Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe

165. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 30, 1968, 9 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Romania

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
• Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

The Secretary noted that the Ambassador had asked to see him August 31 and inquired whether or not he could take up now the matter for which he had asked for an appointment.

The Ambassador looked somewhat surprised but said he had been instructed to make an oral communication, a copy of which is attached.² He said he had been instructed to see either the President or the Secretary.

When the Ambassador had finished his oral statement, the Secretary reminded him that at their last meeting he had referred to disturbing reports in regard to Romania.³

The Ambassador said he had reported his conversation but had received no reply.

The Secretary said that we continue to get reports that were disturbing and that in the last 24 hours we had received a number of reports of troop movements, incidents on the frontier, etc. He asked whether the Ambassador had any basis on which he could give him assurances that action against Romania was not intended.

Dobrynin said he had no official information but that he personally doubted that any such action was contemplated.

The Secretary said that if such action were contemplated, he wished in the name of all humanity to ask that it not be done. The results of such action on world affairs would be incalculable.

Dobrynin inquired if the Romanians felt the same way. He referred to reports that the Romanian Ambassador had called in the Department.

The Secretary said we had no reports whatever from the Romanians. He wished, however, to underline the gravity of this problem. We were deeply concerned. He hoped the Ambassador would not misinterpret his moderate manner. Our attitude was based upon well-known principles that had motivated us throughout our history. Our attitude on Czechoslovakia was not related to our bilateral relations with that country which were not particularly good. We believed, however, that every country, large or small, had a right to national existence. We respect that among our NATO allies and we thought the Soviets should respect it among their Warsaw Pact allies. We cannot understand how the state interests of the Soviet Union were involved in any way that would justify military action. Czechoslovakia was not going to leave the Warsaw Pact or join NATO and no one was threatening them. We wished to express in strongest terms the expectation that the Soviet Union does not contemplate the further use of military force against any countries of Eastern Europe.

The Secretary said he wished again to underline the seriousness with which we took the Ambassador’s statement to the President on August 20⁴ and repeated today, that the Soviet Union did not intend in any way to threaten the state interests of the US. He wished to point out that among these interests was Berlin. Frankly, we did not trust Ulbricht. We wished to emphasize the gravity of any move with respect to Berlin in the current situation. He also wished to point out that the thoughts he had expressed carried the authority of the President with whom he had just talked by telephone. The Secretary said he would be available any time, day or night, if the Ambassador had anything to say to him.

Dobrynin asked if he could report that he had made his oral statement and that the Secretary would study it and comment later.

The Secretary agreed but said he could say now with respect to the reference in the statement to revanchist and imperialist threats to socialist countries that there was no such threat, no CIA plot, there was no intrusion into any of these countries in a manner hostile to the Soviet Union. We could not accept a statement that revanchists or imperialists were carrying out any threat to any of these countries.

Dobrynin referred to a UPI statement on the ticker and wondered whether this was officially inspired. It had referred to a possible meeting between Kosygin and the President as well as to the effect of Czech developments upon our cultural relations.

The Secretary said he would have to look at the stories before he could comment but he urged the Ambassador not to confuse any such reports with what he had said to him this evening. He said the President had been trying to make clear our attitudes on Czechoslovakia but he had also wished to keep our options open. The President thought that the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia was a great mistake on the part of the Soviet Union and that the US respects the right of a small country even though it was one with which our relations were not good, but the President still thinks that there are major problems that need attention. The President had had many phone calls and direct statements made to him that we were not strong enough on Czechoslovakia. If there were additional actions of this kind, it would be a great tragedy. The Secretary said that the American people are pretty mad about the Czechoslovakian affair. Anything that happened between our two great countries could be tragic for the whole world.

1. Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379. Secret; Limdis. No drafting information is on source text; the memorandum was approved in S on September 3. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office. For a telegraphic report of this meeting, see Document 90.
2. Not attached. A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Walt Rostow Files, Czech 1968.
3. See Document 87.
4. See Document 80.