term retention of various of the Indian Ocean
islands for use in various forms by our military establishments; (b)
arrangements which it might be suitable and feasible to make now for
this purpose, including arrangements to minimize exposure of these
islands to decolonization pressures being exerted in and through the
UN; and (c) the local political and economic impacts of any military
utilization of such islands. On the latter point, we would wish
initially to have the British participants, given the more extensive
British experience in the area, identify the specific problems which
might emerge, and suggest for consideration ways in which these
problems might be handled.
We envisage that the talks will focus primarily on these islands. In
addition, we would be prepared to discuss generally the related
aspects of such4
developments as the forthcoming deployment of U.S. Naval units into
the Indian Ocean and the new responsibilities of the U.S. unified
command CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.
In view of the current indigenous reaction to recent unfortunate
public revelations of US intent to periodically deploy an attack
carrier task force into the area as well as of our interest in
exploring the possibilities of providing for support facilities
there, it would be hoped that the substance of the talks can be
closely held.
