132. Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State1
VISIT OF BRITISH PRIME MINISTER WILSON
February 1968
PERSIAN GULF
Prime Minister Wilson announced in the House of Commons on January 16 that British military forces would be withdrawn from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. The forces involved, consisting of air and naval units as well as ground troops, at present number 6,000-7,000 men. Some 1,500 men associated with the limited British security commitment for Kuwait may be withdrawn sooner, but the remaining force will probably be lifted out in one operation about three months before UK troops leave the Far East at the end of 1971.
The Persian Gulf littoral comprises both independent nations and dependencies greatly varying in size, economic resources, and power. Two states—Iran and Saudi Arabia—dominate the scene. Only these two, and to some extent Iraq, have any real capability to extend political influence beyond their present borders. One small state—Kuwait—is reasonably stable and secure. The other ten entities—Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial States, and the independent Sultanate of Muscat and Oman—are politically weaker with regimes dependent in one degree or another on British protection.
While the British announcement will give radical political movements in the Gulf a psychological shot in the arm, we do not expect it to lead to any dramatic political changes in the immediate future. Internal security is reasonably sound in most of the Gulf dependencies. Much will depend on the vigor with which the British now move to reassure the local rulers and give credible evidence of their intention to continue political and other forms of support.
In the longer run, stability will depend on whether more viable indigenous political and economic mechanisms can be created, and this will probably only be possible if a greater measure of regional cooperation can be established among the weaker Gulf states. There will be an increasing need for regional mechanisms to allow the have-nots to benefit to some extent from the area’s wealth. Long-range stability will also depend on whether (a) the Iranians and Saudis can be [Page 275] persuaded to restrain their competition for influence in the weaker Gulf states so that orderly political and economic development can take place, (b) the Iraqis can limit their support for radical splinter groups down the Gulf, and (c) the Persian Gulf does not become the scene of proxy activities in larger disputes (e.g., between the US and USSR or between Iran and the UAR).
In broadest terms, the US objective is to prevent the Soviets or Chinese from gaining positions which might help them undermine our strategic interests in the Middle East, and to maintain unimpeded access to Gulf oil on commercial terms. This can best be accomplished by: (a) encouraging the British to maintain as much of their present special role in the Gulf as long as possible; (b) encouraging the Saudis and Iranians, in particular, to settle outstanding differences (sure to be an uphill struggle); (c) encouraging greater regional economic and, as feasible, political cooperation among the Gulf states; and (d) avoiding any undue military build-up by Gulf littoral states while recognizing that some increase in indigenous forces is no doubt inevitable.
While the basic British decision to withdraw UK forces by 1971 probably cannot be reversed, we think we should urge the British to maintain certain elements of their position beyond 1971—particularly in providing leadership and technical assistance for indigenous security forces.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Visit of PM Harold Wilson Briefing Book, 2/7-9/68. Secret. Drafted by Sterner and cleared by Brewer.↩