Office of the Historian

208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

Washington, June 7, 1966, 7:14 p.m.

7326. Joint State-Defense message. Ref: Deptels 6906 (Kuwait 191)2 and 6923 (Kuwait 192).3

Begin FYI only.

1.
Following are basic aspects of decision not license sale US arms (including combat aircraft and SAMs) to Kuwait:
a.
Conclusion recently announced aircraft sale to Israel (and anticipated HAWK sale to Lebanon) marks end of a cycle in arms acquisitions Near East where we trying halt added capital weapons purchases. New US sale to UAC member Kuwait would threaten further escalation, renewed pressure from Israel for purchase US arms, and heightened opposition by Congress (where Jordanian and Israeli deals have already brought expressions of grave concern over recent sale of arms to area of tension).
b.
We do not desire introduce US arms into Kuwait in any way which would (1) undermine Britain’s ability perform on its defense commitment to Kuwait, (2) encourage British relinquish that commitment, (3) give Kuwaitis renewed idea of turning to US for defense of country, or (4) result in US-UK friction which could limit our efforts work with British for orderly political development in Lower Gulf or lead to UK hindering our commercial activities in that region. (In long run, anticipate Lower Gulf market will be of greater significance for US balance of payments than sale US arms Kuwait.)
c.
Kuwait revenues enormous but not unlimited. It is of more importance for US world interests to encourage Kuwaitis increase their assistance programs in other countries (e.g., South Arabia) than purchase sophisticated weapons.
2.
At same time, for purpose gaining maximum benefits from UK in connection with collaborative US-UK arm sales Near East under [Page 399] F-111 offset arrangement, or at least some moral credit for an assist in Britain’s balance of payments problem as a means of encouraging accelerated UK payments to US on the F-111 sale, we do not wish categorically inform British or Kuwaitis at this time re our negative decision on US arms to Kuwait. End FYI only.
3.
Request you approach Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Aviation at appropriate level along following lines:
a.
Recently British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean undertook to inform Secretary McNamara of Iranian overtures to UK arms manufacturers, and to sound out US attitude toward UK participation in military sales to Iran. USG appreciates UK consideration and cooperation in this regard.
b.
In similar manner, USG wishes inform HMG that Government of Kuwait has made official requests for purchase of US combat aircraft, and that several US aircraft firms are pressing for approval of export licenses.
c.
US has no desire undermine UK defense commitment to Kuwait through introduction of American equipment, and is willing not press sale of US aircraft. However, request from Government of Kuwait and strong interest of US manufacturers may impel USG give practical consideration this matter.
d.
In these circumstances, we would welcome expression of view by HMG on this matter.
Ball
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 KUW. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Townsend Hoopes, NEA/NR Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs Lieutenant Colonel Billy R. Byrd, Meyers, Officer in Charge of United Kingdom Affairs Thomas M. Judd, and Symmes, and in substance by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations Henry J. Kuss and Dwight M. Cramer (G/MC); and approved by Davies. Repeated to Kuwait and USCINCMEAFSA and pouched to Jidda and Dhahran.↩
  2. Telegram 6906 to London, May 18, instructed the Embassy to approach the British Government and request that it give urgent consideration to meeting Kuwait’s combat aircraft needs. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Telegram 6923 to London, sent as telegram 192 to Kuwait, May 19. (Ibid.)↩