Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

41. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 15, 1964, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The United States and Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Acting Secretary of State Ball
• Assistant Secretary of State Talbot
• Ambassador Duke
• Ambassador Barnes
• Mr. Robert Komer
• H.M. King Hussein of Jordan
• H.E. The Minister of Court Hazem Nuseibeh
• H.E. The Foreign Minister Anton Atalla
• Ambassador Juma

The President opened the conversation by presenting the King a volume of colored photographs taken during the King’s visit, commenting with a laugh that on the basis of the hospitality and good will reflected in the pictures it was going to be hard for the King to demonstrate to his Arab colleagues the diminishing interest of the U.S. in the Arab world, which he was quoted in the press as having mentioned in his address that noon. The King quickly denied that he had said any such thing and added that he was very upset that such a story could appear in the press. It was completely contrary to everything he felt. Exchanges such as those he had had in Washington could do much to erase doubts and establish a level of good will that would extend through future relations.

The President said the truth of the matter was that the USG is interested in and concerned with the future of the Arab people and would continue to be in the future. Of course there would always be some people who would seek to misinterpret our position but he could assure His Majesty that there had been absolutely no change in policy by the present administration. We had no intention of being friends of one country at the expense of another but would always strive to deal with each one equally. The King said he was very pleased with the exchange of views which had taken place and if at any time in the future some misunderstanding should arise he would be glad to exchange personal messages in order to avoid having a serious problem develop.

The President then said that it was important for the King to bear in mind that the amount of help which Jordan received from sources other than the U.S. would affect what we were able to do. Within the limit of the resources which Congress makes available he stood ready to help Jordan. The Secretary of Defense had already discussed military assistance. We were also ready to help with economic assistance. He hoped the King would assure the Arab world that this was our attitude. At the same time he should realize that Soviet aid to the Arabs did influence the Congress and could have a bearing on the level of resources made available to the Executive Branch and therefore on our ability to render assistance.

The King said he was very grateful for this statement and he knew that President Nasser would be too. Nasser had asked the King to convey his greetings to the President and he personally wanted to express the hope that U.S.-Arab relations could in the future be close. The President said that he wanted to be able to do more than at present but the Congress wanted to do less. It was true that we had very heavy taxes and a very large national debt. The answer to our level of aid would be some agreement between the Executive and the Legislature, but the conduct and actions of foreign governments could do much to influence the range of this agreement.

The King said that Jordan remained deeply grateful for everything which had been done and continued to do the best it could with the resources which it had. For instance, various reforms had been instituted in the budget and fiscal side of the government. A new 7-year development program was being initiated with the object of reducing Jordan’s need for external assistance. The rate of taxation in Jordan was the highest in the Arab world but even so they had just proposed a bill providing for reform of the income tax. Domestic expenses had been frozen for the past two years while government revenues had been pushed up about 10% per year. This was Jordan’s response to American aid.

As for the Communist problem the King said he did not today consider this a threat to the area. It had been a problem in the past but there was now a relaxation of tension which had reduced the threat. Jordan had accordingly established relations with the USSR. There had been times in the past, he said, when he did not know whether Jordan could survive. Now he felt in a more secure position. He wanted to thank the President again for his kindness in inviting him on this visit. From time to time he welcomed the opportunity to tell the Arab side of the story and he believed this kind of frank exchange could assure friendly relations between their two states in the future.

The President said he appreciated this comment and wanted the King to assure all the Arabs that Johnson is just as much their friend as Kennedy was. Our desire was for peace and good will. He referred again to his Weizmann Institute speech and said he had never meant to take sides. This had apparently been misunderstood but the real truth is that we want to help all. He would like to be able to see all the Arab leaders to make this clear but since that was impossible he was glad it had worked out so that the King could come and speak as a representative of all the Arabs.

The President then referred to the constant Israeli pressure for more arms because of the increase in Arab arms. The King said no such increase applied in the case of Jordan which was still far behind in armaments. This was very worrisome to him and he hoped that some day a balance could be achieved. Secretary Ball spoke up to say that we had always sought to avoid an arms race. New weapons produced a demand for more new weapons which led to a spiral of ever increasing armaments. Ideally we should have complete disarmament but this was not possible. By the same token you could probably never achieve a perfect balance for one side or the other would forever be seeking more.

Dr. Nuseibeh said he wanted to make it clear that Jordan was the victim of this increase in armaments. They were not increasing their armaments but they remained the most vulnerable country. Foreign Minister Atalla added that he had no doubt as to the sincerity of the U.S. position toward the Arabs. He knew we had tried to avoid an arms race in the area. We had sought to solve the refugee problem. But Jordan nevertheless remained the country in the exposed position and therefore the one which needed outside assistance.

Mr. Talbot pointed out that it was this very situation which had given rise to the statement made by President Kennedy on last May 8. President Johnson added that the May 8 statement remained the policy of the U.S. Government.

The King said the fundamental element in this picture had to be the long Jordan frontier with Israel. Presumably the arms which Saudi Arabia or Iraq possessed were considered part of the so-called balance but these arms would do Jordan little good. Israel had the capability of hitting hard and effectively and therefore Jordan felt very exposed. Secretary Ball said the presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet should provide a measure of security in the area. Our power was Jordan’s assurance of protection. Therefore we found it very hard to understand Nasser’s attack on the Libyan bases. These were useful to us and therefore were a part of the stability of this area of the world.

The King said that if there could be a continual exchange of views in the future we could avoid this kind of misunderstanding. He had seen the statement that these bases were designed to help Israel. This is part of the Arab concern. He was glad to have this explanation and he would certainly report these views to the other Arab leaders. The President added that the matter of the bases was a real problem. If we were in effect to bring the bases home why should we send military assistance out the following week to help maintain stability in the area? Dr. Nuseibeh said the Arabs had a genuine fear that these bases were designed to assist Israel. They had not simply adopted a pro-Soviet position on the bases but were concerned about them as a threat to the Arabs. The President said the bases were definitely not a threat to the Arabs but were a part of the stability of the area. He hoped the King would convey this message to all the Arab leaders.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 4/14–15/64 (II). Confidential. Drafted by Ambassador Barnes on April 22 and approved by U on April 29 and by White House on May 4. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the President’s office from 4:33 to 5:25 p.m. (Ibid.)