Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

187. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 30–65

Washington, March 10, 1965.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM

The Problem

To estimate present attitudes and future trends in the Arab-Israeli problem over the next two or three years.

Conclusions

A. The Arab-Israeli dispute is heating up. The initial success of Arab efforts to cooperate in a scheme for diverting Jordan waters at Israel’s expense and for achieving a degree of military unity has given the Arabs some confidence that they may be capable of hurting Israel. This Arab cooperation and the new willingness of richer Arab states to contribute funds to the program have led the Israelis to fear that a significant turning point in the dispute is occurring to Nasser’s advantage. In response, they are hardening their posture toward the Arabs. In this situation, tension will be higher in the next few years and the danger of armed clashes greater.

B. In a year or so, if the Arab projects to divert the waters of the Jordan River basin materialize, the danger of Israeli strikes to put them out of commission will rise. However, we believe that Israel will first seek to deter the Arabs by a combination of political and psychological moves, directed particularly at detaching Jordan and Lebanon from effective participation in a common Arab military and water diversion effort. The chances are at least even that some development will come to pass by which the Arab diversion projects would satisfy Arab self-esteem without encroaching on Israel’s minimum requirements for Jordan water. In the absence of such developments, Israeli strikes against the diversion projects, especially in Syria, are probable. An Israeli strike would probably elicit some Arab military response, most likely by Syria, but would severely strain Arab cooperation. There is some chance of more general fighting in the tense circumstances prevailing, but we believe that both sides would try to avoid a general war during the period of this estimate.

C. The accelerating arms race is involving both the Arabs and Israel in advanced weapons development, particularly in the missile field. The Israelis probably will be able to deploy a French-built surface-to-surface missile with a range of about 270 nautical miles by 1967–1968; the UAR may be able to deploy considerably less sophisticated missiles of slightly less range by 1968–1969. The UAR has virtually no prospect of acquiring nuclear weapons except from foreign sources—which we consider highly unlikely. By contrast, the Israelis could probably develop nuclear weapons by 1968–1969 and/or nuclear warheads by about 1971 without outside assistance, if a decision to go ahead were given at this time. We do not believe, however, that the Israelis have taken such a decision.

D. Whether the Arab-Israeli controversy erupts into armed clashes or remains confined to political tensions, it will almost certainly be more difficult in the next few years for the US and other Western powers to maintain satisfactory relations with both Israel and the Arab states. The dispute will present the USSR with opportunities to increase its influence with the Arabs. Israel is likely to intensify its already strong pressure on the US both to limit arms supplies to the Arabs and to provide Israel with arms. Israel is also likely to press vigorously for a US security guarantee. Given the strong Arab resentment over US support for Israel in the past, developments of this sort might lead toward a more pronounced polarization of the Arab-Israeli dispute to include the Soviets and Arabs on one side, and Israel and the West on the other. In any event, Nasser’s strategy will include threats against Western interests in the area in order to pressure the Western powers to lessen their support to Israel.

[Here follow the Discussion portion of the estimate, an annex, and 4 tables.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A table of contents is not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on March 10. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, AEC, and NSA representatives concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside his jurisdiction.