Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

87. Telegram from the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, January 15, 1965, 2 p.m.

2622. For the Secretary. I appreciate your going to such length to describe the background of your thinking on the reunification problem (Dept’s 1978).² You portray very well the present confused situation here, which reflects in exaggerated form the normal suspicion and sensitivity of the Germans—derived from their basic feeling of insecurity, and lack of confidence in themselves and in their future. Despite the current attraction of de Gaulle, every German knows that his security rests only on the U.S. Even the slightest doubt about our position sends them into endless rounds of speculation and questioning. During each major period of upset, and I have gone through approximately six of them in the twenty months I have been here, every old doubt and fear is reexamined. The public reverberations reach a peak of intensity—and then die down and our relations become normal again.

I realize that this is very vexing there in Washington. It is of course to us here. The Germans should have more confidence in us, as I told Schroeder yesterday.³ However, we are not likely to see any change in their basic mood. If we hope to preserve and build on our alliance with them—as the second most powerful nation—in many respects—in the Free World, we must continue to be patient with them. We must continue to try to reassure them, to avoid apparent abrupt changes in policy on vital matters affecting them without careful preparation and explanation. When we do speak, particularly in public, we should I believe stick close to the “boiler plate” the Germans are used to and that we know will work. If we have serious questions about changing the policy it describes, we should first take it up quietly with the government.

Your backgrounder has in many respects had a healthy effect here. Most serious observers are in agreement with the basic points you made. There have been many favorable reactions in the German press. Most responsible people appear to accept the proposition that any new reunification proposal should be carefully thought out, and that certain agreed positions should be reached in advance. Indeed, Schroeder is embarrassed that he is being portrayed as proposing initiatives that are not serious.

With respect to the question of borders, you may be interested to know that Fritz Erler is reported in today’s press as saying that Germany should discuss the Oder-Neisse border immediately with Poland. I myself have long been concerned at the German attitude toward borders, which I think is the one most disturbing subject of discussion here. I agree that the time may very easily come when we should speak out. I would not be willing, for example, to continue supporting an irridentist Germany. I would not be willing to see the 7th Army used as a pawn for Mr. Seebohm to take the Sudetenland. His formula of Heimatrecht plus self-determination is sheer aggression. If things get worse I think we might first threaten and then, if it continues, later publicly disassociate ourselves from any German hope of territorial gain.

It was not my intention in Embtel 2565⁴ to suggest that we work out something with the Germans on a reunification initiative following which we would obtain British-French agreement. What I intended to say was merely that we would be willing to sit down in a Four-Power meeting to attempt to work something out, i.e., as we do through the Ambassadorial Group.

I am quite in agreement with your proposals (A) and (B) as to what we should tell Erhard and Schroeder before Erhard’s visit to Paris. I would appreciate it, however, if you would confirm by immediate return telegram⁵ since I see Erhard at 4:30 our time, that you would be willing to include as a serious reunification initiative the Four-Power Council proposal as made by Schroeder, even though it is essentially a procedural proposal. Would your requirements for substance be met if the Four Powers could agree in advance of the proposal as to all of the variables which would be involved in the proposal itself, and at least the first and second round of questions the Soviets might put to the British, French and ourselves in the event the proposal were accepted, without necessarily bringing up to date a comprehensive substantive proposal such as the Herter Plan?⁶

I see no objection why you should not let it be known that you took reunification up with Gromyko as a result of Schroeder’s initiative in Paris, with the agreement of the other Foreign Ministers and with negative results. Schroeder has been briefing the German Foreign Affairs Committee and the Cabinet here, using material from your meeting with Gromyko which we have supplied him with Dept approval. This fact has become known in the press. If you do not consider that it might tend to dry Gromyko up on the subject in future discussions with you, I believe it would be very healthy for you to see that this fact gets into the public domain.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 32–4 GER. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Document 84.
3. McGhee reported on his meeting with Schroeder in telegram 2610 from Bonn, January 14. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF (MLF))
4. See footnote 7, Document 83 and footnotes 2 and 4, Document 84.
5. Instructions for McGhee’s discussion with Erhard were contained in telegram 1977 to Bonn, January 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–4 GER)
6. Reference is to the Western Peace Plan of May 14, 1959; see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 624–629.