112. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State1
626. 1. During 45 minute discussion this morning with FonMin Peter, I went over the areas in which progress might be made in moving towards solution of at least some of our outstanding problems with the Hungarian Government. Starting from the general philosophy outlined in the President’s speech of Oct 7 1966,2 I expressed the conviction that, despite admitted differences, we could most usefully come to grips with the issues between us on a pragmatic case by case basis, and noted that in our conversation on Nov 17 Prime Minister Fock3 had concurred in this general approach.
2. Under consular matters, stated that we would be prepared to negotiate a consular convention with the Hungarian Government. This would serve a mutually useful purpose, regularize the handling of cases involving our respective nationals, and make a contribution to tourism. In this context, cited Csala case,4 noting that it was a current irritant in our relations and expressing the hope that the Hungarian Government would move toward its early resolution.
3. Under cultural contacts, observed that, as Lisle had already told Nagy, we were prepared rescind our Sept 1 1955 restrictions if the Hungarian Govt took reciprocal action. We hoped that greater scope could be given us in field of media exchanges, e.g. circulation of cultural bulletin and publications such as “Amerika“, now distributed in USSR and Poland, and mutual exchange of radio and television programs. Added that regularization of arrangements for treatment of performing artists would also be useful, as would increased scope for US participation in English-language instruction programs. Expressed concern that, precisely at this juncture the Hungarian authorities had seen fit to cancel IUCTG exchange program, and urged that Hungarian Govt consider whether it would not wish restore this program.
4. In economic area, noted that while Congress had not granted the President requested authority to grant most-favored-nation treatment to countries as Hungary, we had taken earlier action to liberalize export [Page 316] license controls, would as usual participate in next year’s International Trade Fair in Budapest, were discussing with appropriate Hungarian authorities American sanitary requirements affecting Hungarian meat exports to US, and were prepared exchange patent gazettes. Also noted that, while the situation was difficult, we hoped take up again at a suitable time question of financial claims.
5. Finally, in area of diplomatic problems, raised question of Embassy personnel ceilings and travel restrictions along lines indicated in Deptels 56033 and 71229.5
6. In concluding presentation, observed that, in many of these areas, Hungarian practice was more stringent than that of other socialist countries. We hope begin discussion of details with Hungarian authorities soon, and assumed that FonMin would appropriately instruct Deputy FonMin Szilagyi and Ambassador Hazi (head of Dept V) who would presumably have to bear main burden, in this sense.
7. In response, Foreign Minister said that he too could accept the general approach which had been outlined, that is, to negotiate on a pragmatic case by case basis in an effort to achieve specific improvements. Hungarian Govt would be prepared to discuss anything US wished to raise. He had to point out, however, that Hungarian authorities could not overlook the general international situation. They could not come to any agreements with the US of a political nature which would be misinterpreted by Hungarian people and their allies as representing tacit acceptance of US actions which government did not approve. Hungary must maintain posture of sincerity and consistency in this respect. When I asked him how he defined political agreements, since the four areas which I had described were essentially non-political, Peter indicated that particularly cultural field tended have political overtones. Moreover, too lenient treatment in Csala case would be misunderstood by Hungarian people under present circumstances. Should specific actions occur which would contribute towards an improvement of relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be able exercise more influence in the case.
8. In his view, Peter continued, the economic field seemed particularly suitable for progress at this point. Anything which would contribute to increased trade between Hungary and the US would be all to the good, and would lead to a real betterment of relations. He personally saw no reason why we should not make another effort to move towards a claims settlement, although the Hungarian negotiators, after the abortive round last spring, had reported to him that negotiations had reached [Page 317] a dead end. In any event, Hungarian Govt would be pleased to resume negotiations on claims at any time the US wishes.
9. Before I left, Peter requested that my presentation be summarized in aide-mémoire to be furnished to him as soon as feasible. I agreed and hope to have delivered to him start of business tomorrow morning. Text will be forwarded by airgram.6
10. Comment: In possible effort to appear more forthcoming than realities may actually permit, Peter may have been dispensing a certain amount of soft soap. Both he and Fock have emphasized their complete acceptance of pragmatic case by case approach towards resolution of outstanding problems between Hungary and US, despite the international situation to which they make reference in stock phrases. Neither Fock nor Peter brought up subject of Viet-Nam by name, a degree of forebearance which I had not expected but significance of which should not be overemphasized in evaluating actual prospects.
11. As soon as Szilagyi and Hazi return from their trip to Western Europe, Embassy will approach them with view to opening detailed discussions. We must expect, however, that any progress in achieving even minimal US objectives will follow a very measured pace. Hungarian authorities are unlikely overlook fact that, upon analysis, balance of practical advantage in nearly all of areas indicated other than those economic ones in which progress is least likely, falls on side of US. We may, however, expect a small initial gesture or two.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Munich, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw.↩
- For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, pp. 1125–1130.↩
- Hillenbrand reported on this meeting in telegram 622 from Budapest, November 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US)↩
- Csala, an American citizen of Hungarian birth, was arrested, convicted of espionage in March 1966, and sentenced to 6 years in prison. He was released in October 1968.↩
- Telegram 56033, October 16, and telegram 71229, November 17. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG–US)↩
- A copy of the aide-mémoire was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to airgram A–189 from Budapest, November 26. (Ibid.)↩