Office of the Historian

324. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, March 30, 1964.

Mac—

You asked the other day what gestures we could make toward the Arabs. One smart move would be to show we aren’t in sympathy with UK’s foolish Sandys style Arab policy.

Most of us accept that Nasser’s 22 February speech reference to Libyan bases2 (which triggered current mess) was a reaction to Home’s Ottawa remarks about Suez. Note also that UAR has nationalized two UK oil companies (pour encourager les autres?).

British covert support of Yemeni Royalists is breeding dangerous reactions too. Now Brits, in response to UAR/YAR border fiddling (which has killed only camels so far) have made retaliatory raid on a Yemeni fort.3 This over-reaction will lead to much greater Arab pressure on UK, and us too unless we stand aloof.

Our man in Yemen urges (Taiz 549)4 that we cease representing the UK in Sana’a, as a gesture of disengagement. Talbot and I quite agree (it’s a small, low-key gesture that would get little if any publicity, but be read correctly in London, Cairo, and Sana’a).5 But Rusk is so-so on this. If opportunity offers, put in a word. The Brits will lose us Wheelus if we’re not careful.

RWK
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret.↩
  2. On February 22 UAR President Nasser made a speech declaring that no country could claim independence unless the foreign military bases on its territory were liquidated. The Libyan Government subsequently announced that it did not intend to renew the treaties whereby the United States and the United Kingdom maintained bases in Libya.↩
  3. British jets attacked a fort in the Harib area of Yemen on March 28 in reprisal for a March 27 attack from Yemen into South Arabian Federation territory.↩
  4. Telegram 549 from Taiz, March 29, urged that the United States cancel its British representation function in Yemen and argued that it would be more effective as a relatively disinterested party rather than in its present role, which was interpreted by many YARG officials as that of lawyer for the United Kingdom. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ADEN-YEMEN)↩
  5. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “RWK. I doubt that we should do this [at] this moment. McGB”↩