Office of the Historian

150. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)1

Washington, August 2, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • Persian Gulf Study

I refer to your memorandum JCSM 380-68,2 dated 19 June 1968, forwarding a study on the Persian Gulf by CINCSTRIKE and requesting appropriate action to (a) establish a U.S. arms policy for Kuwait and the lower Persian Gulf states, and (b) establish a Defense Attache office in Kuwait.

[Page 304]

Over the past months U.S. policy and possible action in the Persian Gulf after British withdrawal have been carefully considered in the IRG as well as by the appropriate agencies. As a result, the U.S. Government has publicly announced that we should not “fill the vacuum” caused by the British withdrawal. By this we mean we should undertake no new programs in the area nor become involved in the affairs of the small Arab states on the Persian Gulf. Instead, we should continue to concentrate our principal efforts to support Iran and Saudi Arabia. The reasons are several:

a.
We anticipate that the small states and sheikdoms of the Gulf will naturally look to the U.S. to take the place of the British as a thoroughly enmeshed protector, and it is easier to avoid this role at the outset than it would be to extricate ourselves at some later point.
b.
We think that the people of the area, particularly those in Iran and Saudi Arabia, can better manage the situation in the Gulf without additional involvement by the U.S.
c.
We already have a high degree of interest in and close relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. We have in fact just agreed to sell the latter $600 million of additional arms. Therefore, the U.S. should avoid selling arms to the small states in the area and should permit them to rely on the British or other Western European sources for whatever military equipment or other assistance they may require. (In this connection, General Hall of the British MOD recently surveyed Kuwait’s defense forces and found that their materiel requirements were of a low order of priority.) However, even in the event that they turn to non-Western sources for arms, it is preferable that we not become involved in an effort to make the sales ourselves.

I have asked the ISA staff to consider with your office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State the need for a Defense Attache in Kuwait. I will furnish the results of these considerations to you at a later date.

Paul H. Nitze
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Persian Gulf 092, 2 Aug 68. Secret.↩
  2. Document 147.↩