Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

121. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 14, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Jordan’s Request for Sale of U.S. Arms

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• U—Mr. Ball
• NEA—Mr. Phillips Talbot
• NE—Rodger P. Davies

Mr. Talbot said that decisions on how to meet Jordan’s arms request went far beyond our bilateral relations. These could force abandonment of our traditional policy of restraint on sale of arms to the Arab states and Israel. They could ultimately bring polarization of the area with the Arab states armed and backed by the Soviets united against a “Fortress Israel” armed and supported by the U.S. He was to impart our decisions to King Hussein by the end of January during visit to Amman.

The Unified Arab Command, financed by the Arab states of North Africa and the Near East, has levied a requirement on Jordan to modernize and expand its army and air force as part of an Arab program to achieve parity with Israel. If the U.S. refuses to sell arms to Jordan, King Hussein tells us he will be forced to acquire Soviet equipment. He has withstood UAC pressure to standardize Arab military inventories on the basis of Soviet equipment only by assuring the other Arab states that the U.S. will provide essential equipment. If Jordan acquires Soviet aircraft and tanks which would require Egyptian training crews, Israel’s alarm would be intense. We would find it difficult to justify before Congress continued U.S. support of the Jordanian budget.

If we meet Jordan’s request, thus violating our traditional Near East arms policy, Israel probably would tolerate or even welcome our sales to Jordan for she recognizes we could no longer fend off Israeli efforts to obtain offensive American weapons. We believe the bitter emotional response of the Arabs to the direct supply of offensive U.S. arms to Israel would be so great that it might force those Arab states now drawing on Western arms to turn to the Soviet Union. This would be a major step toward polarization which our policies over the years have been designed to prevent.

The Secretary asked whether it would not be possible for the Jordanians to meet at least its aircraft requirements from European sources.

Mr. Talbot said that we hoped to preserve the basic essentials of our arms policy by persuading King Hussein to acquire the French Mirage fighter which is comparable to the Soviet MIG 21 or our F–104. The British Lightning seems ruled out because it is excessively heavy and expensive. In addition the British have made clear that they will not consider credits in the sale of military equipment to Jordan. If we can persuade Hussein to acquire the French plane, we will have averted the worst of our potential problems with Congress and preserved a chance of maintaining continued American restraint on arms sales to the area.

Mr. Davies noted that the French Mirage was expensive with a fly-away cost for twenty aircraft of approximately $28 million as compared to $12 million for the MIG 21 and $27 million for the F–104G. Other versions of the 104, the C and H, ran from $10 million to $20 million, however.

Mr. Talbot said that while we would push for a European sale, we must be ready for the contingency that King Hussein will refuse to accept our views. Although the balance of disadvantages is close, he believed that to obviate Jordan’s acquiring Soviet supersonics, he should have stand-by authority to offer to consider selling American supersonic fighters.

Mr. Talbot said the situation was also complicated by Jordan’s request for M–48–A–3 tanks with 105 mm cannons. Although we recognize Jordan’s need to modernize its armor, we have previously declined to sell this particular tank to Israel. If we sold the M–48–A–3 to Jordan it would arouse strenuous protest from Israel and its supporters in the United States. On the other hand, if we talk the Jordanians down to the M–48 or the M–48 with the diesel engine but not the 105 mm cannon, the Arabs will be incensed when Israel acquires this model from other sources. There is some possibility that the Arabs are aware that Israel is planning to acquire this particular tank.

The Secretary said that the issues involved were so important as to require consultation with the President. He asked for a very short summary of the problem² to take with him to Texas the following day so that he might brief the President if opportunity arose. In any event, when the President returned, it would be necessary to discuss these decisions with him.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davies on January 19 and approved in S/S on January 27.
2. The memorandum indicates that a summary sent to the Secretary, dated January 15, was attached. The summary is not attached, but was apparently the memorandum from Talbot to Rusk summarizing the issues, drafted by Killgore and Davies on January 15, a copy of which is filed as an attachment to a memorandum from Jernegan to Rusk, March 27, 1964. (Ibid., NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316,NSAM 290)