Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

138. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson¹

Washington, February 6, 1965.

Here is how the Jordan arms issue breaks down at this moment.

State/DOD/JCS/CIA and our ambassadors all still favor going ahead now with a minimum package (basic M–48 tanks, and European jets) as essential to keep Hussein from jumping the reservation. McNamara and Rusk agree. In fact, most of them think even our minimum package won’t be enough to do more than buy us a little time. Only new wrinkle is that if Hussein won’t take M–48 tank we suggest we’ll help him get better German or UK models.

The Israelis (and Mike Feldman) are still dug in hard. Their immediate objective is to buy time to bargain with us, so they’re taking a very stiff line. I believe that if we had the time (and were willing to pay the price) we could bring them around. But our dilemma is that if we stall any longer we may lose Hussein.

It’s important to view the Jordan arms problem in full perspective, as part of the major new Arab-Israeli crisis (this time over the Jordan waters) which we face over the next year or two. We stand only to lose in this crisis because we favor the status quo. So does Israel, which has a special claim on us. So does Jordan, which joined Israel in sharing Palestine. The USSR, UAR and Syria are revisionist powers, with the other Arabs passively on their side on any issue involving Israel.

Thus our real aim is simply to get through this new crisis without: (1) sacrificing Israel’s security or getting a domestic black eye for appearing to do so; (2) ruining our relations with the Arabs—along with all this would cost us; (3) letting the Soviets score another major gain in the Near East, as they did in 1954–57.

Israeli aims are rather different from our own. They’ve consistently felt nervous about US support in a crunch, so have long favored tying us to them publicly (security guarantees, arms aid), regardless of whether this would throw the Arabs into Soviet hands or cost us our position in the Arab world. We’ve always felt that such a course would be disastrous to Israel as well as us. This is again a basic issue, as it is in every Arab-Israeli crisis.

The second thing we want to avoid is another major Arab-Israeli clash, because we’d probably have to step in to stop it. We’d be caught in the middle again too. The best way to avoid such a clash is to maintain an adequate deterrent balance. I’d now argue that this will sooner or later require us to sell arms to Israel. The simple reason is that otherwise the growing Soviet arms sales to the Arabs will slowly tilt the balance against Israel (even after the latter gets missiles, though not necessarily if it goes nuclear). But if we want to prevent Israeli nuclear proliferation yet protect Israel and forestall another conflict, we’ll have to provide Israel with its own arms.

A sale of arms to Jordan could give us the excuse for selling to Israel too. In fact, it would almost compel us to do so. We could justify this publicly as a response to Soviet moves. Moreover, to the extent that our arms sales to Jordan kept the Soviets and UAR out, this would minimize the threat to Israel too.

Since this basic policy reversal on our part (from avoiding sales to making them) is probably inevitable, there’s a case for making it now! The Arabs may react violently, but they will also react violently when we have to back Israel in a Jordan waters crisis too. And Arab knowledge that they could not win an arms race against Israel should contribute over the long run to a damping down of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

In sum, I see longer range policy reasons for taking the plunge now. Announcement of this new policy might largely blanket any Congressional reactions to our sales to Jordan.

Returning to the immediate Jordan arms issue, we have three basic alternatives:

A. Take Israeli line—offer nothing and rely on threats of withdrawal of US aid. We’ve tried this already and Hussein said he’d have to risk loss of US aid. Note his reaction last August (Tab A).² Experts think probabilities are that Hussein would have to go the Soviet route. So this course gravely risks the worst of all eventualities—Soviet/UAR arms in Jordan.

B. Take State/DOD line. Offer minimum package designed to keep ball in play, while making crystal clear that if Hussein goes Soviet route he’ll sacrifice US aid (DOD and State think we might be able to get Hussein to go for UK, French, or German tanks and planes). Experts still think this won’t work unless package is rich enough. Also Israelis have urged at highest level we not take this road; if we do so without signing them on, we multiply our subsequent problems.

C. Stall for a little more time. State, DOD, and our Ambassador all say we’ve stalled so long (nine months) that we must fish or cut bait. Hussein says so too, and he’s a gambler—capable of rash action. But there is a chance that we could shake him enough, without closing the door, to buy ourselves at least a few days and perhaps till 10 February, when he goes to Cairo. This would give a little time for us to pressure and cajole the Israelis. My scenario is at Tab B.³

As to other possibilities, they seem to net out as follows:

1. Getting concerted Western pressure on Nasser to lay off Hussein is infeasible. De Gaulle would thumb his nose at us. Erhard is fighting desperately to solve his own problem, i.e. forestalling Arab recognition of East Germany. The UK favors a Jordan arms deal.

2. The oil companies are no help. They see the problem, but are so under Arab pressure now that they have no leverage with Arabs.

3. The Soviets won’t help us out, because they stand to be the biggest gainers from our woes. In fact, if we even broached the subject, they’d squeal to the Arabs.

4. I personally favor an approach to Nasser if only to tell him what we plan to do. But not before we get Hussein signed on. Then nothing will be lost from trying to convince Nasser not to scream.

5. A secret high level mission to Israel is indicated immediately to try and convince the Israelis we make sense. If it were authorized to offer arms sales, it could succeed. Harriman would be best, or Feldman or myself (but not Mike and I).

Bob Komer

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I. Secret. Komer’s handwritten note at the top of the memorandum states that Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti read it and agreed.
2. Tab A is a copy of telegram 84 from Amman, August 11; see footnote 2, Document 88.
3. Tab B, entitled “A Possible Stall for Time,” unsigned and undated, is not printed.