Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

288. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 12, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Near East South Asia IRG Meeting
• Wednesday, 12 April 1967
• U.S. Commitment to Saudi Arabia

1. The State² and Defense papers prepared for this meeting have previously been sent to the DD/I and ONE. What follows is the report of the IRG/NEA meeting chaired by Ambassador Battle.

2. Before turning to the agenda item, Ambassador Battle said that he was “IRG-minded,” wishes to continue the active use of the IRG, desires to have the IRG participate in policy formulation when possible and always to be informed of what is going on.

[Here follows discussion of another subject.]

The USG Commitment to Saudi Arabia

5. The White House (Harold Saunders) thought the President’s statement to Faysal during his last visit—“we will not let that fellow (Nasser) gobble you up”—was probably the best point of departure for examining our USG commitment to Saudi Arabia.³

6. In a lengthy discussion there gradually evolved a consensus that: (a) the USG commitment was to preserve the integrity of a regime in Saudi Arabia that was friendly to the U.S. and prepared to assist the U.S. in protecting its interests, (b) the USG was not committed to the Saud regime, to Faysal as an individual, to the Monarchy as such or to the protection of the geographical area of Saudi Arabia, (c) it would be unwise to define the specific types or acts of aggression which would lead the USG to the decision to act to protect the Saudi regime and (d) the viability of the Saudi regime, the internal political and security situation and the impact of aggressive actions on the stability of the regime would always have to be considered, ad hoc, in evaluating a current threat.

7. We noted that the UAR air attacks on Nejran, Jizan and Khamish Mushayt combined with the psychological impact of the parachute drop near Yenbo and the weakness of King Saud’s regime had led the USG to the decision to put Hard Surface into Saudi Arabia. At the same time, we took note of the improved internal security situation and the social-economic progress under Faysal as being related to our low-keyed reaction to more recent aggressive actions by the UAR, including air attacks and the terror bombings carried out by Yemeni trained by the UAR in the Yemen.

8. Initially, there was evident an inclination to limit our IRG examination to overt military threats; in the course of discussion I drew upon the history of President Kennedy’s recognition that friendly governments are more often threatened by subversion, sabotage, propaganda, terror etc.—all of which led to the building of the massive house of cards known as the “counterinsurgency” programs and that the Chairman of the IRG was explicitly the inheritor of this residual “Special Group CI” responsibility. It seemed to me that the Chairman had a special responsibility, stemming from NSAM 341,⁴ to examine the non-military threat to Saudi Arabia as well as the U.S. military commitment based largely on an overt UAR military threat. This comment led to questions and discussions about the nature of “insurgency” in the Peninsula; Hoopes (ISA/Defense) wondered whether we were able to detect foreign influence and distinguish foreign-influenced “insurgency” from genuinely nationalist pressures for change. Also, he wondered if there was any evidence that externally-influenced insurgency was growing in the area. I responded that in Saudi Arabia, as elsewhere in the area, one found a local variety of nationalism, a second with the Cairo coloration and a third with a Soviet overlay. Watching foreign influence move into genuine nationalist forces in the Peninsula and the Gulf was, I said, like watching a tide come in; every time you looked the water was a few more feet up the beach while here and there one discerned deeper pools that had filled more rapidly—Aden for example. This produced a general discussion of our posture in a number of Middle East countries where “insurgency” problems were a factor, what we were able to do, where we fell short etc. The USG actions on Jordan after the Samu raid by the Israelis in November 1966 was reviewed as having some relevance to the problem of Saudi Arabia. Ambassador Battle expressed some surprise at the extent of the USG actions in Jordan, including the crash program to help the security authorities and the measures aimed exclusively at the attitudes of the military. From Cairo, he had missed much of the traffic on all but the military assistance package.

9. Turning to the question of U.S. capabilities to respond, Ambassador Battle sought the views of the JCS and the State Arabian Peninsula Director, William Brewer. Brewer thought we should now reenforce COMIDEASTFORCE with two destroyers, keeping them active in the Red Sea as a deterrent. JCS, supported by the majority of the members, thought we should either do nothing right now or start planning to put a carrier force into the area. Ambassador Battle asked a number of highly relevant questions about the availability of forces, time factors etc. The JCS offered no specifics but thought that a carrier force was not available and that the USG would be hard-pressed to put much into the area. It was noted that CINCMEAFSA and JCS maintain a Middle East Plan and that the CCPC had done a study on a Saudi-UAR confrontation. Ambassador Battle asked to be briefed on these. The IRG finally agreed that at this time no decision to move U.S. Forces into the area should be sought.

10. There was some discussion about the courses of action open to the UAR and what UAR current intentions vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia seemed to be. I suggested that the most likely course of action would be an attack on the Hawk Battery in Jizan—most likely by a guerrilla attack such as that at Pleiku. We might be thinking about what we would do if, say, eight or ten of the Americans at Jizan were killed in such an attack.

11. There was also note taken of the general trend toward “mercenaries” in the area—ranging all the way from the British and French mercenaries in the Yemen to the employees of Air Work and Raytheon who were fairly exposed. Also, note was taken of the trend among the Turks, Iranians, Saudis, Jordanians, Paks and others to collaborate in military matters—outside of any arrangements with the USG and in particular in the pooling of arms procured from non-U.S. sources.

James H. Critchfield ⁵
Chief, Near East and
South Asia Division

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01580R, DCI Executive Registry Files, IRG. Secret. Drafted on April 17.
2. Document 287.
3. See Document 275.
4. See footnote 3, Document 271.
5. Printed from a copy that indicates Critchfield signed the original.