153. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Implications for Yemen Problem of Current Dissidence in Southern Yemen
The serious tribal dissidence which broke out in the People’s Republic of Southern Yemen (PRSY) on July 25 has introduced considerable fluidity in that quarter of Arabia. It could have important implications for solution of the Yemen problem. Dissident groups in PRSY comprise disparate tribal and political elements with apparently little direct outside support. But the Saudis have no doubt privately been [Page 308] giving mild encouragement to dissident exile groups. In the Yemen Arab Republic (YARG), Prime Minister Al-Amri has for more than a month permitted anti-PRSY elements to take up residence in Taiz, knowing full well that they would mount efforts to undermine PRSY.
Parallel to these developments in the PRSY situation have been renewed indications that both the Saudis and the YARG would like to settle the Yemen conflict. The Saudis were notably disheartened by the failure of their efforts last spring to make the Royalist regime more unified and effective. Al-Amri is worried by radicals in his own government and army, as well as by their connections with the NLF regime in Aden.
The resultant situation is both complex and confused. We do not believe that any direct coordination exists between the Saudis and Al-Amri nor do we think the Saudis are in any major way responsible for PRSY’s current turbulence. But one key factor has emerged: both King Faisal and Al-Amri have important reasons for wishing to see the demise of the NLF regime in Aden. Al-Amri may well have calculated that, by permitting PRSY exile groups to operate from Yemeni territory, he would increase his chances of working out some meaningful compromise with Saudi Arabia which would end the longstanding Yemen civil war. It is too early to predict what may come of this, but at least the Saudis and Al-Amri have a common interest in hoping that the Government of President Qahtan al-Shaabi in Aden will soon be overthrown. Should events in PRSY not require Al-Amri to trim his sails in the Aden regime’s direction, the likelihood of some movement on the Yemen issue would seem to be enhanced.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 S YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Brewer on August 2 and cleared by Rockwell. A copy was sent to Austin (INR/RNA). Rusk’s initials on the memorandum indicate he read it.↩