122. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
833. PriMin Eshkol called me in evening January 17 to tell me he is greatly perturbed over recent developments concerning diversion Jordan headwaters and that, in view of reports that Lebanese parliament due to formulate GOL position this coming Thursday,2 he thought it would be wise to ask USG tell GOL that diversion is serious matter and will be dealt with by GOI as serious matter. Eshkol pointed out that what is at stake is large portion (100 MCM’s or more) of sweet water which is necessary for Israel’s development. PriMin stated he would not want to use force protect this water but sooner or later he might have to do so. However, to avoid such development, GOI wished use USG channel to exert counter-pressure upon GOL which, while probably not wanting assume responsibility diverting waters, is subject [Page 272] to Egyptian threats. He referred, apropos such USG assistance, to “promises” and “assurances” he had received in his talks with President Johnson and others in Washington.
I said that USG fully agrees that question Jordan headwaters a serious matter and also believes that GOL has some room free for maneuver. I pointed out, however, that our assessment differs from GOI’s in that we do not think Lebanese suffering from any misapprehension re Israeli attitude. Thus, while USG has had several talks with GOL re diversion, we would wish avoid any undue pressure which might provoke unfortunate Lebanese reaction, notably if Lebanese prestige directly involved by such tactics.
Eshkol interrupted to say GOI certainly didn’t wish press too much but question was vital and that somewhere along the line there was a zero hour. He didn’t know of any halfway measures. I answered that I didn’t think that the critical point would be reached with the beginning of digging or the pouring of concrete, but only when water was actually diverted from Israeli use. If Israel forced employ drastic measure he feared, such measure would be just as effective against completed works as it would in earlier stages of construction and obviously consequences such intervention could be far reaching and unpredictable, possibly disastrous. Since there was always the possibility that Arabs would never be able get project off the ground I thought GOI had every reason play this hand out. Eshkol admitted that the construction of pumping stations and tunnels would take time and that it is a question of months rather than days. However, he is greatly perturbed and wishes USG know his concern and communicate it to GOL. Fundamentally, I believe he feels coming Lebanese parliamentary session important point in formulation Arab strategy and every effort should be made try to ensure best possible outcome.
In assuring PriMin that I would bring his personal concern to attention USG I told him it would not be helpful if Israel started a big press campaign of intimidation against Lebanon. Eshkol said he did not envisage this and that GOI is trying to avoid public involvement Lebanese prestige.3
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus and pouched to Jerusalem, London, Paris, and USUN.↩
- January 21.↩
- Telegram 615 to Tel Aviv, January 19, also sent to Beirut, endorsed the line Barbour had taken with Eshkol and instructed the Embassy in Beirut to continue to pursue the line it had been taking with senior Lebanese officials on this subject. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER) Circular telegram 1317 to Tel Aviv, January 22, instructed the Embassy to suggest that Israel might bring the Jordan waters problem to the United Nations by means of a letter to the Security Council President describing the problem and warning of the possibility of an eventual clash of riparian interests. (Ibid.)↩