Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe

23. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)¹

Washington, October 1, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Material for Use in the SIG Meeting, October 4, Concerning Contingency Planning in Europe

The attached papers review the issues confronting us in Europe as a result of the Czechoslovak affair with particular reference to Rumania, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Berlin. The papers have been prepared for use by the SIG members in their review of status of contingency planning in the aftermath of the Czech crisis.²

Attachment 1

Washington, undated.

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

AFTERMATH OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA—ISSUES AND PLANS

The military intervention in Czechoslovakia indicates the lengths to which the Soviet Union is prepared to go to subjugate a neighboring ally to the national interests of the Soviet Union and the interests of international communism.

1. Doctrinal Justification

The ideological foundation for this intervention was set forth in the Warsaw Letter of July and more recently in Pravda of September 26.⁴ These documents stated that internal affairs in any socialist state become the affair of all when the international communist system is thereby threatened. Ambassador Dobrynin’s oral statement to Secretary Rusk⁵ underlines this determination in concluding that “it would be a mistake to suppose, however, that showing its care in this respect [i.e., improved US-Soviet relations]⁶ the Soviet Union would neglect its primary responsibility—the defense of the position of socialism wherever and in whatever form, should a threat to the fraternal socialist countries emerge.” Implicit in these theoretical statements is the assumption that the Soviet Union, as the most powerful member of the camp, will be the final arbiter in determining who has become a deviant requiring punishment and rescue.

2. Assessment of Soviet “Rationality”

The Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia should thus be understood as a rational act of an orthodox majority which decided that it was necessary to undertake limited risks and to assume certain political costs in order to prevent the further disintegration of the communist order in Eastern Europe and to ensure the preservation of the existing balance of forces in Europe as a whole. It should not be seen as the first in a succession of reckless moves by the USSR which could ultimately engage NATO forces. The Soviets, we believe, will continue to avoid moves risking serious confrontation with the West so long as NATO maintains its essential military strength and political cohesion.

3. Possible Further Threats

Nevertheless, the instinct and determination to nail down the status quo has a dynamism of its own and could lead to further repressive measures and actions in Eastern Europe. Yakubovskiy’s tour to East European capitals is reportedly motivated by an attempt to strengthen Warsaw Pact defenses. Parallel moves to tighten economic links within the framework of CEMA may also be underway. Such moves beg the question of how far the Soviet Union intends to go to impose its brand of orthodoxy in the Warsaw Pact camp and to protect what the Soviet Union determines to be its vital interests. Even now Romania feels threatened despite the fact that it, unlike Czechoslovakia, has a party which is in absolute control and a frontier which does not border on “revanchist” West Germany. Similarly, Yugoslavia, even though it is not and has never been a member of the Warsaw Pact, is uncertain enough of Soviet intentions to believe that a Soviet military move against it is possible. Despite these fears, there is as yet no hard evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union intends to intervene militarily in these two countries. The danger of intervention would appear to increase if the Soviets, for example, felt it necessary to impose a harsh occupation regime in Czechoslovakia. Such an act would suggest that a hard-line majority was willing to escalate its military actions to stamp out heresy and would foreshadow increased impatience with “deviationism” in Romania, especially in the foreign policy arena, and critical, polemical attacks from the side of Yugoslavia. Moves against Romania and Yugoslavia would further pose the question whether the Soviet Union would consider violating Austrian neutrality for one reason or another to protect and advance its interests in Central Europe. Should such a chain of events take place, dangerous actions against Berlin could not be excluded, although in this instance the Soviets would have to consider more than in the other cases the likelihood of a Soviet military confrontation with the US and its allies.

4. General Issues and Strategy

In the foregoing cases, i.e., Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria and Berlin,NATO faces a range of challenges to the security and vital interests of its member countries. Although we would wish to deter a Soviet move against Romania, for example, the fact is that an invasion and occupation of that country would not seriously affect the vital interests of NATO or result in a significant shift in the strategic balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. It could be argued that invasion of Romania might weaken the Warsaw Pact war potential since additional Soviet forces would be required to neutralize the Romanian divisions—as in Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia would be of a totally different dimension, and the challenge at the far end of the spectrum, Berlin, would be much more acute and require an entirely different series of political and military responses.

