295. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
5305. 1. Thus far SAG has stood up admirably to Arab pressures sever relations with US. We have had private (but official level) assurances that King does not intend do so. But we should not take Saudi [Page 563] position for granted. Much will depend on USG actions these next few weeks indicating continued US concern for Arab interests. In Saudi Arabia, as elsewhere in Arab world, our prestige and influence have suffered as result of recent hostilities and belief is widespread that stunning Israeli victory somehow attributable to US. It behooves us urgently to do what we can to arrest adverse trend and begin difficult climb try to regain broader Saudi confidence. For this purpose various US actions desirable, viz:
2. Continue strictly even-handed policy on conflicting Arab-Israel claims. While some rationalization of some Arab-Israel boundaries may be justified and ultimately necessary, emphasis should be on credibility USG assurances at highest levels re political independence and territorial integrity Arab states as well as Israel. Rightly or wrongly, some of our statements have been viewed as equivocation here and as unwillingness to speak up forcefully to criticize Israel. Anything we could do to show that even-handedness applies censuring Israel as well as Arabs, where this justified, will be helpful here.
3. Continue USG programs of support for SAG in military and other spheres. Specifically, continue Corps Engrs cooperation on TV, military cantonment and SAMP programs. Also willingness proceed with RAMP if Saudi wish. Especially helpful would be early release of long expected Sidewinders for F-86 aircraft. Equally important continue USMTM advisory effort. This is a somewhat delicate subject since at moment most USMTM activities in limbo. We should discreetly be there ready to continue help Saudi military as wanted, yet for the moment not seek to push ourselves on reluctant Saudi military recipients. We have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports indicating many Saudi officers severely critical of US, along with others, for Arab debacle and we will doubtless face difficult job reestablishing rapport with them. It will take patience and understanding on part of all USMTM officers and men.2 Desalination project should continue.
4. Urge American firms continue do business here as usual, facilitate return to Saudi Arabia of their absent employees, and proceed with existing programs. Most heads of American firms have expressed willingness do so. We have done utmost keep American citizens calm during crisis and ensure adequate protection for them. It has not been easy for American citizens. However, generally speaking, they have [Page 564] cooperated splendidly. Barring renewed breakdown Saudi security situation, we hope this may continue.
5. Early initiation of widely publicized program of relief for Jordan. King and SAG have focused on this point. Any such action on our part would be consistent with SAG’s activities. Admittedly we will receive only minimal credit for any such program and many Saudis (and other Arabs) will argue it represents blood money. Still such program would show our concern for Jordan’s welfare.
6. Continue to hammer away at denials of UAR and other Arab accusations of US collusion with Israel in recent conflict. Unfortunately as result years of radio Cairo “conditioning” many Arabs want to believe worst of us, but it is essential that we actively refute all charges. All such refutations should be given fullest and continuing publicity in Arabic using VOA and perhaps BBC assistance. We were slow in starting our denials last week, which made problem more difficult. Would also recommend that in addition to US invitation send UN observers to Sixth Fleet, a request to do so might carry some impact here. Job of disseminating our denials exptremely difficult. We are having great difficulty getting USIS material published these days, hence much will depend on outside broadcasts.
7. Avoid placing King Faisal in position these next few days or weeks where he required show excessive public identification with US. However, where possible, look for ways of showing that his past policy of friendship toward US pays off, not only for Saudi Arabia but for other Arabs. It is distinctly in our interest at present time to push Faisal and other Arab moderates’ causes in Arab community.
8. Continuously and quietly appeal to Saudi self-interest, this must largely be done here, but occasional helpful support may be given from outside.
9. At appropriate time resume encouraging King on need for reform program. In current Saudi mood of frustration over Arab military defense, growing sentiment appears be developing among young Saudis that an accelerated political and social reform is needed. Ironically, it also painfully evident during recent crisis that only reliable elements loyal to SAG and willing protect Americans were not young, would-be Saudi reformers, Saudi military officers or potential Saudi progressives, but National Guards comprised of strictly tribal types. King and Saudi establishment doubtless keenly aware of this and likely be more reluctant than ever move ahead.
10. Seek to be actively responsive these next few weeks to any emergent Saudi requests for help, e.g., police training, educational advisors, etc. we should try in all such instances minimize our administrative red tape and show we ready to move without delay.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 US-SAUD. Confidential. Repeated to Dhahran, London, DOD, CHUSMTM Dhahran, CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA, and Rabat.↩
- Telegram 5260 from Jidda, June 12, reported Prince Sultan’s assurances that the men, women, and children of USMTM would be looked after like he would look after his own family, and that the Saudi Government would provide full compensation for all losses. Sultan had also said that the soldiers and civilians who had participated in the rioting and looting were now in jail and would be punished severely. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)↩