322. Memorandum of Conversation1
Washington, March 10,
1964.
SUBJECT
- Yemen
PARTICIPANTS
- Prince Abdul Rahman ibn Yahya, leading member of Hamid al-Din family
- Mr. Ahmed Zabarah, ex-Yemeni Charge d’Affaires
NE—Rodger P. Davies
NE—Talcott W. Seelye
The Prince covered familiar ground in presenting the royalist case to Mr. Davies, including the following:
- 1.
- The presence of an Imam in Yemen is essential to both the Zaidis and Shafeis. In the absence of an Imam as temporal-spiritual head of Yemen, the people are staying away from Friday prayers. (In response to a query, the Prince stated that while the Imam does not have to be drawn from the Hamid al-Din family, no other family qualified for the position has sufficient stature or the appropriate personality.)
- 2.
- The new Imamate, unlike its predecessors, is enlightened and seeks to introduce reform and modernization to Yemen. It would look to the United States for guidance and assistance.
- 3.
- The royalists cannot participate in a republican-led, UAR-supported coalition government, particularly while UAR troops remain in Yemen, since to do so would only reinforce the UAR position by enabling the UAR to claim to the world that it enjoys full Yemeni support, thus permitting the UAR to bring about a UAR-YAR federation.
- 4.
- Evidence of the UAR’s determination to remain in Yemen, as well as its deceit, is exemplified by the following recent incident: In response to a request from the UN transmitted via Saudi Arabia the royalists “opened” an important road artery in Yemen in order to allow the UAR to “withdraw” some of its troops from outlying areas; however, instead of withdrawing troops, the UAR took advantage of the situation to attack the royalists.
Mr. Davies restated the USG position, including the following:
- 1.
- We seek similar objectives in Yemen, i.e. the withdrawal of foreign military forces, peace and security in Yemen, and Yemeni self-determination.
- 2.
- The creation of a broader-based Yemeni regime offers the best hope for effecting a drawdown of UAR troops in Yemen sooner rather than later.
- 3.
- The failure to achieve a coalition-type regime in Yemen risks the danger that the UAR will be induced increasingly to take over running the YAR government machinery down to the provincial level and to add to its military forces in Yemen. (The Prince noted that the UAR is already “running things,” notably security, and told of a British correspondent who was able to see Vice President Al-Amri only in the company of two Egyptian officers.)
- 4.
- Our impression is that the UAR resists the proposal that the YAR be federated with the UAR. We understood that the UAR turned down earlier efforts by Sallal to bring about such a federation.
- 5.
- He reported his conversations in Yemen last October with Vice President Al-Amri and UAR General Qadi and noted General Qadi’s apparently genuine interest in helping develop Yemen.
- 6.
- He noted the recent suggestion that the UAR military force in Yemen be replaced by an Arab League force. (The Prince opposed this idea since he assumed such a force would be composed only of troops from pro-UAR countries. However, he would not oppose the dispatch of a “neutral” UN force.)
The Prince handed Mr. Davies the Arabic original, together with an English translation, of a letter from Imam Badr to President Johnson.2 He expressed the hope that the letter would be transmitted to the President. Mr. Davies assured the Prince that he would see to it that the letter reached the White House.