40. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
- King Hussein of Jordan
- Brigadier Khammash of Jordan
- Phillips Talbot, NEA, State
- John T. McNaughton, Acting ASD(ISA)
Summary
The important assurances by the Secretary were these:
- 1.
- US performance of undertakings incidental to military aid grant and military sales hereafter will be carried out promptly and the items will be in good condition, with adequate spares and appropriate ammunition. Hereafter fulfillment of commitments will be of highest priority—if necessary at the expense of US stocks.
- 2.
- He is prepared to talk to Jordanians (even to send representatives to Jordan) about possible purchases by Jordan of US arms using funds made available to Jordan-Syria-Lebanon by the new Arab group. The Secretary did not promise to sell but only to talk about selling.
- 3.
- Military aid to Jordan for FY 65 will be at the same level as for FY 64. This will be managed somehow out of whatever Congress authorizes and appropriates.
(Note: The Secretary (4) did not discuss the C–47s and (5) did not discuss any $5 million loan to Jordan.)
Chronological Account
The conversation began by the King’s assertion that he thought that the new Arab cooperation would lead to increased stability in the area. There was some discussion of economic development in Jordan—the 7-year program with approximately 10% increase in the economy each year. The King used this point to shift to his concern that economic development, which could make Jordan independent of external aid, could be thwarted if military aid was reduced. He stated that Jordan was far behind militarily.
Secretary McNamara, with respect to US past performance of military aid undertakings, stated that it had come to his attention that the [Page 97] US had been late in deliveries, had delivered equipment without spares, and had provided some defective equipment and ammunition. He assured the King that this would be handled more effectively in the future and asked the King to send him a personal cable if our performance in the future was otherwise.
The King asked whether the Secretary was prepared to sell arms to Jordan, payment coming from funds made available to Jordan from the new Arab organization. The Secretary stated that he would be prepared to have his people talk about this with Jordanian representatives. He added that with respect to sales as well as grant, hereafter US performance would be prompt and items would be in good condition, with adequate spares, and with appropriate ammunition. Secretary McNamara said that Jordan could assume that military aid from the US for FY 65 would be at the same level as for 64—that this would be managed somehow out of whatever funds Congress authorized and appropriated.
There was some discussion about the Jordanian economy (extension of irrigation, drilling for oil, etc.), education and health. The King referred to the Palestine problem—particularly the problem of refugees. He referred to Communist influence in the Near East and called the area a “bridge” between the Bloc and Africa. He stated that he saw the new Arab grouping as a stabilizing regional thing and hoped to see Iran and Turkey included. He mentioned that there were enticements—financial and ideological—to tie to the Soviets. He stated, for example, that the Soviets offer MIG-21s at two-thirds price. He hopes that the US looks at both sides of the problem and does nothing to make it difficult for US’s friends to continue the course they want to continue, as friends of the US.
Secretary McNamara, stated that fulfillment of undertakings to deliver military items will hereafter have top priority, if necessary at the expense of US stocks.
Mr. Talbot raised the question of the unfortunate introduction of “sophisticated” hardware into the Near East.
The King stated that all Jordan wanted was to maintain a “balance” in the area. He stated that Israel could “clobber” Jordan in 48 hours. Mr. Talbot stated that Israel phrases the problem in almost exactly the same terms and urges increased armaments for themselves on the grounds that the Arabs could destroy them. He suggested that an increase of several million of arms on one side would almost certainly lead to an increase of an equivalent or a greater amount on the other.
Brigadier Khammash stated that 15 million pounds a year for 10 years will be made available to Jordan-Syria-Lebanon by the Arab group. The King and he stated that perhaps 5 million pounds of this each year would go to equipment.
[Page 98]The King stated that something had to be done to stop Israel—that Israel had set up a potash operation in Jordan territory (“formerly Trans-Jordan”), that Israel was occupying more and more of the demilitarized zones, and that Israel was misbehaving with respect to the Jordan river waters. He urged the United States not to do anything without considering “both sides.” Both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Talbot assured the King that the United States was doing exactly that.
Secretary McNamara concluded by assuring the King again that DOD performance of undertakings hereafter would be as he had indicated earlier.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77 A 75, Memos of Conversation Between Sec. McNamara and Heads of State (other than NATO). Confidential. Copies were sent to Solbert, Director of Military Assistance General Wood, Sloan, Rowen, Henry J. Kuss, Jr., and Strickland. The meeting was held at Blair House.↩