Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State¹

Budapest, November 30, 1967, 1626Z.

663. Subject: Conversation with Party First Secretary Janos Kadar.

1. My introductory call today on Party First Secretary Janos Kadar lasted one hour and ten minutes. He obviously wanted to go beyond the usual exchange of pleasantries for such an occasion, and after a few minutes launched into a long, somewhat discursive but obviously prepared statement of how he saw the state of relations between US and Hungary. There was no false modesty, and he spoke with the assurance of someone who is not only party boss but the real power in this country.

2. Kadar began by welcoming fact that US had sent its first Ambassador to Hungary. This was useful step, although fact that it had taken nearly a year to accomplish after initial announcement was in itself indicative of our current difficulties. When last December US had proposed a date for announcement of mutual raising of diplomatic establishments to Embassy rank, this date by accident happened to coincide with an important party congress in Budapest. When it was suggested that it might be inopportune to make such an announcement at that time, he had brushed this objection aside, since he sincerely believed the value of establishing full relations with the US and saw no reason to qualify such a step, or to postpone its public announcement, merely because of a party meeting. The great majority of the Hungarian people undoubtedly support better relations with the US, and this was a fact that any Hungarian leader had to take into account.

3. He had been fully informed of my previous discussions with Hungarian officials including that yesterday with Parliament President Kallai (reported A–199 Nov 30, 1967),² Kadar continued, and had taken note of the statements made. The task of a new Ambassador in Budapest would in some respects be pleasant but in other respects difficult. It would be pleasant because the Hungarian authorities were prepared to deal sympathetically with outstanding problems between the two countries in an effort to dispose of those which would be solved. They would be polite and helpful in every legitimate way. The Ambassador’s role would, however, be difficult because of the admitted differences between Hungary and the US on major issues. He recalled that a school friend of his who had planned to become a diplomat had once lent him a manual for students of diplomacy. From this he had learned that a primary function of diplomacy was to strive to achieve peaceful solutions of outstanding problems. In this sense, the US would find that the Hungarian Government practiced diplomacy in its best form. He wanted us to know that the Hungarian authorities were really sincere in their espousal of peaceful coexistence as the only rational approach today between countries whose systems were based on differing theories of society. It might not have been possible to say this 20 years ago, when the force of ideologies was much more intense, but the basic problem today was to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war between the two superpowers.

4. He did not want to belabor the past, Kadar observed, but he did want to bring to my attention two problems between Hungary and the US which he felt it useful to examine for their illustrative value. The first of these was the Mindszenty case (his remarks on this subject are being reported in a separate Limdis telegram to Dept).³ The second was the handling of the Hungarian question in the UN. He referred to a chance meeting which he had had in 1963 with Governor Harriman (then Under Secretary of State) at the Moscow Sports Stadium. He had compared the situation at that time as similar to two boxers who had been slugging at each other for seven rounds (from 1956 to 1963). Neither could hope to knock the other out, neither was prepared to capitulate, and neither could ultimately hope to gain very much from the contest. Hungary was not prepared to come on its knees to the US, and he knew the US was not prepared to assume this posture before Hungary. As I knew, he went on, the UN problem had now been solved in an acceptable way. If we approached current problems in the same spirit which had finally led to a solution of the Hungarian question in the UN, based upon realistic acceptance of the facts of life, then there was good possibility of advancing towards agreement in other areas.

5. The system which existed in Hungary today is a reality, Kadar stressed with some emphasis, and it is a fact that it will remain. Compared to the feudal conditions which had existed in the country until the end of World War II, the present system was certainly far superior for the masses of the Hungarian people, who had previously lived in abject poverty. He was willing to concede that many in the US would undoubtedly still like to change the system in Hungary, and he would be the first to admit that he would like to make some changes in the American system. However, as a realist, he recognized that this was out of the question. Mutual recognition of each other’s systems as facts of life was basic premise of peaceful coexistence. Both sides would, of course, indulge in propaganda against each other, but firm and realistic acceptance of this truth would not let the possibilities of improving our relations be submerged by such propaganda.

6. Kadar said that he did not want to spoil the cordiality of this initial talk by any pointed references to Viet-Nam, but he did want to observe that, while the US might win further victories there, it could not in the final result be victorious.

7. He concluded his remarks (which by surreptitiously glancing at my watch I timed as lasting 55 minutes) by reiterating his pleasure at the establishment of relations at the Ambassadorial level between Hungary and the US, his hope that I would have a pleasant stay in Budapest, and that both sides would mutually make a genuine contribution towards better relations between our countries.

8. I responded by noting that he had indicated he had received a full report of my previous discussions with Hungarian officials, and I would therefore not repeat what he already knew. As I had pointed out in my previous talks, the basic framework of current American policy towards countries such as Hungary was set forth in the President’s speech of Oct. 7, 1966, and I hoped that, in the spirit of the speech and of his own remarks about the desirability of coming to grips with the problems between us we could move towards a solution of at least some of them. I hoped soon to begin talks with Deputy Foreign Minister Szilagyi, after his return to Budapest early in December, on the various matters which I had raised with Foreign Minister Peter and which had been incorporated in an aide-mémoire sent to the Foreign Minister.⁴ I finally observed that our objective in Viet-Nam was not to be victorious in the sense of desiring conquest of the country, but to achieve the limited objectives which had been set forth in numerous statements by American leaders.

9. Comment: Although Kadar’s remarks fell pretty much in the same pattern as those of my previous conversations with Hungarian leaders, I report them here at some length because they represent, I believe, the first contact in recent years between an American official and the undisputed leader of this country. Kadar was in an obviously relaxed, good humored, sometimes semi-ironic mood. He was well-briefed and had apparently carefully thought out the line of argument he wished to use. He seemed to enjoy playing the role of a confident leader big enough to forget the past, and hopeful for betterment of Hungarian-American relations though very mindful of present difficulties.

Hillenbrand

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, Munich, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., POL 15–1 HUNG)
3. Telegram 665 from Budapest, December 1. (Ibid., SOC 12–1 HUNG)
4. See footnote 6, Document 112.