Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait¹

Washington, December 13, 1968, 1344Z.

286622. Persian Gulf. Following based on uncleared memcon and subject revision on review. FYI only and Noforn.

1. Summary. Amir of Kuwait took up at length with Secretary GOK concern at security situation in Gulf in wake British withdrawal, as well as problem created by Iranian claim Bahrain. Secretary reaffirmed our interest in region and said we would see whether there anything constructive USG might do to help resolve Bahrain issue. End summary.

2. Secretary met with Amir of Kuwait for two hours December 12. Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Minister of Finance/Oil Affairs, Kuwaiti Ambassador to US, Ambassador Cottam, Assistant Secretary Hart and Country Director Brewer also present. Amir referred at outset, as he had with President previous day, to uncertainty as to USG position re Gulf affairs following UK withdrawal.

3. Secretary responded this primarily matter for new US Administration. On personal basis, he noted if there were group Gulf states which arranged give each other mutual support in case attack, any USG support would not have divisive effect which unilateral USG assurances to any one area state would have. Secretary stressed our strong interest in security of Kuwait and recalled USG action in moving destroyers towards Kuwait during Iraqi crisis in 1961. Secretary also noted our continuing support for CENTO, importance of close Iran/Kuwait/Saudi Arabia ties and opined some UK role in Middle East perhaps not ended.

4. Amir asked if USG interests or regional stability in Gulf threatened by outside power would USG take some action. Secretary responded answer to this most solemn question could only come from next President under our Constitution. Personally he would like say yes but this would be like giving check without funds in bank. If there were major Soviet threat, this would no doubt be major East/West crisis involving totality our relations to which we could not remain indifferent. If threat came from neighboring state, then solidarity among Kuwait and its neighbors would provide basis on which outside support might be provided.

5. FonMin explained GOK did not have in mind conclusion mutual defense treaty but rather wished know whether USG interested in regional stability and territorial integrity each state there. Secretary said he could give categorical response. USG was deeply interested both as matter general policy and specific USG interests. Secretary then cited our actions in Middle East since World War II, noting record made clear general policy USG is to support territorial integrity and political independence all states in region. Secretary noted, however, most USG actions to which he referred had reflected general policy considerations rather than specific textual commitments. It one thing to act when situation requires it but, under our system, much more difficult make promises in advance. Thus, though USG has serious interest in independence and security of Kuwait, it constitutionally difficult explain what we might do in specific circumstances.

6. Amir then raised question Iranian claim to Bahrain. Secretary said thing that most concerned American people on such territorial disputes was wishes people concerned in this case on Bahrain. We did not think Iran sought solution by force but there is historical Iranian claim. Secretary hoped “quiet diplomacy” would produce acceptable compromise.

7. Amir said Shah had made clear during November visit Kuwait GOI desire find peaceful solution. Question was how. Amir felt USG help needed. Kuwait doing what it could, such as being instrumental in arranging quiet Iran/Bahrain meeting at Geneva two months ago. Two sides would meet again. Secretary congratulated Amir on this development and said we would be glad examine problem further and see whether we could come up with some constructive suggestions. Amir expressed appreciation and said he hoped we could keep in touch on issue. In response question from Hart, Amir said he believed Bahraini people fully support Ruler. While in principal anything like plebiscite unacceptable, perhaps there could be effort collect info re wishes people, e.g., through some UN mechanism. Minister of Finance noted opposition plebiscite not based on fear outcome but rather that it would be “a form of submission to a claim”.

8. Comment. Kuwait clearly concerned both at future Gulf stability after British go and apparent intractability Bahrain problem. Dept planning take advantage concurrent presence here Ambassadors Meyer and Cottam for full review subject in effort see whether there anything useful we might propose.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 KUW. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Brewer on December 12; cleared by Cottam, Eliot, and Davies; and approved by Hart. Repeated to Tehran, Jidda, London, and Dhahran.