120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic1
4008. Rusk-Kamel Meeting. UAR Ambassador called on Secretary January 8 to appeal to USG to step up aid. Talbot attended.
Secretary opened by stating he hoped quiet talks could counteract effects of recent events on US–UAR relations. He would welcome Kamel’s personal and official appreciation of situation.
Kamel expressed gratitude for opportunity, conveyed Nasser’s best wishes for New Year to Secretary and President, and expressed personal hope for year of constructive US–UAR and global cooperation.
As for unfortunate events triggered by Congo situation, Kamel considered them minor, but they had been dramatized in effort destroy UAR-US relations. Help and wisdom of Secretary and President needed to overcome this tactic. Hence Kamel considered this meeting with Secretary equally as significant as his meetings with Secretary and President in 1961 when policy of US–UAR cooperation was laid down.
Because of its troubled history, its sharp contradictions in creed and status, its current social upheaval, its proximity to Soviet Union, and its preoccupation with Israel, Kamel said Near East was a particularly complicated area in a complicated world. Hence Near East policy had to be formulated in expectation of such difficulties as those just experienced. Objective was not to rake over old problems but to seek solutions. Major US interests in area were preservation of Near East independence, protection of Western economic interests, protection of status quo, and control if not solution of Arab-Israel conflict. In 1958, [Page 265] with crisis of confidence between US and Egypt and Western troops in Jordan and Lebanon, all four US interests were in jeopardy. Kamel then arrived in US to hear on all sides Near East was lost to Communism.
However, Kamel said, activation of US–UAR economic cooperation had kept Communism out of Near East (even though it had infiltrated to within 80 miles of US shores), had frozen Arab-Israel conflict, muted inter-Arab disagreements, and reduced area of Soviet opportunity; not one major US interest had been touched. Why then the agitation in Congress?
To pursue protection of US–UAR cooperation, Kamel advocated that parties beware of defeatism, pressure tactics, over-dramatization, and excess of zeal—focussing instead on subtlety, restraint, and silence. If USG did not fully recognize Egypt’s need for economic assistance in its demographic problem, Egypt might fall to the Communists, and its loss to Free World might be as grave as loss of China. Economic cooperation was one arena in which US had advantage over Soviet Union. One hundred fifty million per year was modest investment in terms of results achieved and dangers averted. Oil company revenues alone far exceeded it.
In late 1963, primarily as result of Yemen problem but possibly also as effect of US-Soviet detente, Kamel said Egyptians had sensed slow-down in US aid. Implementation of existing agreements continued, but no new areas of economic cooperation were penetrated. Growing stress on negative aspects of US–UAR relationship had left mark on his Government that Kamel now seeks to erase. Even at this,UARG had continued to fulfill its side of the understanding by playing constructive roles in Arab, African, and neutral summits and averting the war everyone had expected over Jordan diversion. But Kamel’s efforts secure reactivation of aid had failed. Recognizing limits on USG capabilities, he had also sought IBRD help and failed. In fact Woods’ remarks in Tokyo about UARG’s delinquency on foreign claims may have been contributing cause to recent incidents in UAR-US relations.
As the senior partner in the relationship, Kamel said perhaps USG could muster more patience than UARG. It did not do for USG to play the schoolteacher, react to every line in foreign press, and follow policy of tit for tat. Such policy grated on proud Mediterraneans, as Soviets recognized. They exercise restraint even where Communist party banned. Recognizing Egypt as key to Near East, they would keep up their campaign to win it over.
Turning to recent incidents, Kamel said he would not try to assess rights and wrongs and it did no good to cry over spilt milk, but he agreed with Secretary’s statements about need for respect for diplomatic conventions. He regretted burning of library and felling of plane; [Page 266] he did not feel harsh words necessary. But UARG had met diplomatic requirements on library, and in context of US global interest these incidents were tempest in tea-cup. He hoped US response would match its responsibilities. He proposed that USG and UARG put these incidents behind them, focus on fact that 99 percent of thirty million Egyptians were predisposed toward West, and open new chapter of cooperation by continuing PL–480 program after June 30, complying with request for increments to present agreement, and perhaps by granting the twenty million dollar commodity loan and enlisting help of IBRD and other states.
If USG did not continue PL–480 program, Kamel could not conceive how we could keep the US and the West in the Near East. Communists were constantly at work in Egypt and were another cause of recent incidents.
Kamel said France was making approaches to UARG, but he felt they were tactical. In any event he felt his country’s interest required that US influence predominate.
To alleviate US–UAR friction over Congo, Kamel proposed this issue be left to OAU, with recognition that solution will be long-term process. Kamel was hopeful position his Government would evolve toward that of USG.
Kamel pointed to dangers in conducting international relations in anger and in allowing annoyance over one issue affect over-all relationship. He knew this was not the diplomatic style of men at helm of USG; foreign diplomats in Washington were proud to know these men were leading world. He also paid tribute to Department staff.
Finally, Kamel asked if USG could not take some action to mute annual attack on UARG in Congress. Repetition year after year had heightened Egyptian doubts about durability of US–UAR relationship. Within limits of US constitutional system, he felt President and Secretary could help guard relationship from this quarter. He doubted it could survive another attack like that of previous session. Whole UAR-US relationship was now jeopardized by trivia. Kamel believed in elemental need to preserve it. In this effort he had 100 percent support of his government. He knew able US Ambassador in Cairo was defending relationship with equal determination.