In each case, however, NATO countries face two problems. The first is how best to combine political, psychological, economic and military moves to deter aggressive actions by the Soviets and their allies. Thus in the case of Yugoslavia, political assurances must be matched by higher and more visible stages of alert and action by NATO than in the case of Romania. This suggests that some NATO actions included in the Romanian contingency papers would be more credible if incorporated in contingency plans for Yugoslavia. The second question posed in each case is what action NATO should actually take in the event an invasion occurs or Berlin is physically threatened.

The attached papers discuss these issues and policy questions in detail and provide a basis for revising and fleshing out the contingency arrangements now incorporated in the general Romanian package.

Attachment 2

Washington, undated.

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁷

ROMANIAN CONTINGENCY

Summary: A Soviet invasion of Romania, while always possible, appears less likely than it did a month ago. Although NATO and the US have no security commitments vis-á-vis Romania, an invasion by the Soviet Union would be a matter of concern to the West. It would signify further Soviet willingness to resort to military force in international affairs. Such a move would also suggest an increased numerical strength in combat-ready Warsaw Pact forces and pose an increased threat to Yugoslavia where NATO strategic interests are more directly concerned. NATO military counter-intervention in Romania is unlikely since it could be the touchstone for World War III. NATO and US efforts should therefore focus primarily on political actions. Consideration would, however, have to be given to assistance of some kind should the Romanians resist. Every possible pressure would have to be brought to bear to forestall further military aggression and threats to European security.

1. Assessment of Invasion Possibility:

These factors are pro-invasion:

a. Having taken the step in Czechoslovakia, the Soviets are clearly capable of a second invasion. Romanian nationalistic communism, a chronic thorn in the Soviet side, would be eliminated or neutralized.

b. With the Romanians brought to heel, Warsaw Pact territory would once more come under complete Soviet control.

c. Soviet doctrine as articulated in the September 26 Pravda article effectively legitimizes such an action as far as the present Soviet leadership is concerned.

Anti-invasion signs:

a. In contrast to Czechoslovakia, the Romanian party is in complete control.

b. Unlike Czechoslovakia with its long common border with West Germany, Romania offers virtually no foreign security problems.

c. There is no hard, verifiable military or diplomatic intelligence indicating the likelihood of a Soviet invasion.

d. The Romanians have already made conciliatory noises and will doubtless be trying to convince the Soviets that they are not dangerous.

Conclusion: Given their present apprehensions, the Romanians will avoid giving the Soviets any pretext for intervention. The probable result: a low-key war of nerves for several months with the Romanians sensitive and generally accommodating to Soviet demands.

2. The NATO Stake:

a. Aggression anywhere in Europe is of concern to NATO.

b. Pressures on the rest of Europe would be greatly intensified.

c. An increased threat to Yugoslavia and, by extension, to the NATO southern and southeastern flanks would be posed.

Conclusion: These are important concerns. While eschewing military intervention, NATO should remain vigilant and weigh extremely carefully responses and reactions open to it to forestall a further deterioration in matters affecting European security and stability.

3. The US Concern:

Increasingly independent foreign policy moves by Romania since 1964 have coincided with our more substantial post-war efforts to improve our relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe. The gradual improvement in our relations with the Romanians has been a solid plus in our Eastern European policy. It cannot be forgotten, however, that we have no commitment to the Romanian communist leadership which has not hesitated to use repressive measures to control the population. Against this background, our concern over a Soviet invasion falls into these categories:

a. The remnants of hope for East-West détente which still existed following the Czechoslovak invasion would be further damaged by a second invasion.

b. The possibility of implementing the non-proliferation treaty or of opening new business in related fields would be substantially deferred.

c. A second invasion would further inhibit the bridge-building policy, at least in the foreseeable future. It would be extremely difficult to engage in “normal” economic, cultural or scientific exchanges with the Soviets or with regimes which had either collaborated in a Soviet invasion of a second Eastern European country or were themselves under increasingly inhibiting Soviet control.

d. A more direct and immediate threat of an invasion of Yugoslavia than now exists would have been created.

