Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

42. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 36–2–64

Washington, April 15, 1964.

IMPLICATIONS OF US MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL

The Problem

To assess the implications of a US decision to provide Israel with 500 modern medium tanks.

Conclusions

A. The atmosphere of US-Arab relations, which has been relatively good for the past few years, has recently become clouded by a resurgence of Arab suspicions that the US has a pro-Israel and anti-Arab bias. These suspicions would be greatly increased in scope and intensity were the US to furnish 500 tanks to Israel. (Paras. 4–7)

B. Every Arab state would take at least some anti-US action, which might include harassment of US diplomatic establishments and of oil companies, revocation of some military transit rights, and increasingly anti-US positions in international forums. Termination of US base rights at Wheelus Field would be speeded up. Self-interest would, however, place some restraint on Arab reactions, and widespread nationalization of oil properties would be unlikely. (Paras. 8–10)

C. The receipt of tanks from the US would gratify the Israelis and would strengthen their long-held hope that the US will eventually make a definite decision to take Israel’s side in its disputes with the Arabs. Israel’s own policies and attitudes towards the Arabs would not be softened, however, since they are dictated by considerations of national security. (Paras. 15–17)

D. US ability to moderate area disputes would be seriously impaired for some time, especially with respect to the Middle East arms race, which would be intensified by the US action. The Soviets would be alert to exploit a variety of opportunities which the US action would give them to identify themselves more closely with the Arab cause. (Paras. 12–14)

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem (Background Use Only). According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 15. The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here.