Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe

202. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State¹

Vienna, September 4, 1968, 1628Z.

6390. Subject: Chancellor Klaus informal request for indication of US reaction if Austria were attacked. Ref: Vienna 6174, Vienna 6253.²

1. Chancellor Klaus asked me to call today to exchange views on “very informal basis” re developments in Central and Eastern Europe. After reviewing again reasons (Vienna 6174) why GOA statements re Czech invasion had been without polemics (he is still obviously sensitive to some domestic criticism for not speaking out more strongly), he inquired how we presently viewed threat to Romania and Yugoslavia. Drawing on Dept’s helpful guidance,³ I told him that while Soviets obviously had formidable capability to move on Romania, information available does not lead us to believe intervention is in prospect for time being. Re Yugoslavia, I indicated I knew of no intelligence indicating there is any extraordinary Warsaw Pact build-up on Yugoslav frontiers. Furthermore, some qualified observers in Europe and elsewhere doubted that present Soviet leadership would undertake what Stalin had decided was not a profitable venture some twenty years ago.

2. Klaus said while he also doubted Soviets planned any imminent military move against Romania, Yugoslavia or elsewhere at this time, one could never be certain. Therefore, on most confidential and informal basis, he would like to know how we would react if in fact Soviets moved in Europe against such targets as Romania, Yugoslavia, West Berlin and particularly Austria. (Comment: Klaus obviously asked me to call to put this to me.)

3. I replied to Klaus that I would try answer his question on a personal basis. Each of the four targets he mentioned represented a different situation. Romania, like Czechoslovakia, was a member of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON and therefore full-fledged member of Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia, by contrast, while Communist state, had been independent of Moscow since 1948. Furthermore, it seemed certain that if Soviets moved on Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs would resist bitterly as they had the German invasion in the last war. West Berlin represented still another situation in that we were present there and had rights and responsibilities stemming from 4-Power Agreement to which Soviets were a signatory. President Kennedy had made crystal clear to Khrushchev in their Vienna meeting that West Berlin was not negotiable and if the Soviets did indeed move on West Berlin militarily, they would have to attack US forces stationed there.⁴ Austria, on the other hand, was a militarily neutral country and not a member of any Western security pact. However, we, as well as Britain, France and Soviet Union, were signatories of the Austrian State Treaty which recognized Austria’s independence and territorial integrity. If Soviets invaded free and independent Austria, a very grave situation would obviously arise which would affect the military balance of power and equilibrium in Europe. Exactly how the United States or other NATO countries would react to such an aggression I could not say. However, in this connection I assumed that as chief of government of a neutral state he was not seeking any specific guarantee or assurance as to how we or other NATO countries would react militarily but rather sought a general indication of our reaction to an attack on Austria.

4. Klaus hastened to say that his query was informal, that he would make no record of our conversation, that I was right in assuming he wanted to know our “political reaction rather than military reaction,” and that he hoped our conversation would be held in strictest confidence. He said, however, that he would be grateful if we could give him some private indication that there would be a “serious political reaction in the United States if Austria were attacked.” I replied I would hold the substance of our discussion in strictest confidence and would report it most confidentially to Dept. I personally felt that we would take a very grave view of any Soviet attack against Austria since, as contrasted with the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it would be an attack against a free and independent nation that was really a basic part of Western Europe even though it was militarily neutral.

5. Comment: I believe I have steered Klaus away from the idea that it would be either wise or prudent for him to try to obtain from us some specific assurance of how we would react to a Soviet attack on Austria since obviously we are not in a position to give any such assurances. However, I do recommend that I be authorized to inform Klaus that I reported his conversation to Washington which informed me in reply that USG would indeed take most serious and grave view of an attack on Austria, etc. Would appreciate Dept’s comments Sept. 9 as Klaus indicated he would like another “informal” discussion about events in Central and Eastern Europe next week.⁵

MacArthur

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS–USSR. Secret; Limdis.
2. Telegram 6174 from Vienna, August 24, and telegram 6253 from Vienna, August 28, are ibid., POL 27–1 COMBLOC–CZECH.
3. Probably a reference to telegram 231312 to Vienna, August 31, which provided the Department’s updated analysis of the Czech situation. (Ibid.)
4. For documentation on the Vienna summit June 3–4, 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volumes V and XIV.
5. In telegram 234682 to Vienna, September 7, the Department of State authorized MacArthur to tell Klaus that the United States had undertaken to respect Austrian independence in the State Treaty, which “remains fully valid today,” and that the United States “would regard a Soviet attack against Austria as an extremely serious and grave threat to peace.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS–USSR) MacArthur relayed this message to Klaus on September 9. He reported on his meeting with the Chancellor in telegram 6459 from Vienna, September 9. (Ibid.)