4. US Action Objectives:

Our dominant objective must be to forestall further aggression. We could at least partially achieve this if we were disposed to use military means. This course is impracticable for the following reasons:

a. If NATO were to act militarily, this could trigger World War III since it would involve us in a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union in an area where we have no security commitment and in which the Soviet Union considers its interests paramount.

b. Even if military intervention by NATO were considered desirable or necessary, it is doubtful that sufficient ground forces could be brought to bear soon enough to affect the complete takeover of Romania by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.

c. Public opinion would perhaps have a difficult time believing that the security of the West should be endangered to save a communist regime which has not been above using Stalinist methods against its population. In the mind of the public, the Czechoslovak experiment to evolve a more democratic and humane form of socialism would have been more worthy of fighting to save than the Romanian nationalist form of communism.

d. Unlike Yugoslavia, there has been no precedent for tangibly supporting Romania’s independence and integrity by means of significant military aid and economic assistance.

5. Our Options:

Although military intervention is inadvisable, this should not foreclose considerable US, NATO, and UN activity in other areas. The President’s August 30 speech⁸ and the Secretary’s three meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin (August 23, 30 and 31)⁹ all conveyed a message of deep US concern over the possibility of a Soviet invasion.

As a general proposition, we should (a) assume an escalated national posture of moral outrage, (b) cease all but the most urgent bilateral contacts with the aggressor powers, (c) consult urgently with our NATO allies, (d) have recourse to the Security Council, and (e) consider carefully types of assistance which could conceivably be of some help should the Romanians in fact put up a stiff resistance.

6. Contingencies and Responses:

The Soviet capability to invade Romania in any desired strength and by any military means or mixes of means from any or all of four directions—Ikraine-Moldavia, Hungary (plus forces based in Czechoslovakia), a, and the Black Sea—is impressive. This is the basic contingency, and the responses we are likely to make are those cited earlier. Gradations in style, timing, manner of orchestration, political preparations, or others may create contingencies demanding somewhat different immediate reactions. The subsequent list of such possibilities and recommended US actions is by no means exhaustive:

a. Continuing Evidence of Soviet and Warsaw Pact Military Buildup:

We and our NATO allies—as well as concerned governments anywhere—should maintain constant top-level pressure on the Soviets, preferably through their Ambassadors, along lines already exercised in the US.

b. Advance Warning and Request for US Assistance:

The timing of a Romanian request for military or economic assistance is unpredictable. Military aid is likely to prove impracticable. The decision as to whether and how to grant economic assistance would depend on type, terms, need, and availability (reserves and pipeline). But even extending US economic assistance of any kind to Romania could be considered provocative by the Soviets.

c. Severe Economic Warfare Against Romania by the Soviets:

There has been some evidence, notably in formal Romanian requests that Western European countries step up purchases of Romanian goods, that some traditional markets in the USSR and Eastern Europe are at least temporarily closed to Romanian merchandise. Interestingly, the Romanians have not approached us. If they do, we should promise to look into possibilities for an early expansion of trade.

d. Soviet-Directed Coup d’Etat in Romania:

There is little we could do. We can and should, however, exploit such a development in our propaganda output. We should also recall our Ambassador until an “election” is held and a new regime “legalized” and the situation is assessed.

e. Czechoslovak-Style Invasion:

The scenario of political actions suggested in the existing contingency papers should be followed closely. Military measures such as an increase in vigilance should be screened carefully, however, to insure against giving false signals either to the Soviets or to our Western allies as to the nature of our intended reaction.

In a meeting with Dobrynin, the Secretary should warn against any further moves by the Soviets and make clear that any encroachment on Yugoslavia, Austria, Berlin or Germany would be of a totally different dimension and would risk triggering World War III.

f. Unexpectedly Strong Romanian Resistance:

Neither the capacity of the Romanian military nor the experience of Romanian history suggests the likelihood of protracted military resistance, guerrilla warfare, or even, in fact, harassments of the type executed by the Czechoslovaks in the early days of the Soviet invasion. In the unlikely event that any of these materialize, however, we could not ignore considering whatever options may be open that entail limited risks.

g. Dismemberment of Romania:

The Soviets might conceivably detach Transylvania and hand it to loyal Hungary. They should be criticized harshly for perpetrating such an action.

Attachment 3

Washington, undated.

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹⁰

YUGOSLAV CONTINGENCY

Summary: The immediate possibility of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia is sharply limited. Our concern is based on the threat posed to the NATO area. We are also interested in preserving Yugoslavia’s independent and relatively liberal image. If an invasion materializes, we should extend the Yugoslavs maximum political support and selective economic assistance upon request. If military conditions permit and the Yugoslavs ask for help, we should grant them conventional small arms, transport equipment, and spare parts, if we have them.

