276. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- President’s Meeting with King Faisal
PARTICIPANTS
- King Faisal
- Prince Sultan
- Dr. Rashad Pharaon
- Ambassador Ibrahim al-Sowayel
- The President
- Mr. Walt W. Rostow
- Ambassador Raymond A. Hare, NEA
- Ambassador Hermann F. Eilts
- Mr. George C. Moore, NEA:NE
- Mr. Howard Wriggins
- Mr. Isa Sabbagh (Interpreter)
(The President and the King rejoined the others in the Cabinet Room after over one hour’s private session.)2
The President said they had had a delightful talk together. They spoke of what they both hope to do in the development field, of US interest in the integrity of Saudi Arabia, of events in Southeast Asia, of possibilities for use of the World Bank, of their mutual problems with Communism and their attempts to build up their own systems as bulwarks. He said he did not know when he had so enjoyed such a visit and that he and the King had established real rapport. He said the King had expressed his views during the first part of their talk and that he had spoken during the second part. The King now had some comments to make.
The King emphasized that he was fully aware of US good intentions, good will and willingness to support Saudi Arabia. He was so reassured of the US position that he felt he should apologize for having even thought there was a need to mention it.
The King’s major question related to our joint concern over the danger Communism presented for the whole world and for the Near Eastern area, which in turn could have great ramifications for the rest of the world. Communism was like a germ which, if allowed to grow, ultimately destroyed the whole body. South East Asia was a good example. It was his personal view that if firm decisions had been taken there in 1954 the present sacrifices of the flower of American youth would not be necessary. He recalled that many people, even in the US, used to refer to Mao Tse-tung as merely a reformer.
The President interjected that we still had deluded people, the Near East had no monopoly on these.
The King continued that where situations, such as Vietnam, develop as the result of views of such naive, misguided people, it was lamentable when firm measures were not taken sufficiently early. While he does not favor the principle of military intervention, the US position is clear. It must intervene in all areas to stop the growth of such problems in their infancy.
The President said that the 170,000 US casualties since World War II were proof of our interest in stopping such developments.
The King, after expressing deep appreciation for and sympathy with the US for such sacrifices in US lives, urged that we not allow such a development as Vietnam to be re-enacted in the Near East. The King referred to the President’s remarks about the Saudis cooperating with others in the area to stem the tide of Communism and stated that [Page 529] such was precisely his aim, whether on the Arab or Islamic level, to make people conscious of this danger.
The King, referring to the President’s comments concerning US-UAR relations, asked that he not be considered as advocating that we not aid any needy people, Arab or otherwise. It was up to the US, on the basis of its expertise, to determine how far it wished to go with such aid. He was sure that the US was aware of the need to help countries which were still young, to enable them to resist the still-immature Communist danger and eradicate it. He emphasized that he was not referring to Saudi Arabia. The question of US assistance in various ways to Saudi Arabia is one strictly between the two of us. He found it lamentable to hear so many people saying, “If you want help from the US, the quickest way is to speak out against the US.” This of course was not true, but was frequently said and influenced a great majority of the people.
The King referred to the President’s remarks on Yemen concerning the avoidance of provocative acts such as helping the royalists. He wished strongly to reassure the President that since signature of the Jidda Agreement he had done nothing provocative. It was the other side which had continued provocative actions. (The President interjected to say that he had spoken of the climate for a settlement being enhanced by the King’s continued restraint, not resuming arms shipments and such.) The King continued that he wished only to show that there were only two possible alternatives for the resumption of hostilities: 1) consistent acts from the other side could finally force the royalists to retaliate; or 2) the other side could finally take action on the pretext that they had been provoked. In these cases, what could Saudi Arabia do to establish the fact that it had not undertaken any provocative acts? Saudi Arabia will continue to exercise self-restraint, but developments might force it to take action. This was not to imply that he had anything else in mind, however, other than continued restraint. However, every day that passed with the Egyptians still in Yemen meant one further day of Communist gains there.
The King, referring to South Arabia, said the British had made a major mistake by failing to develop, during the years of their presence, a cadre of competent local personnel who could run the country. Now they had suddenly announced their intent to withdraw completely in two years, including the military base, which left the country with little capability for government. The King was most happy to see independence come to these Arabs, but he feared that chaotic conditions would result. He hoped that the US and the UK could prevent this chaos. All he asked was that the US act to keep external aggression from the area.
Concerning aid to South Arabia, Saudi Arabia was ready to help, just as it was helping the Trucial Shaikhdom of the Gulf, but it did not [Page 530] wish to interfere in local affairs or try to dominate them. The President’s idea of an international aid entity of some type was a good one, but he feared that if it were an Arab Development Bank or some such body it would be dominated by the UAR, Syria or such countries for their own purposes.
Mr. Rostow suggested that to begin development in South Arabia and the Gulf, concentration should be placed on smaller, specific projects. The King agreed that local aid of limited scope was a sound approach.
The King agreed in principle with Mr. Rostow’s view that, for US aid, the first requirement was that the Governments and the peoples in a given area should request our help. But the King said that as a result of the avalanche of propaganda from the UAR, Syria and similar sources, there were few people willing to ask the West for aid. They were afraid for their own lives. Current terrorism in South Arabia, instigated by the UAR from Yemen, resulted in this. The methods pursued by the UAR and Syria there were clearly Communist methods. Not that the people involved are convinced Communists—they are believers in nothing—but their actions serve only to enhance the spread of Communism.
The President noted the recent success of peoples in asserting their rights in the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, and Ghana, and then suggested, because of the late hour, that they continue their talks at dinner and on the following day.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67, Secret. Drafted by Moore on June 22. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid.) The memorandum is Part II of II.↩
- See Document 275.↩