Office of the Historian

320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic1

Washington, January 27, 1964, 7:48 p.m.

3430. Jidda’s 755 to Dept;2 Deptel 3306 to Cairo;3 Cairo’s 1649 to Dept.;4 Jidda’s 772 to Dept.5

While noting there are hopeful indications certain Arab League countries are promoting further UAR-Saudi contacts, we share Embassy Jidda’s view that UAR-SAG relationship insufficiently improved to warrant our ignoring opportunity play catalytic role. We have repeatedly urged reconciliation and profferred our assistance in connection therewith. Also SAG no doubt reposes most confidence in USG middleman role. We inclined believe best prospect for inducing Faisal agree to detente lies in following Saqqaf’s stategy.

Accordingly, unless you perceive strong objections, request you (1) make known to GUAR fact that Ambassador Hart has seen Saqqaf, who in reply to Ambassador’s question stated SAG is now ready discuss matters in general with GUAR but without prescribed agenda and is ready to welcome anyone from GUAR to SA, (2) convey as much of material contained five numbered-paragraphs Jidda’s 272 to Cairo6 as you deem appropriate.

Ball
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UAR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Seelye, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Jidda, London, Taiz, and Dhahran.↩
  2. In telegram 755 from Jidda (sent as 272 to Cairo), January 20, Ambassador Hart reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf had requested U.S. assistance through the U.S. Embassy in Cairo to make known to the highest level of the UAR Government that Saqqaf was ready to discuss matters in general with the UAR Government and was ready to welcome a UAR emissary to Saudi Arabia. Saqqaf asked that the U.S. Government make the following points: (1) after Faisal’s recent visit to Cairo, the United Arab Republic should have no inhibitions about sending a top level emissary to Saudi Arabia; (2) the emissary should be “a truly important figure”; (3) both sides should start the talks with the concept that the Yemen problem could not be solved except by UAR-Saudi agreement; (4) there should be private talks between the UAR team and Saqqaf before and after each session with Faisal; and (5) several meetings would be required. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Dated January 21. (Ibid.)↩
  4. In telegram 1649 from Cairo, January 22, Badeau argued that the Embassy saw little profit in the proposal in telegram 755, noting a previous occasion when the United States had obtained UAR agreement for private bilateral talks with Saudi Arabia only to have the arrangement vetoed by Faisal. He recommended that the U.S. Government not involve itself in this question unless it received a direct request from Faisal. (Ibid.)↩
  5. Dated January 26. (Ibid., POL SAUD-UAR)↩
  6. See footnote 2 above.↩