Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

101. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 9, 1967.

US-UK TALKS ON UN AFFAIRS

Washington, August 9-10, 1967

ADEN-YEMEN GAS

PARTICIPANTS

• United Kingdom
  • Ambassador Dean, UK Embassy Washington
  • Minister Tomkins, UK Embassy Washington
  • Sir Leslie Glass, UKUN
  • Sir Richard Beaumont, Foreign Office
  • David Hildyard, Foreign Office
  • Anne Warburton, Foreign Office
  • Stephen Egerton, UKUN
  • Alan Urwick, UK Embassy Washington
• United States
  • Ambassador Goldberg
  • IO Assistant Secretary Sisco
  • NEA Assistant Secretary Battle
  • USUN Ambassador Buffum
  • USUN Ambassador Pedersen
  • NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies
  • Helmut Sonnenfeldt, INR/RSB

Aden Ambassador Beaumont offered to give a briefing on the latest situation in Aden. He said British objectives were (1) to extricate British forces from Aden in good order, and (2) to leave behind a viable and unified independent state. The first objective he described as “imperative”; the second, although less imperative, was one that the British were trying very hard and sincerely to achieve. The HMG offer to provide a deterrent naval force after independence (the date for which, Beaumont said, was still January 9, 1968) was designed to give confidence to the new state. The British would also keep a bomber force on Masira Island and continue to support the Bedouin Legion in the East Aden Protectorate.

The British remained faced with a political deadlock in Aden resulting from the intensification of extremism in Adeni political groupings brought about by outside pressures and the intimidation of the population caused by terrorism. Today it was hard to say who controls Aden. The British believed, however, that the Federal Government, with its backwoods tribal support, represented a genuine political force which would have to be recognized in any post-independence government. The British were having a hard time convincing the UN Special Mission of this. The British felt strongly that the rural component of the population must have appropriate representation in the new government if the new state were not to disintegrate. The danger of giving the urban elements an overwhelming voice was borne out by recent defections from the Federal Army. There was a real danger that if the post-independence government was of an extremist nationalist complexion the Shaikhs would withdraw their forces from the army and civil war would ensue.

The British believed that FLOSY had lost ground to some extent to the NLF in recent months and that the NLF, although still primarily a terrorist organization, was nevertheless developing some political leadership capability. The trade unions, which used to be the most important force in Aden politics, were now split between FLOSY and the NLF. The South Arabian League contained able men but the organization seemed to fall between two stools—not radical enough for the urban nationalists and too radical for the up-country rulers. Also, most of the SAL leaders were in exile.

Beaumont wished to put two requests to the USG in the interest of facilitating the transition to a viable independent South Arabian state. First, it would be helpful if the US could make some kind of statement in support of the territorial integrity of the new state. Secondly, it would also help if the US could in the near future make a decision to offer some kind of economic assistance to the new state. The British appreciated the problems that the US would have in extending economic aid of any magnitude. However, even a token gesture along these lines would help to steer the situation in a constructive direction. The aid offer would not have to be specific, and it could be directed to the newly-created state rather than to the present government. HMG itself was planning to extend economic assistance to the new state in the amount of $140 million spread over three years.

Beaumont emphasized that the British adhered to their timetable for withdrawal from Aden. In fact the withdrawal of military forces was slightly ahead of schedule.

Ambassador Glass said that so far as the UN Mission was concerned HMG’s objectives were to achieve a caretaker government which would provide for a cooling off period and a coalescing of political forces. The original effort of the Mission had been a great disappointment to the HMG. Now British efforts were concentrated on keeping the Mission from “becoming a nuisance.” In recent days the Mission had become somewhat more constructive. HMG had hoped that the nationalist political groups would agree to meet with it in Geneva but FLOSY had now said it would not, and the NLF had done likewise. High Commissioner Trevelyan had urged that the Federal Government send representatives to meet with the Mission.

Responding to the two British requests of the USG, Ambassador Battle said that both would pose difficult problems. This would be particularly true in terms of Congress, which recently had expressed criticism of our extending our commitments to additional territories. We would look into the question of whether our existing statements concerning support for the territorial integrity of the states of the area could somehow be defined to include South Arabia. On aid, he did not wish to leave the British with unjustified expectations. Given existing pressures on foreign aid generally, it would be difficult for the US to do anything substantial in South Arabia. Perhaps some technical assistance would be feasible. Ambassador Battle assured the British officials that their requests would receive careful consideration.

Use of Poison Gas in Yemen

Ambassador Beaumont said there were two aspects to this issue. First, the UAR’s use of poison gas, now pretty well established, had shocked people on humanitarian grounds in Britain. Secondly, it seemed to offer an opportunity to attack the double standard that prevailed in the Afro-Asian world whereby the “imperialist” powers came under constant criticism for “atrocities” but apparently the Afro-Asian states could never commit any sins. Ambassador Beaumont saw an advantage in raising the issue in various forums so as to bring some pressure to bear on the UAR to stop this practice and also to adopt moderate policies generally in Yemen.

Ambassador Glass said unfortunately the Arab-Israel conflict had made it more difficult to condemn the UAR for its use of gas. Such a move could now be labelled by the Arab extremists as an anti-Arab tactic. The most feasible tack might be to get the GA’s third Committee to consider a general resolution condemning the use of gas (without specifying the UAR). The trouble was the Third Committee tended to be erratic. The General Assembly had adopted a resolution in 1966 condemning the use of gas in wartime, and it might be possible to introduce another resolution extending this condemnation to use under any circumstances. This resolution had been dealt with in the First Committee with disarmament questions.

Ambassador Battle said it was difficult for us to do anything in the UN when the parties most directly concerned were unwilling to push a charge against the UAR. Of late the Saudis had not been willing to break Arab solidarity by pushing this issue. At present we didn’t see any other group that would be willing to take the lead on it. Sir Patrick Dean wondered whether the Scandinavians might not play this role. He pointed out that the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers would be meeting in a week or so and that perhaps the UK and US might wish to stimulate them to take the lead on this issue. Mr. Sisco said he was doubtful that they would, adding that one problem with bringing up the gas issue in the GA was that it might tend to unify Arabs on the broader Arab-Israel question.

Ambassador Goldberg said that personally he had been shocked at the use of gas, and that American public opinion was outraged. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the US because of Congressional and private pressures, not to make some move. However, he saw that the US could not bring the issue up formally but he thought we should actively stimulate either the Scandinavians or the Latin Americans to raise it. Mr. Sisco said that as a fallback position we might want to organize certain states to take the lead in preparing documentation on the case. It was left that the US and UK delegations in New York would consult on the matter inter alia to consider means of moving ahead if Saudi Arabia remained reluctant to give active support. It would be necessary to be in touch with the Scandinavians and the Saudis.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Secret. Drafted by Michael Sterner (NEA/IAI).