Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon¹

Washington, February 6, 1965, 8:06 p.m.

808. Instructions to Talbot. We have reviewed the Jordanian arms requests at the highest level. That review has taken account of the strongly adverse reaction from the Government of Israel and the concern that would be aroused in many sectors of the Congress by a US sale of arms to the Unified Arab Command.

On the basis of this careful rethinking of the problem we are instructing you to limit your offers to King Hussein in accordance with this telegram and to try to buy time during which Western European sources of supply for tanks and airplanes can be fully explored.

Before making any explicit offer to the King, you should forcefully make the following points:

1. The United States friendship for, and support of, his regime in Jordan has been amply and repeatedly demonstrated over the years. This is a partnership we would like to continue. A partnership, however, requires mutual understanding of each other’s problems. We feel that we do understand the difficulties of the situation Hussein is facing with respect to his arms buildup under the United Arab Command.

2. Despite our serious misgivings about any large increases in armament in the area we have authorized Assistant Secretary Talbot to make as forthcoming an offer as feasible in the circumstances. At the same time, the President wishes the King—as an obligation under our mutual partnership—to understand United States’ concerns and inhibitions.

3. The ambitious arms buildup planned by the United Arab Command can lead only to a rising spiral of military capability between Israel and the Arab world. Sooner or later this will almost certainly result in an explosion since the Israelis will not sit by and see the Arab world outdistance them. Because of Jordan’s geographic location, it will inevitably bear a particularly heavy brunt from any Arab-Israeli holocaust.

4. The King’s request has put us in serious dilemma. While we are attempting to give the King as much support as possible, he must understand that a major USG contribution to the arms race in Arab-Israel area will be bitterly resented by Congress and American people. This would bring critical US domestic reaction that could adversely affect our future ability to continue our cooperation with, and support of, GOJ.

5. Our offer—which is as generous as is feasible—is necessarily contingent on GOJ not accepting any form of Soviet military equipment. If GOJ should elect to turn to Soviet equipment, we would be regretfully compelled to terminate our present military assistance program. More than that, we would necessarily have to reexamine the status and continuance of our entire partnership relation.

6. Finally, the King must keep in perspective the relative value to him of close and continuing friendship and support of USG as against a few tanks and airplanes. It is USG earnest hope that Hussein will not allow disappointment over present arms negotiations to jeopardize partnership which we deeply value and which we believe of critical importance to him.

With the foregoing clearly in mind make following offer:

(1) Military ground equipment valued at $55 million² over calendar years 1965–1969 inclusive.

(2) M–48 tanks. Bear down heavily on advantages to Jordan of basic M–48 as outlined in supplementary talking points 1(Armor) (a).³ If King insistently demands newer model, point out that we have no M–48A2s or M–48A3s for sale. We would, however, be willing to explore with him possibilities of procuring more advanced armor from Western Europe.⁴ If Hussein cannot be convinced, consult Washington immediately for further instructions.

(3) Supersonic Aircraft. Use every effort dissuade Jordan against early move into supersonics. If King proves adamant, however, acquiesce reluctantly in Jordanian purchase of a West European squadron. If King insists on purchasing Soviet MIGs in default of an American squadron, remind him of consequences. Urge that he make not hasty decision until you can return to the United States for further consultations.

(4) King should understand that sales of arms Jordan may well force U.S. to make arms sales to Israel. We will count on Hussein in this event to help keep down Arab reaction.

(5) In discussing the above, you should urge on King maximum secrecy about our discussions.

Ball

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Killgore and Macomber, cleared by Jernegan and Komer, and approved by Ball. Also sent to Amman.
2. Telegram 782 from Beirut, February 7, queried this figure, noting that the proposed 5-year package with M48 tanks came to approximately $42 million. (Ibid.) Telegram 440 to Amman, February 7, confirmed that the figure should be $42 million. (Ibid.)
3. Talbot’s talking points have not been found.
4. Telegram 782 from Beirut (see footnote 2 above) stated that the only change in the offer to King Hussein was apparently to take a flat position against selling M48A2 or A3 tanks but to express willingness to explore possibilities of procuring Western European tanks. Telegram 440 to Amman confirmed that the only change in the offer related to tanks.