1. Assessment of Invasion Possibility:

Advantages for the Soviets:

a. The Soviet military and strategic position would be superb. It would also force an expansive redeployment of NATO forces.

b. A long-standing irritant, the peculiar but successful Yugoslav brand of socialism, would be reshaped and brought back into line.

c. Dramatic proof of Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe would have been demonstrated—and would provide a ready answer to doubters in both parts of Europe.

Anti-Invasion Factors:

a. An invasion of Yugoslavia would be long, costly, complex, and probably more trouble than it would be worth.

b. It is possible that an invasion attempt would not be entirely successful.

c. Yugoslavia has long since been written off as part of the Soviet-dominated world. It has never been in the Warsaw Pact or CEMA and has been identified as a leading neutral for close to 20 years. Although they have frequently antagonized the Soviets, however, the Yugoslavs have more often than not cooperated with them.

d. The US and NATO would be considerably more concerned than they were in the Czechoslovak or Romanian cases and might react militarily. This could trigger a wider war.

Conclusion: It appears highly doubtful that the Soviets will take the enormous risk of invading Yugoslavia for the questionable gains that would be achieved.

2. The NATO Stake:

The strategic and security considerations raised by a Soviet invasion are serious and possibly vital to the defense of Europe for these reasons:

a. The balance of military power in the Mediterranean and in the NATO southern and southeastern areas would be significantly altered.

b. A direct threat to Italy and Greece would be posed.

c. An important military challenge to NATO itself would have been offered.

d. Austrian neutrality would be challenged, both by the possibility that Soviet troops would cross Austria en route to Yugoslavia and by the presence of Soviet forces in Yugoslavia.

3. The US Concern:

Our stake in Yugoslavia since 1948 has been political, economic, and, to an uncertain degree, strategic. Cooperation with the Tito regime has been uneven, both in substance and objective. Although we have had cause to welcome Yugoslav political independence, and its development of considerable domestic liberalization, we have only rarely achieved any identity of views. There has been no effective military relationship for a decade. On most issues affecting world peace or European security the Yugoslav position has been considerably closer to the Soviet than to ours. Recent examples include Viet-Nam and the Middle East.

We would nevertheless be deeply concerned over a Soviet invasion, both for the reasons cited in the preceding paragraphs, and because of the evidence it would provide of Soviet readiness to continue an aggressively adventurous course immediately adjacent to the NATO area. If this followed an invasion of Romania, it would be the third case of direct Soviet aggression in Eastern and Central Europe. The argument for considering active counter-measures stems basically, therefore, from the actual direct danger to US and Western European security interests offered by a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia.

4. US Action Objectives:

We would want ideally to prevent this invasion without becoming directly involved. In fact, to prevent without involvement is all but impossible, because any truly preventive steps would entail the serious risk of triggering a wider war, but on the other hand our actual security stake in Yugoslavia is too large and immediate for us to resist some type of involvement as proposed below.

Our political debt to Yugoslavia for past “favors” is non-existent. In a post-invasion situation, any political or action objectives we might have would be directed almost exclusively to protecting the regional NATO position and forestalling further aggression rather than shielding the Tito regime. Our other interests can be practically served only by contributing to the prevention of an invasion.

5. Our Options:

a. The Case of Assistance:

Both politically and psychologically, supporting Yugoslavia is more attractive, convenient, and necessary than assisting Czechoslovakia or Romania. The Yugoslavs have considerable appeal in the West, they are closer and more identifiable geographically and, as they have done so skillfully in the past, they would actively resist invasion. These and actual military factors are a strong argument for proferring quick, effective assistance to Yugoslavia. They are not completely offset by the character of the Tito regime which, although more “liberal” than that of any other Communist country, is still basically undemocratic, or by the fact that the Communist Yugoslav Government has supported the Soviet position on virtually every major international issue since 1955. The balance tips toward some kind of assistance beyond the political steps we should take almost automatically.

b. Political-Military Action:

At a minimum, we should quickly take all of the steps described in the contingency papers for Romania and several others. These should include, both in the pre- and post-invasion periods, as appropriate:

(1) Strong statements by the President and other NATO chiefs of state.

