Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

146. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

I-23190/68

Washington, June 12, 1968.

SUBJECT

• The Soviets and the Persian Gulf

1. Long before the October Revolution of 1917, the Russia of the Czars was restlessly seeking warm-water ports in which their shipping would not be bottled by narrow waterways. The last few years have seen a large increase in the Soviet navy and its appearance in the Mediterranean. The last few months have seen expressions of Soviet interest in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and adjacent seas. These latest expressions of Soviet interest in the Persian Gulf have coincided with the recent announcement of the UK that by 1971 they would withdraw their forces from that area, and their protection from the sheikdoms of the Gulf. To the states bordering the Gulf as well as to the Soviet Union, this British statement is practically tantamount to withdrawal, and there has been among the various states and sheikdoms a great deal of confused activity as they seek, ineffectually so far, to rearrange their lives without Great Britain. The Soviets brought a cruiser, a destroyer, and an oiler all the way from the maritime provinces to this area only two weeks ago, and visited Indian, Pakistani, and Iraqi ports, and one Iranian port (the Shah’s invitation reportedly “reluctant”). The Soviet ships are now headed for East Africa. It has been a “Show the Flag” operation highly comparable to the visits paid to ports in the area by our own Mideast Force of three ships, stationed in Bahrein.

2. The significance of threat to the US of these phenomena is being debated throughout the government. Some see these Soviet activities as a large and growing threat to US world-wide interests; others are more inclined to view it only as a natural movement out onto the seas of the world of a large and powerful nation which can now afford that sort of activity. I am more inclined to the latter view, particularly as the Soviet Union whose naval ships are now appearing in these southern waters—although it still does not wish us well—is not the Soviet Union of the 1950s. The Soviet Union of today simply has too many problems at home, with China, with the states of Eastern Europe, and with the communist parties outside the Soviet Union, to be dangerously aggressive in the overt manner of the past.

3. Our view in ISA has been that US policies and actions in the general area of the Persian Gulf should rather precisely correspond to our public statements that we have no intention of “filling the vacuum” left by the British withdrawal. By this, we mean that we should undertake no new programs in the area, nor get involved in the affairs of the small Arabic states that stretch along the southwestern littoral of the Persian Gulf. The reasons are several:

a. We already have a fairly high degree of interest in and close relations with Saudi Arabia (i.e., King Faisal and ARAMCO), and with Iran, whom we have just agreed to sell during the next five years $600 million worth of additional arms.

b. Aside from that, we think that the people of the area can manage their lives better without additional interference from us than they can with it.

c. We anticipate that the small states and sheikdoms of the Gulf will rather naturally look to us to take the place of the British, and that it is easier to avoid this temptation at the outset than it would be later to attempt to extricate ourselves.

d. In effect, we are placing our money on a modern Persian Emperor to keep open the Persian Gulf; and I advocate that we sell arms to no one else on the Gulf except Saudi Arabia. 4. Although it is difficult to make predictions about such matters, my own guess would be that the Soviets have begun a diplomatic game highly reminiscent of the ones played by both the Russians and the Western European powers during the last century. Although we should keep an active eye on our present investments in the area, a fine restraint of exuberant activism would best serve our long-term interests. While it is quite possible that Iran’s “peacekeeping” in the Persian Gulf may become from time-to-time a rather messy operation, I doubt that a large role by the United States would be any more effective—or less messy. I think that we are already sufficiently immersed in Arab affairs with respect to those states immediately surrounding Israel.

Any or all of the above thoughts which you adopt as your own can, of course, be declassified for use as background with the New York Times.

Paul C. Warnke

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Persian Gulf 800, Persian Gulf 1968. Secret. The memorandum indicates it was seen by the Secretary of Defense on June 15.