Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

106. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, October 28, 1967, 1130Z.

1647. Subj: Apprehension of Persian Gulf Rulers. Ref (Notal).² From Seelye.

1. King told UK Ambassador Man in connection King’s criticism UK policy in South Arabia (Jidda’s 1646)³ that Persian Gulf rulers have expressed considerable concern to him re prospect UK will disengage from Persian Gulf as peremptorily as they have from South Arabia. King told Man that he shared this concern and that he was worried also that UK would undercut existing regimes by handing over authority to nationalists prematurely.

2. Man states he endeavored to disabuse King of this belief, assuring King that any UK withdrawal from Gulf would not occur for sometime (Ustaqbal ba’eed). King probed Man as to precisely what this meant. Would it mean next year? Man affirmed that it assuredly did not, but, he confides, he was not authorized to tell King that British have in mind staying at least until 1970. Man endeavored to persuade King that he must have faith in British and expressed hope that King would pass his reassurances along to Gulf rulers. (Man states that political resident Stewart Crawford reports from Bahrein aroused their apprehensions by warning that British will pull out of Gulf sooner rather than later.)

3. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] King acknowledged he had exchanged letters with Zaid re Buraimi but noted that a misunderstanding had developed. He had expected Zaid in initiating correspondence to make specific proposals re settlement Buraimi dispute but, instead, Zaid had asked King to initiate proposals. King had thereupon tossed ball back at Zaid by asking Zaid to make first move.

4. Comments: Ambassador Man expressed belief that he had succeeded somewhat in reassuring King that UK planned no peremptory disengagement from Gulf but he expressed personal reservations re determination of present UK Government remain in Gulf through 1970. Should nationalist uprising occur in Bahrain before then, for example, he doubts whether UK would intervene militarily to support regime.⁴

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Confidential. Repeated to London, Kuwait, Aden, Dhahran, and Tehran.
2. Not further identified.
3. Dated October 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN)
4. Telegram 61726 to London, October 30, expressed the Department’s puzzlement over the reference to British plans to remain in the Gulf “at least until 1970,” noting that a British decision might have been taken that the U.K. Ambassador was not yet authorized to communicate. The telegram noted that the U.S. Government believed that the United Kingdom intended to remain in the Gulf to protect its interests there for the foreseeable future, i.e., well beyond 1970. (Ibid.)