(2) Regular, preferably inconvenient call-ins of Ambassador Dobrynin here and similar action by the NATO Governments.

(3) Early, unmistakable reference to the risk and real possibility of nuclear war.

(4) Convening of emergency NAC meeting followed as quickly as possible by force deployments calculated to demonstrate NATO determination to defend its regional interests.

(5) Instructions on increasing military vigilance measures, return of redeployed US NATO air and army units, and redeployment of Spanish-based air squadrons.

(6) Emergency meeting of Security Council and other appropriate UN action.

(7) Announcement of the suspension of travel of US military dependents to Europe and return of those already there.

c. Economic Assistance:

The accompanying action memorandum “Assistance to Yugoslavia in the Eventuality of Soviet Military Pressures”¹¹ sets forth the procedures to be followed to facilitate granting economic aid to Yugoslavia. The steps described in it should be taken upon determination that Soviet military intervention is likely.

d. Military Aid:

Aside from a military sales agreement, which amounts to an undertaking to sell Yugoslavia spare parts for equipment it obtained from us in the 1950’s, we have no military responsibility for providing military aid to Yugoslavia. Legal obstructions which now exist can be overcome according to procedures set forth in the accompanying paper.

We should be prepared to engage in military support operations for Yugoslavia in these circumstances:

(1) Only if requested by the Yugoslavs.

(2) No involvement of US or NATO personnel beyond participation in delivery operations.

(3) Heavy equipment of a type requiring considerable lead time for delivery should not be provided.

(4) If portable relatively easily deliverable equipment can be furnished at any stage of hostilities, we should take all necessary steps to grant it.

(5) The Yugoslav military genius is in guerrilla-type operations. We should orient our assistance in that direction.

6. Contingencies and Responses:

An invasion of Yugoslavia can occur in any one or combination of several ways:

a. The movement of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces through Bulgaria and Romania.

b. An invasion which would include the movement of Warsaw Pact forces through Romania either with Romanian agreement or after, or accompanying, an occupation of Romania itself.

c. An invasion which would include the movement of Warsaw Pact forces through Austria.

Our response to the invasion of Yugoslavia itself would not be materially different whichever routes of invasion were involved.

The Soviets can in any case invade and occupy large areas of Yugoslavia quickly and probably effectively with elements from Hungary, Bulgaria, and (by air) the USSR as well as with occupation forces from Czechoslovakia and probably Romania. They would have considerable difficulty, however, in taking the country. The Yugoslav resistance potential is an enormous, proven quantity. It is highly probable that the Western response would, in the final analysis, be directed to bolstering and feeding it.

Attachment 4

Washington, undated.

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹²

AUSTRIAN CONTINGENCY

A. Strategy and Issues

Soviet action against Austria would indeed present a grave challenge to the United States and our national interests would be seriously involved. The threat to us would arise from a combination of strategic, psychological and political factors.

Strategic

Austria has no strategic resources or other important strategic considerations except for its geography. The gain of Austrian territory by the Soviet Union, however, would provide it with a more defensible line against the West, would provide it with a natural corridor for access to Yugoslavia, and potentially Italy and Germany, and would deprive the West of a strategically located corridor for its access to Eastern Europe.

Psychological

Austria has demonstrated in recent weeks its concern regarding Soviet action against Czechoslovakia. That concern would undoubtedly intensify if moves appeared imminent against Romania and Yugoslavia. The Austrian press has discussed the desirability of an American guarantee of Austrian neutrality and Chancellor Klaus has informally inquired of Ambassador MacArthur what our reaction would be to Soviet aggression against his country.¹³ We are committed by the State Treaty of 1955¹⁴ to recognize Austrian independence but we have no commitment to protect or guarantee that independence. There is no doubt, however, that the loss of Austria would be a severe psychological defeat for the West.

Political

The challenge to this country in a Soviet move against Austria would be greatest in its political aspects. Austrian independence and neutrality has been clearly recognized by East and West and has become an important fact of political life in Central Europe over the past 13 years. An effort by the Soviet Union to violate that independence and neutrality would clearly be a change in the status quo which would threaten U.S. national interests.

B. Scenarios

There are several possible ways in which the Soviet Union might effect its move against Austria. There could be a request to the Austrian Government for free passage of Warsaw Pact forces across Austrian territory to reach Yugoslavia. There could be an unannounced violation of Austrian air space and territory by Soviet forces en route to Yugoslavia. Finally, there could be a statement by the Soviet Union that Austria was not living up to the terms of the State Treaty and, to protect Austrian independence, the Soviet Union was obliged to move into Austria to carry out the terms of the treaty.

