Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

259. Telegram From the Consulate General in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Dhahran, February 20, 1966, 1454Z.

235. From Ambassador Eilts. Contel 234.²

1. After trade mission had withdrawn, King and I had lengthy, two-hour private discussion attended only by Saqqaf. I first conveyed substance Deptel 470 to Jidda³ that President will receive Prince Sultan noon February 21. King expressed real pleasure and outlined background Sultan’s mission as follows:

2. As I knew, King had long been worried about growing Communist threat in Middle East area. Admittedly this threat still largely latent, but something should be done nip it in time before situation degenerates into open conflict as it has in Southeast Asia. He had therefore decided send his brother, Sultan, even though he could ill afford to spare him, in order to convey to the President his deep personal concern and his belief that the USG and SAG cooperate to meet the threat.

3. In first instance, the King spoke of the large number of Soviet and ChiCom technicians in the area. He reiterated his often expressed belief that the UAR is providing a protective screen for Soviet influence to gain foothold and spread. He did not think Nasser is a Communist, but he noted Nasser is ambitious and sometimes allows his ambition to further Communist purposes.

4. It not only foreign Communists, the King continued, but also steady growth of “local” Communists that worry him. Such indigenous Communists have already been identified in South Arabia, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, the UAR, Syria, and elsewhere (he did not mention Saudi Arabia). Here again their strength is still limited, but unless they are nipped now, their capability will steadily grow until they are able to subvert Western interests in the Middle East as well as governments friendly to the West. The King said he hoped Sultan would be able to explain his concern to the President and obtain some reading on how the USG views the problem and what might be done about it.

5. I again reminded Faysal that there is no government which has been consistently anti-Communist as the USG. I observed that greater part of his eloquent disquisition could have been made by an American official. Said I found this encouraging since it again underscored our community of interest in this as in so many other matters. I had in all frankness to tell him, however, that USG does not at present share his view that the UAR is for all practical purposes Communist. We may be worried about UAR tolerance of Soviet and ChiCom presence in various parts of the Middle East, including Yemen, but have had no real evidence to justify suggestion that the UAR deliberately furthering Commie objectives. I hoped we could agree that this was an area where we might have to continue to disagree, but that it not be allowed obscure our very real identity of interest in guarding against Communist subversion. I also hoped it might be possible explore in the future ways in which our two governments could cooperate in combating the incipient Communist threat.

6. King reiterated his belief that UAR is for all practical purposes Communist. Referring to UAR national charter, he claimed it reads like Marxist Communist Manifesto. Entire UAR economy, education, etc. is socialist which King equated with communism. I suggested that while UAR economy might be operated on socialist basis, this was still a far cry from political communism. As far as I aware, UAR has shown no tendency to be any more subservient to Moscow than to anyone else. King disagreed. Nasser and Moscow, he contended, are working together more and more. He professed be puzzled why USG seemed to ignore fact that Nasser and Egyptians largely responsible for introducing Soviet and ChiCom presences into Middle East.

7. King then assured me Sultan’s mission intended present Faysal’s anxiety about Communist threat in general terms rather than in specific Yemeni terms. I said I thought Sultan’s meeting with President and other top level USG officials in Washington could be helpful to SAG in clarifying USG’s assessment of the Communist threat. I reiterated to King that he would never find USG blind to dangers of communism, although USG may differ on some aspects of problem. In this context, I cautioned King not to accept exaggerated estimates of numbers or activities of Soviets or ChiComs in various parts of Middle East without first carefully checking facts. It neither in his nor our interests to try to tackle problem on basis grossly exaggerated figures. Soviet and ChiCom activities in Middle East and particularly Red Sea area may indeed be reaching point where they require closer surveillance, but they have also to be kept in perspective in terms of magnitude and numbers and the intentions of the governments of the area.

8. King reiterated SAG wants USG help to combat Communist threat and expressed strong hope that Sultan’s mission will be successful. In answer my query if Sultan carrying any specific ideas or suggestions, King was vague. I rather suspect about best he may come up with will be do something about Yemeni situation. I hope, however, that we may be able to make some proposal to him calling for joint USG-SAG analysis of Communist threat in Middle East area and ways and means coping with it.

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 SAUD. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Jidda, London, and Cairo.
2. Dated February 20. (Ibid., POL 23-7 NEARE)
3. Dated February 19. (Ibid., POL 7 SAUD)