Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

188. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, March 12, 1965, 1 p.m.

536. Deptel 521; Embtel 527.² Presented draft memorandum of understanding with explanation for changes to Brigadier Khammash March 10 and met with King, Prime Minister and Khammash afternoon March 11 for further discussion.

Made careful presentation Deptel 521 to which King’s reaction milder than I had anticipated. On statement that we considered likelihood of preemptive military strike substantially reduced, he said he was glad to hear this but all of his intelligence contained ominous indications of build-up for aggressive action. On statement that we might have to make comparable sales to Israel, he said he quite recognized that Israel could not be denied access to arms though he hoped that in present mood of area we recognized that other Arabs might not react as moderately as he did. On stationing of tanks on West Bank, he said he obviously could not give assurances as to internal disposition of his forces. However, he could assure me that under continuation of what might be termed normal conditions he intended to keep tanks on East Bank, but obviously under wartime conditions this assurance would not apply. He would also continue make every effort avoid any action that might be considered provocative.

On the memorandum of understanding, the King desired to add language along lines of paragraph 3 of his letter to me (Embtel 486)³ but after some discussion and in light of remarks I had already made, agreed to delete this provided I would acknowledge receipt of his letter. This I agreed to do. He also sought to insert language in illustrative sales list stipulating that second 100 tanks would be M48A3 but when I said this unacceptable to Washington he agreed to remove language on understanding that DNF dealing with each other in good faith and that he was anxious to move forward on this much of package as soon as possible. He reiterated in this connection pressures he felt from UAC to demonstrate concrete results and fact that these results must ultimately in some form include supersonic aircraft.

One open point in addition to changes covered below is that GOJ acceptance of our delivery schedule on M48s is still conditioned on our ability to deliver 48 MAP tanks in next few months (Embtel 525).⁴ Otherwise King said he would have to insist on delivery of at least 50 tanks in 1965 in view of commitments which he had made to UAC subsequent to his discussions with Talbot and Solbert.

[Here follow lists of changes proposed in the memorandum of understanding and the illustrative sales list.]

Subject to satisfactory answer on delivery of M48 tanks and acceptance of textual changes outlined above, Prime Minister indicated he stood ready to sign agreement promptly. No reference was made to possible publicity and I did not raise subject.⁵

Barnes

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Received at 8:10 a.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv.
2. See Document 186 and footnote 2 thereto.
3. Document 154.
4. Telegram 525 from Amman, March 9, reported a March 8 meeting with Khammash. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US/JORDAN)
5. The memorandum of understanding signed March 18 by Barnes and Tell provided for the sale to Jordan on a cash basis of defense articles and services along the lines of an attached illustrative list, with details to be negotiated subsequently. Implementation of the memorandum was conditioned on Jordan’s keeping the United States and other free world sources as the sole sources of supply to its armed forces, carrying out the modernization and expansion of its ground forces in a manner that would not adversely affect its economic development, obtaining from sources outside Jordan the funds required for the materiel covered by the memorandum and for the planned expansion of Jordan’s military establishment, and Jordan’s assurance of its intent to keep its military budget at no more than $52 million a year. The illustrative sales list included 100 M–48 tanks and 50 armored personnel carriers, as well as small arms, ammunition, and other items. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 400.3295 Jordan)