We see no likelihood of a coup d’etat in Austria in connection with a Soviet move. The Communist Party is no threat and the Austrian people have clearly demonstrated their disapproval and revulsion of the Soviet moves in Czechoslovakia. Austria has said it would resist any Soviet move by force; our assessment of the capability of the Austrian armed forces, however, leads us to believe that Austrian resistance would be ineffectual militarily, although it might create a psychological impact.

Request for Passage

The Austrians would undoubtedly respond that, as a neutral and sovereign nation, they could not permit the use of their territory for military operations against another nation. They would probably refer to the State Treaty and call upon the U.S., the UK and France to intercede with the fourth signatory to honor the obligation in that treaty to respect Austrian independence. Our response to such a request should be positive. We should issue, in the form of a Presidential or Secretarial statement, a call to the Soviet Union to honor its Treaty obligation. We should announce consultations with the British and French. We should announce our intention to convoke a meeting of the Security Council to discuss this matter on an urgent basis.

Unannounced Violation

The Austrians are fully aware of their inability to oppose the Warsaw Pact forces militarily. Their announced intention to do so is therefore probably aimed at exerting psychological pressure on the West to come to their defense and to help avert their defeat. Depending upon the time available to them, they would undoubtedly make public requests for assistance. These requests would be for ammunition, supplies, arms, air support, and commitment of Western forces, in an ascending order of involvement. Our response to these requests would have to be determined in the light of other developments and requirements for U.S. forces at the same time.

Alleged Violation of the Treaty

The above two scenarios discuss a move by the Soviets against Austria in conjunction with a move against Yugoslavia. It is possible, although less likely, that the Soviets might move against Austria alone, without at the same time undertaking a move into Yugoslavia. Such a move would probably be couched in the terms of a necessity by the Soviet Union to take action to correct a failure by the Austrians to live up to their commitments under the State Treaty, most likely a claim they had violated Article IV which prohibits union with Germany.

Our response to this would be framed in terms of the Treaty. The Treaty provides a mechanism for consultation among the four chiefs of mission at Vienna on disputes arising from interpretations of the Treaty and we should use that mechanism to blunt the Soviet charges. Our reaction should be in concert with France and Great Britain and should also include a convening of the Security Council.

Finally, however, it is recommended that we consider a preemptive move regarding Austria. Our public statements to date have not referred to Austria specifically and such a reference at an early moment would appear to be appropriate. We should undertake immediately to consult with France and Britain, reminding them they, too, have responsibilities under the State Treaty. We could suggest to them that the Secretary, Stewart and Debre call in the respective Soviet Ambassadors and state that recent developments have caused us to re-examine the State Treaty and our mutual obligations thereunder. In order that there be no misunderstanding, each Ambassador would be requested to report to Moscow the firm intention of his host government to uphold and honor the State Treaty and our firm expectation that the Soviet Union would do the same. The Ambassadors would be asked to convey to Moscow the three governments’ views that any Soviet move against Austria would be a grave and serious threat to the peace of Europe and would be considered a clear indication that the Soviet Union was no longer interested in maintaining that peace.

1. Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 87. Secret With Top Secret Attachments. Drafted by Beaudry.
2. Attachment 5, “Report on Berlin Task Force Planning,” October 1, is not printed.
3. Secret. Drafted by Dubs (EUR/SOV) on September 30.
4. Reference is to the Brezhnev Doctrine, originally propounded by Soviet Communist Party spokesman Sergei Kovalev in an article entitled “Sovereignty and International Responsibility of Socialist Countries” in Pravda, September 26, 1968. A translation is printed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, October 16, 1968, and Remington, Winter in Prague, pp. 412–416.
5. See Document 91.
6. Brackets in the source text.
7. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
8. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69, Book II, pp. 917–920.
9. See Documents 87, 90, and 167.
10. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
11. Not printed.
12. Secret. Drafted by Crump (EUR/AIS) on September 30.
13. See Document 202.
14. For text of the treaty, signed May 15, 1955, in Vienna, see Department of State Bulletin, June 6, 1955, pp. 916–932.