Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, April 22, 1964, 6:51 p.m.

4953. Deptel 397 Amman, 809 Tel Aviv, 4343 Cairo.² In meeting with King Hussein April 15 Assistant AID Administrator Macomber urged King give favorable consideration Criddle proposals. Recognizing political difficulties acceptance could pose, Macomber suggested King depict his move pick up waters from power plant pool as unilateral assertion Jordanian rights. Noting Arab Summit Jordan diversion plan may never come to fruition he pointed out Criddle proposals could yield water within year—without King’s having declare himself against Summit plan.

King said he had taken lead in trying keep Arab leaders standing by Summit decisions; acceptance Criddle proposals would mean he himself would be “going off the reservation.” Macomber suggested he could portray Criddle proposals as interim step to fellow Arab leaders. King wondered about US financing Mukheiba dam and heightening of East Ghor canal walls. He was told USG backing for Mukheiba not possible because it inconsistent with 1955 plan. Similarly we could not assist in raising East Ghor walls unless this project integral part measures carry out Unified Plan. Macomber assured King Maqarin dam would have strong behind the scenes support USG and expressed hope GOJ would move swiftly get engineering and financing for this project.

King conceded Criddle proposals and Unified Plan would give Jordan more water than Arab plan and promised he would go back and take another hard look at proposals. Said he remained skeptical about Criddle proposals and would have to discuss with “other Arab leaders.”

For Amman: Believe King has keener appreciation technical advantages Criddle proposals and has acquired idea of tack that might enable him to carry off politically his acceptance. It clear however in King’s conversation with Talbot April 16 (Depcirtel 1950)³ he far from convinced Criddle proposals wise. You should not press King on this matter after his return though you should be ready discuss if he raises it. Would seem best continue assure his most influential technical and political advisors are fully conversant our views. You should continue give this high priority.

For Cairo: If King actually consults other Arab leaders re Criddle proposals, Nasser will probably be among them. In view Salim’s hostility proposals and his apparent role in determining King’s earlier negative reaction prospects we could sweeten atmosphere in Cairo seem dim. Dept officers recently have taken line with Amb Kamel that Unified Plan represents only means insure Israel respects Arab rights and that Summit statesmanship has shown signs of turning into spite and menace. Kamel appeared taken with idea Unified Plan which safeguards Arab water rights should not be thrown away. He said he would report along these lines to Cairo. Does Embassy see any prospect mitigating UAR hostility at least to degree assuring silent UAR acquiescence GOJ acceptance proposals?

For Tel Aviv: King told Macomber he convinced Israelis already dumping salt water into Jordan. Do you have any info to substantiate this charge? You may inform GOI that in spite negative tone King’s remarks on Jordan waters in public here, he did not completely bar possibility re-examining components technical formula. We still consider essentials Criddle proposals alive but believe further time necessary for maturing of ideas we have planted.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Heywood H. Stackhouse; cleared by Macomber, Donald A. Wehmeyer, and in draft by Davies; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Amman and Tel Aviv and repeated to USUN.
2. Telegram 397 to Amman, March 19, also sent to Cairo as telegram 4343 and to Tel Aviv as telegram 809, expressed regret that Jordan and the UAR rejected the technical formula on Jordan waters but indicated hope that it might still be possible to obtain acceptance of its components. The telegram instructed the Embassy in Amman to continue discussion with the Jordanians of the realities of the problem and of the course of action that would best advance immediate Jordanian interests. (Ibid.) For text of the technical formula, see footnote 5, Document 11.
3. Circular telegram 1950, April 19, summarized the conversation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 JORDAN)