Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe

204. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 21, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Eastern European Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Austrian
  • His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • His Excellency Dr. Ernst Lemberger, Austrian Ambassador
  • His Excellency Dr. Arno Halusa, Director General of Political Affairs
• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. John E. Crump, Desk Officer, Austria-Switzerland

Czechoslovakia

Minister Waldheim emphasized that, contrary to the impression created by Austrian newspapers, there had not been a sense of panic among the Austrians and there had never been a fear of Soviet invasion, although there had been and still remains serious concern. He admitted that the Austrian military establishment had contributed to the sense of nervousness by its prediction of Soviet action against Austria. This fear had been based upon the large numbers of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia,² illegal over-flights over Austrian territory and a three-day period when Soviet leaders were not available to the Austrian Ambassador in Moscow. The current feeling is that the Soviets will not undertake direct action against Austria because to do so would bring on a direct confrontation with the West. It is difficult to see into the future but Austria expects no action by Warsaw Pact powers against Yugoslavia or Austria.

The Secretary replied that in August we had considered the chances of an intervention in Czechoslovakia to be 51/49. We had the impression from the Soviet Ambassador and others that developments in Prague represented a fundamental threat to the Soviet Union and that possible Czech defection from the Communist Bloc had been raised. In addition, the Czechs themselves had raised questions regarding the fundamental governing position of the Communist Party.

The question which now remains is the presence of Soviet forces near the Bavarian border. This is a problem for NATO and certain steps will be taken—these steps are a matter of prudence rather than steps arising from a fear of immediate attack.

Possible Future Soviet Actions

The Secretary outlined possible actions which might be taken by Warsaw Pact powers in a descending order of gravity.

1. Action against Berlin; this would clearly mean war.

2. At almost the same level, any Soviet move against Austria would surely involve a confrontation with the West. The U.S., France and Great Britain have an interest in Austrian independence arising from the State Treaty and if Austria were to call on the signatories of the Treaty to help her preserve her independence, this would surely precipitate a crisis.

3. Soviet action against Yugoslavia would produce a far more formidable crisis than Czechoslovakia. We cannot look calmly at Soviet actions aimed at the Adriatic area. The question arises whether Yugoslavia is still considered a member of the Socialist commonwealth. In this regard, the Secretary mentioned a press briefing recently at the Soviet Embassy which indicated that the Soviets do not consider Yugoslavia to be a member of the Socialist Bloc.

4. An attack on Romania would have different motivations because there is no question there of the monopoly of the Communist Party. The question regarding possible intervention in Romania was put directly to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin who replied categorically that the Soviet Union is not planning action against that country.³ While it is questionable what value should be given to that response, we do not see the threat of military action against Romania nor any of the other three areas at the present time.

This can obviously change very quickly. We are concerned about the recent Pravda article which apparently set forth a new doctrine of the “Socialist commonwealth.”⁴ It may be that this is an explanation of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia to those persons in the Soviet Union and elsewhere who require such an explanation. On the other hand, the Soviets may have indeed evolved this new theory which may be used to explain further military moves.

In summary, we doubt the likelihood of further military moves at the present, although the situation remains one of utmost gravity. An attack against West Berlin, a NATO country or Austria would present an extremely grave situation; Soviet moves in other areas would be less serious but still grave.

Western Responses

Minister Waldheim said that it was of great importance to make clear to the Soviet Union that an act against a neutral European country would lead to counter-action. The Secretary replied that the NATO Ministerial meeting in mid-November will show a clear response on the part of NATO.⁵ It is important that all Western countries move together and the days of a response by the U.S. alone are over. For example, during the 1961 Berlin crisis the U.S. added $6 billion to its defense budget, called up reserves and took actions which were not taken by any other NATO country. Similarly, we were alone in some actions following the Czechoslovak invasion. Europe cannot say that it is up to the U.S. alone to respond to Czechoslovakia.

The Secretary said he would hope that if the Austrians receive any information or indications of Soviet pressure, they would immediately inform the U.S., Great Britain and France so that we can make clear to the Soviet Union our reaction. In the case of Romania we had felt it necessary to make a public statement⁶ and to call in the Soviet Ambassador;⁷ we would need as much advance warning as possible if similar actions were to be undertaken regarding Austria.

Soviet Internal Reaction

The Secretary noted that the Soviets certainly could have predicted the disadvantages which would accrue from their intervention in Czechoslovakia—unfavorable publicity in Czechoslovakia, division among the Eastern Europeans, splits in Western Communist parties. They were willing to pay this price and this may indicate a willingness to move back to the cold war days in the Kremlin. Another explanation may lie in the fact that committee actions, such as are required within the present Soviet Government, make it difficult for an individual to oppose the majority view and this may have a bearing on future moves. It is clear that the Soviets have become afraid of peaceful co-existence.

The Secretary added that the Soviet Government may now realize that its intervention in Czechoslovakia has developed badly and cannot survive without far reaching changes. The Soviets face problems with their youth and with minority national groups. They must continually deal with nostalgia in Eastern European countries for ties to the West. These factors have created a difficult situation and their awareness of the situation causes them to be nervous and afraid and they are therefore dangerous.

Austrian Views

Minister Waldheim responded that the Austrian judgment of the present situation is similar. However, while the Austrians see no danger in the immediate future, they are concerned about long-run developments, particularly in connection with hostilities in the Middle East. If war breaks out again in the Middle East the Soviets can be expected to make further moves in Eastern Europe.

He agreed that it was necessary for the U.S. and Austria to keep in close touch regarding any increases in Soviet pressures against Austria. He said that he had been asked about guarantees of Austrian neutrality and had responded that the obligations in the State Treaty are sufficient for that purpose. It is clear to the Soviet Union that an action against Austria would bring on a new war and there is therefore no necessity for any further guarantee.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E–USSR. Secret. Drafted by Crump and approved in S on October 24. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office. Waldheim was in the United States attending the U.N. General Assembly.
2. Soviet troops held maneuvers in Czechoslovakia June 19–30.
3. See Document 167.
4. Reference is to the “Brezhnev Doctrine.” See footnote 4, Document 23.
5. The NAC Ministerial Meeting was held in Brussels November 15–16. For text of the NATO declaration, see Department of State Bulletin, December 9, 1968, pp. 595–597.
6. Apparently a reference to President Johnson’s August 30 address at San Antonio, Texas. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69, Book II, pp. 917–920.
7. See Document 165.