Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, February 6, 1965, 7:58 p.m.

701. Following is text of uncleared memcon.² FYI and Noforn.

Ambassador Harman delivered to Under Secretary February 5 message from Prime Minister Eshkol³ along lines predicted Tel Aviv’s tel 927.⁴ Message urged President prevent provision military equipment to Jordan and use utmost influence persuade King Hussein abstain from creation new and aggressive Army. Stressed following points: (1) Increase in size Jordan Army from 7 to 12 brigades would transform it from defensive to offensive Army under aggressive directives of UAC. (2) Under circumstances impossible for King Hussein not embark on aggressive policy. (3) Supply of tanks and other material to Jordan would place large aggressive force only few kilometers from Tel Aviv. Israel would lose capacity defense in depth. Result would be fundamental change in balance strength unacceptable to Israel. Psychological blow to Israeli people no less significant than military blow. (4) GOI must and will do everything in its power to oppose development tension in Near East to all-time peak. (5) Arab countries openly preparing steal water to which Israel entitled and maintaining UAC for aggressive purpose and blackmail Western countries.

Ambassador Harman supplemented message with oral presentation stressing: (1) Communication on US intentions supply arms to Jordan transmitted by Ambassador Barbour took GOI by surprise. Matter of gravest concern to Israel and Ambassador had been assured US officials would keep in touch as matter developed. (2) Urged initiation intimate and detailed consultation on highest level. Such consultation had not yet taken place, but vital to security Israel. (3) Supply US materiel to Jordan would change character Jordan Army from defense to offense. Whole basis GOI defensive planning based upon assumption Jordan Army defensive with role guard frontier until reinforcements from other countries arrived, i.e., permitting five day lag. With new offensive Jordan Army on frontier Israel defense concept invalid. (4) Increase in size Jordan Army with incorporation National Guard largely made up of Palestinians would result in Palestinianizing Jordan Army. Such development particularly dangerous view growing importance and effectiveness PLO. (5) US proposal constituted recognition UAC since Jordanian request for arms generated by it. UAC established to enable Arab diversion Jordan waters with resultant destruction years of Israeli planning. (6) Only economic development could assure survival Jordan. Enlarged Army would constitute severe economic drain that would threaten Jordan’s viability and independence. (7) Impact on public opinion in Israel would be severe. (8) Prime Minister requested (a) US not respond to Jordanian request for arms and (b) seek dissuade King Hussein from following suicidal path.

Under Secretary said US aware Israel’s concern about any arms accretion in neighboring countries. We faced serious dilemma in Near East. Heart of matter is whether better for Israel’s security and peace of area for some arms to be given to Jordan on controlled basis by friend of Israel or on uncontrolled basis by Soviet Union. We remain interested in damping arms spiral but face problem maintaining control over Jordan. We presumed Israel regarded prospect of uncontrolled arming of Jordan by Soviets more ominous than situation we contemplated. We agreed necessary make Hussein understand stakes. Decision on Jordan arms of utmost importance to US and Israel. We would take careful account of Prime Minister’s message. US never understood we would consult Israel on Jordan arms decision but would undertake inform Israel before action taken. Decision had been made but no action yet taken. Under Secretary noted in all honesty action might be taken within next few hours.

Ambassador Harman said he was much disturbed that action might be taken in a matter of hours since he had been assured US officials would be in touch with him on this matter. He said he felt considerable trepidation in taking his leave and appeared obviously dejected. End FYI.

You should make following points to appropriate GOI officials. (1) Prime Minister’s message ignores fundamental problem facing us, i.e., question not whether Jordan gets arms but who supplies them and in what quantity. (2) Message grossly overstates magnitude threat to Israel of modernization Jordan Army. Entire projected sale includes electronic gear and ground equipment including M48 tanks at rate 25 per year for four years beginning 1966. (3) We not meeting Jordan’s full request for arms and proposed offer may not suffice to relieve UAC pressure on King to build up his military forces. (4) We look to GOI for suggestions on how to ease growing tensions in area. We see no advantage in premature reaction to plans such as Arab water diversion, extent of which unclear and which far from fruition. Counter-pressure at this time only encourages and speeds buildup we hope avoid. While we appreciate Israeli concern about growing Arab military strength GOI should remember US determination oppose aggression from whatever quarter. In last analysis Western power is and will be prime deterrent to hostilities.⁵

Ball

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Amman for Talbot.
2. Not found.
3. Eshkol’s message to Johnson was conveyed in a note of February 5 from Harman to Rusk. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel—Presidential Correspondence)
4. Dated February 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN)
5. Telegram 702 to Tel Aviv, February 6, instructed Barbour to inform Eshkol that an NSC meeting had been scheduled for February 8 to consider the matter raised in his message. After the meeting, a representative of the President would come to impart the President’s reply and explain the U.S. position. The visit of the emissary was to be kept strictly secret. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) Barbour replied in telegram 938 from Tel Aviv, February 7, that he passed the message in telegram 702 to Eshkol via Bitan, stressing the need for secrecy. (Ibid.) Telegram 703 to Tel Aviv, February 6, instructed Barbour to take no action on the last paragraph of telegram 701. (Ibid.) Telegram 705 to Tel Aviv, February 7, stated that the Embassy could use the arguments in the last paragraph of telegram 701 but without reference to Eshkol’s message. (Ibid.)