Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

326. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, April 9, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Resolution on the British-Yemen Air Strike

The disputed resolution on the British-Yemen air strike has three parts. The first condemns reprisals in general as contrary to the Charter. The second deplores the British attack on the fort at Harib on March 28. The third deplores all other actions by any party which led up to the British attack.²

Stevenson argues that we must support the resolution because: (1) we have a consistent record of opposition to reprisals and strikes of this sort; (2) this particular strike was out of all proportion to the provocation, although the provocation was real; (3) the impact of abstention will be very severe in the Middle East and in the UN where we need support from many of those who will be most outraged—especially Africans, Arabs and Asians; (4) Stevenson has already spoken against the British action, with State Department approval,³ and his own moral position (a matter of deep interest to him) will be affected.⁴

Rusk argues equally strongly the other way: (1) Rab Butler has fought a determined fight against the hard-liners in the British Cabinet to prevent a veto and to secure a British abstention;⁵ (2) the provocation is more sustained and serious than Stevenson recognizes; (3) the U.S. itself may have to respond to provocations of a more serious but technically similar sort either in Cuba or in Vietnam; (4) We have other business pending with Sandys which makes this no time for a Suez-type reaction from hard-line British Tories.

My own reluctant but clear recommendation is as follows: (1) we should abstain; (2) we should go in very firmly to Home to say that this is a one-time act of loyalty which we could not repeat in parallel circumstances, because in our view the reaction, on which we were not consulted, was excessive and imprudent; (3) we should find a way of making it known that we have abstained in order to help prevent a veto, in order to support the wise Butler against the foolish Sandys, and because of an underlying feeling that these resolutions totally miss the real issues involved.

We should also seek to have the “good British” help us somewhat by explaining that their abstention indicates less of a sense of righteousness than a veto would have done, since they are in fact accepting passage of the motion.

McG.B.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yemen, Memos, Vol. I, 11/63-6/64. No classification marking.
2. The draft resolution, submitted to the Security Council by Morocco and the Ivory Coast on April 8, also called upon Yemen and the United Kingdom to exercise maximum restraint; and requested the Secretary-General to try to settle the outstanding issues in agreement with the two parties. (UN doc. S/5650)
3. For text of Ambassador Stevenson’s statement before the Security Council on April 6, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 713-714.
4. In a 10:59 a.m. telephone conversation with Rusk on April 9, Stevenson declared that he could not abstain on a resolution that condemned reprisals and attacks and called for restraint; he argued that no one would respect the U.S. moral position any longer. The Secretary responded that it had been a considerable battle to keep the British from voting against the resolution; he noted that the British position in South Arabia was very important to us and that they needed U.S. help in this situation. If the United States voted for this resolution, it would undermine reasonable and moderate elements in London and make it difficult to get British help in other matters. Stevenson reiterated the moral importance of this. Rusk said that he felt strongly about it and would advise the President to abstain. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Rusk Telcons)
5. In a 10:02 a.m. telephone conversation with Rusk, the British Ambassador, Lord Harlech, that Foreign Secretary Butler had gotten the Cabinet to agree not to veto the resolution. The Ambassador said he was very disturbed at the fact that having gotten the Cabinet to agree to abstain, the United States and France would not abstain with Britian. If the United States did not abstain, it would create a most deplorable situation in Britain. (Ibid.)