Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

45. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, April 20, 1964.

SUBJECT

• United States Policy Toward U.A.R.

1. You asked me to take a hard look at our U.A.R. policy. Toward this end a good many man-months of effort have already gone into the National Policy Paper on the U.A.R.,² the current draft of which substantially supports our policy approach. The attached summary and abstract (Tab A)³ represent the latest version of the policy paper, which is now to be circulated to members of the U.A.R. Working Group for further refinement. Ambassador Badeau addressed himself to this same subject in a recent letter to the President (summary and text at Tab B).⁴

2. I would like an early opportunity to give you a brief oral summary of our policy review. In view of S/P’s responsibility for the U.A.R. National Policy Paper, I have asked Mr. Rostow to accompany me.

The Problem

3. Whether we can better protect and advance United States interests in the Near East (Tab C)⁵ by continuing our present policy toward the U.A.R., including active dialoguing and substantial economic assistance, or by seeking to restrict Nasser’s freedom of action by, in effect, cutting off his rations. In-between measures would bring all the disadvantages of the present policy without any of its advantages.

Discussion

4. Most U.A.R. policies that we and our friends find troublesome relate to Israel, Western bases in the Near East, or intervention in neighboring countries. All three are regional perennials, and the first two, at least, are widely shared by other Arabs.

5. On these and other issues the U.A.R. has the political and economic power, independent of United States assistance, to jeopardize United States and British interests in the region if it should determine to do so. With all its weaknesses, it remains the most populous, most powerful, and most influential of the Arab states, with a capability not only to move but also to lead other Arab states against Western interests. Cessation of United States aid would not adequately reduce this capability. (Tab D)⁶

6. Constructively, benefits have been derived from our policy of recent years, when we have successfully moderated pressures against our major interests through our dialogue with the U.A.R. (Tab E)

7. Advocates of the “get tough with Nasser” policy fail to realize that we already appear to the U.A.R. to have embarked on this course. The relevant factors include the virtual freezing of new assistance since mid-1963, the Gruening-Farbstein amendments, the attendant personalized attacks on Nasser in Congress and the press, the assassination of the President, and the reactions to the two Johnson speeches. In the atmosphere of the Arab Summit and our support for Israel’s diversion of the Jordan, these developments have provoked anxiety as to constancy of United States policy and an Arab public posture of truculence toward the United States and the West.

8. During our effort in the mid-50’s to roll Nasser back by confrontation, the damage done Western interests, as then perceived, was enormous. It was then that Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, brought in a massive Soviet military and economic presence, pressed a hard anti-Western line throughout the Arab world, and accented a leftist neutralism that supported Castro, Lumumba, and extremist movements elsewhere. Since 1961 the balance has been substantially different.

9. The Near East is now being swept by the forces of revolutionary modernization. Since the Arab peoples viscerally identify the status quo with the West, the West is a natural target for their frustrations. In any confrontation between the two, the Arabs have the built-in strategic advantage of contesting on home ground, where Western military superiority is nullified by the nuclear stalemate and the force of neutral opinion. In a contest confined to political and economic action, the West could do serious damage to Arab interests (Tab G), but at the same time the Arabs could do unacceptable damage to Western interests (Tab F). In a struggle between the Arab states and the Western powers, the Soviets would be the only winners.

10. At the present juncture, a challenge to the U.A.R. will be a challenge to the entire Arab world. Our vulnerabilities in the area and the capabilities of U.A.R. propaganda are such as to facilitate conjunction of anti-United States and anti-Israel sentiments and to consolidate the Arabs against us, not only in the eastern area but also in North Africa. On the Israel issue, there is no possibility of emergence of a countervailing Arab grouping.

11. We have enjoyed influence and a degree of immunity from pressures throughout the region in recent years; the challenge of a policy change could reduce our position in the area to the confines of a “Fortress Israel” surrounded by a hostile and increasingly powerful Arab world. U.A.R. pressures could be mounted against civilian overflight rights (access to Africa, Middle East, South Asia), United States commerce (half a billion dollars a year), United States oil interests (a billion dollars a year in direct benefit to the balance of payments), United States presence generally, and against any trend toward eventual accommodation between the Arabs and Israel (Tab G).

12. A policy change would polarize the Near East, with the Arabs solidified into an anti-Israel, anti-American bloc cooperating with the Soviets facing a United States-supported Israel.

13. Nasser has not cast his lot with the Soviet bloc, nor has he turned implacably anti-West. On the contrary, there is evidence that the U.A.R. desires to straighten out the tangled lines of our relations. Propaganda on the Wheelus issue has tapered off, U.A.R. officials have told us that about March 27 anti-United States commentary in Egyptian media was enjoined, and Nasser volunteered to Robert Anderson on March 20 that the single most important question in his mind is improved relations with the West.

Conclusion

U.A.R. objectives include reduction of the military threat it perceives from Israel, and eventual elimination of western military bases from the area where the U.A.R. has paramount influence. We need to retain the Wheelus base through 1970, and our policies in the Near East are premised on an eventual accommodation between Israel and the U.A.R. Our assistance program provides the carrot which can restrain or contain action. Without it, we will not be able to maintain meaningful relations with the U.A.R. Without it, we stand to promote Arab militancy toward Israel and to expose our base rights to perhaps overwhelming pressure in the period of need.

Aside from this element of U.A.R. economic need and our ability to satisfy it, we also have other interests in common: mutual opposition to Soviet expansionism, development of commercial and economic intercourse, and the strengthening of Arab independence and Arab will to resist foreign encroachment.

We are not concerned merely with the U.A.R.’s capacity to do grave damage to our interests in 1964. To my mind, the most compelling objection to jettisoning our present policy is that it offers the best prospect for building a durable position for the United States in the Near East in the years to come.

To facilitate cooperation, the United States should try to avoid involvement in area disputes not threatening its interests directly, accord Arab states access to United States markets, financing, and cereal surpluses, and provide positive support to development programs. We should seek to maintain constructive exchange with the U.A.R., reaffirming our area interests and our willingness to continue economic assistance provided the basic United States position in the area is not challenged.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Talbot, Davies, Duncan, and Curtis F. Jones and concurred in by Rostow. Sent through Harriman, and Macomber (AID/NESA) was informed.
2. The National Policy Paper on the UAR has not been found, but a summary in outline form and an abstract are attached to a copy of Talbot’s memorandum, ibid.
3. The tabs are not attached. Copies of Tabs A through C are attached to the copy of Talbot’s memorandum cited in footnote 2 above.
4. See Document 5.
5. Tab C is an unsigned, undated paper entitled “U.S. Interests in the Near East (In Approximate Order of Importance.”
6. A copy of Talbot’s memorandum dated May 4, one of a set of copies of the memorandum made for wider distribution, is filed with a complete set of tabs, including Tab D, “U.A.R.’s Base of Independent Economic and Political Power;” Tab E, “Benefits Derived from U.S.-U.A.R. Cooperation, 1960–1963;” Tab F, “U.A.R. Intentions and Capabilities to Move Against American Interests;” and Tab G, “Western Capabilities of Political and Economic Reprisal Against the Arab States,” all unsigned and undated. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Egypt)