In reply, Secretary said he was grateful for Kamel’s clear and eloquent statement of his concern for our relationship and ability with which he had pointed to its central elements. To avoid misunderstanding, Secretary wished make clear he would not comment definitively on all items Kamel had raised until another meeting. Some of these matters were of such importance as to require that Secretary confer with President before replying.
[Page 267]Secretary agreed US–UAR relationship has had constructive elements. Certainly Kennedy and Johnson administration had sought to develop them. In narrow national sense, if UARG and USG were to draw up independently lists of their national interests, they would find some major elements in common.
It was true that there were matters in background that were not easy to forget on one side or the other, such as High Dam/Suez experience. The record revealed complex elements which US and UAR must continue to try to wrestle with and circumscribe.
As for the more superficial aspects of recent events, we regretted that more timely action had not been taken to prevent burning of library, but we could fairly say that, in light of all circumstances, steps taken by UARG in that matter would tend to indicate that norms of diplomatic usage had been sufficiently met to warrant considering case closed. Secretary could not however see incident’s early erasure from minds of Congress or American public.
USG would have preferred that UARG confine its measures on the American cargo plane to pursuit over frontier and possible protest. Although we recognized complications from UARG point of view and did not condone flight pattern of plane, we felt UARG remedy had been a bit drastic. However, we felt this incident was also behind us.
Speech of December 23 was kind that creates problems. Perhaps it reflected sensitivity, but it had aroused counter-sensitivity. Secretary did not know if speech had reflected misunderstanding of the talk between Stinu and our Ambassador. Presence of Shelepin did not help anyone who sought to explain the remarks. Secretary would not press exceptionally able ambassador like Kamel to defend another’s rhetoric, but Secretary was hearing of the speech several times a day.
Perhaps most serious problem between US and UAR was Congo. USG had no special national interest there, no appetite for special presence. For several years we had supported Congo’s unity and integrity through UN and through bilateral aid approaching half a billion dollars. For most of period USG had worked in near unanimity with African states in effort to keep Cold War out of Africa and prevent fragmentation of Congo. While Adoula was Prime Minister, we had learned of illegal arms shipments into Congo from Tanzania and Burundi territory. Weapons of Communist Chinese origin had been captured. USG had no fore-knowledge of Tshombe appointment, but supports his Government under already existing policy to support GDRC. USG had been disappointed and a little surprised by UARG’s seeming association of itself with elements holding hostages in northeast Congo. We felt we had acted with great patience under extreme provocation during period August–November when rebels held incommunicado many hostages including five American consular officers and subjected [Page 268] them to barbaric indignity, brutality, and threat of torture, execution, and cannibalism. These elements with whom Cairo seemed to be associating self had in our eyes put themselves beyond the pale of a civilized world. Provision of arms to Congo rebels, particularly as an act of avowed national policy, was a grave issue. Most arms reaching rebels were of Soviet manufacture. We had good information on how they were reaching Congo. Their provision seemed to promote Cold War type of conflagration we had tried five years to avoid. If it could be stopped, we could concentrate our assistance on economic development. Continuation of arms shipments made that very difficult. Secretary would like to pursue this subject with Kamel further in some detail. Since rebels are poorly trained, large quantities of their weapons were falling into hands of Congo Government. There was now some indication deliveries to rebels slowing down. We hoped we could find answer through Security Council and OAU in order to prevent this issue from intruding on totality of our relationships.
Secretary told Kamel his effort regarding existing US–UAR Food for Peace agreements was to ensure that nothing was done to interrupt them, but, as press showed, this effort was under very considerable attack. He viewed this program as an important channel of US–UAR communication; it contributed to welfare of Egyptian people, stood on its own feet, and lent itself to kind of relationship that need not be affected by every sensitive issue that arose. Objectively considered, there were important national interests on both sides that can be basis of cooperation.
For the future, we hoped for steady improvement in UAR-US relations. If Egypt should be free and prosperous, that was extent of US national ambition for Egypt. On that basis we sought cooperation and friendship. Secretary said he had tried limit his own public statements, and he would hope by quiet discussion we would find better answers than we had found thus far. He took encouragement from Kamel’s able and diligent efforts to find a basis, and he paid those efforts full respect. The Ambassador should not consider that what Secretary had said in this one meeting constituted full reply to Ambassador’s important statement. Secretary would wish to confer with President.
Kamel stressed once more urgency of situation and his personal concern and urged that both sides resist demagogy.
Secretary suggested that in next meeting perhaps Kamel would comment on specifics of that urgency and, re his compilation of US interest in good relations with UAR, perhaps Kamel could also state how he sees Egyptian interest in good relations with US.
Kamel said he could answer latter question at once. Only alternative to cooperation with US was cooperation with Soviet Union. Latter was greater danger to Egyptians. They counted on power, patience, [Page 269] and wisdom of US more than on wisdom of others. He adjured USG to continue economic cooperation and to be patient.
Secretary responded that, for our part, we needed help in enabling a great democracy to be patient.
Kamel closed discussion by contrasting superficial benefit to Soviets of arms sales with lasting benefit to US of food sales. By continuing economic cooperation, USG could promote relaxation of Near East political tensions, reduce Egyptian need for Soviet arms, and thus diminish Soviet leverage. If Congress were to force cut-off of aid, it would promote exactly opposite effect.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Confidential; Noforn. Drafted by Jones; cleared by Davies, Jernegan, and Rusk’s Staff Assistant Edward J. Streator; and approved by Talbot. Pouched to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Taiz, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, USUN, and Leopoldville.↩